THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ENTITLEMENT
David A. Super*
Debates over "entitlements" have lacked conceptual clarity because the
term has at least six analytically distinct meanings. The psychological "entitlements" that many attack are distinctfrom the legalistic "entitlements"that
others champion. Most importantly, however, entitlements are economic concepts. A benefit provided to all claimants meeting stated eligibility requirements can be termed a "responsive entitlement', its antithesis is a program
that arbitrarily caps participation. Similarly, a program whose benefits are
defined by the amount required to accomplish some specific purpose is a
'functional entitlement"; it may be juxtaposed with one providing only an
arbitrarysum. The market through which public sentiments and claimants'
needs govern the generosity of benefits and the number of recipients served
can be described in terms offamiliarsupply and demandfunctions. Responsive entitlements allow that market to clear. Artificially capping participation, by contrast, creates the same inefficiencies economists decry in pricecontrolled markets. Benefits lackingfunctional entitlements also may distort
private markets. Moreover, entitlements are crucial to maintainingpolitical
transparency. Without them, programs' scope, benefits, and eligibility requirements must be described in arbitrary terms few voters can comprehend.
Voters tend to assume programs are entitlements, overestimating the support
available to those programs' target populations. Confusion among types of
entitlements, and the complexity inherent in nonentitlements,further impedes
meaningful debate. Recognizing this, some liberals have sought to avoid
debate about costs by creating nonentitlements that they can slowly expand.
Conversely, some opponents of means-tested programs have shifted from attacking programs' funding to dismantling responsive and functional
entitlements.
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INTRODUCTION

Social historian Michael Katz has noted that the term "entitlement"
once "signified the solidarity of an expansive welfare state that extended
the rights and meaning of citizenship" but by the 1990s had "bec[o]me a
term almost as negative as 'welfare."" Although his characterization is
probably a fair generalization about contemporary American debates
over entitlements, this topic has provoked a remarkable degree of inconsistency across the political spectrum.
Looking back on the circumstances that led to passage of the 1996
welfare law,2 four prominent House Republicans declared that
Because recipients were guaranteed payments regardless of
their behavior, entitlement policy permitted or even encouraged dependent behavior such as nonwork and nonmarital
births. Moreover, as long as recipients had a legal right to benefits, it would be impossible to create the type of reciprocal welfare system conservatives wanted to establish.
Republicans saw clearly that entitlement blocked all serious
steps toward creating a system based on work and individual re-3
sponsibility. Hence the entitlement to cash welfare had to end.
In a similar vein, the budget the Bush Administration released in
February 2004 proposed to replace the individual entitlement to Medicaid with a block grant to states and similarly proposed to block grant
some or all of several other important programs for low-income people,
1. Michael B. Katz, The Price of Citizenship 324-25 (2001) [hereinafter Katz,
Citizenship]. "Entitlements plus the interest on the debt that our deficits demand are
acting like 'pacman:' gobbling up everything in the federal budget, so that soon there will
be nothing left to address people's nonentitlement needs," according to Robert Denham
of the Bipartisan Commission on Entitlement and Tax Reform. John K. Mahoney, Quick
Action on Entitlements Needed to Avert Fiscal Calamity: Gradual Policy Changes Now Will
Avoid Draconian Cuts in the Future, Nation's Cities Wkly., Dec. 12, 1994, at 14 (quoting
Denham) (internal quotation marks omitted).
2. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996
(PRWORA), Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105.
3. Nancy L. Johnson, Bill Archer, E. Clay Shaw, Jr., & J. Dennis Hastert, Welfare
Reform Has Already Achieved Major Successes: A House Republican Assessment of the
Effects of Welfare Reform 8-9 (1999) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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including housing assistance, child welfare services, and Head Start. 4 The
Bush budget also proposed broad "superwaiver" authority to override federal standards in numerous programs.
Other conservatives downplay the importance of entitlements. For
example, the Heritage Foundation's Robert Rector, a key outside architect of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act of 1996 (PRWORA), declared that "eliminating entitlement status
alone is not reform, or even a small part of reform. The impact of eliminating the entitlement nature of [Aid for Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)] has been greatly overrated."5
Still other conservatives, such as the Hudson Institute's Anna Kondratas, a former senior official in the Reagan and first Bush Administrations, find some value in programs structured as entitlements. Kondratas
urged that "[s]tates might consider whether [not] renouncing the individual entitlement status of Food Stamps[ ] might not better serve their
purposes" than a block grant, 6 and she praised the food stamp program's
7
moderating the effects of recessions.
Yet although many conservatives have criticized and sought to dismantle some entitlements, the rhetoric of entitlement remains attractive
to them. Most obviously, President Bush selected a name for his education initiative that mentioned only entitlement-"No Child Left Behind"-without any reference to its subject matter.8 And both Republicans and many Democrats have eagerly embraced sweeping business
subsidies structured as entitlements within the tax code. 9
Liberals, too, have taken widely varying approaches to the question
of entitlement to means-tested public benefits.1 0 Some see entitlements
4. OMB, Budget of the U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 2005, at 148-49, 154-55, 185
(2004) [hereinafter 2005 Budget]. House Republicans, although not the Bush
Administration, also proposed to give five states the option to convert the food stamp
program to a block grant. Personal Responsibility, Work, and Family Protection Act of
2003, H.R. 4, 108th Cong. § 602 (proposing amendment to Food Stamp Act of 1977).
5. Robert Rector, Heritage Found., Backgrounder No. 1075, Yet Another Sham
Welfare Reform: Examining the NGA Plan 7 (Mar. 18, 1996), available at http://
www.heritage.org/research/welfare/bg1075.cfm (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
The National Governors' Association's 1996 welfare reform proposals, to which Rector
refers, served as the basis for PRWORA. See id. at I (noting initiation of congressional
hearings on NGA proposal).
6. Anna Kondratas, Reflections on National Welfare Policy and State Reform Options
9 (Feb. 1, 1996) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Columbia Law Review).
7. Id. at 6-7.
8. George W. Bush, No Child Left Behind (2001), available at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/news/reports/no-child-left-behind.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
9. See infra note 199.
10. As discussed infra notes 53-54 and accompanying text, the political debate over
entitlements has focused with particular intensity on means-tested programs-programs in
which eligibility or benefit levels are inversely related to claimants' income and sometimes
resources-even though many of the largest entitlement programs are not means-tested
(e.g., Social Security and Medicare).
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as representing fundamental moral principles. Senator Daniel Patrick
Moynihan declared that PRWORA "terminates the basic Federal commitment of support for dependent children... putting those children at risk
with absolutely no evidence that this radical idea has even the slightest
chance of success." 1
Others, however, studiously avoid discussing entitlement in moral
terms. Robert Greenstein, director of the Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities and a leading opponent of PRWORA, wrote a thirteen-page paper in 1995 criticizing proposals to convert the food stamp program into
12
a block grant without ever mentioning "entitlements."
Obviously, the term "entitlement" has become highly emotionally
charged. Periodically, we are told that present and future budget deficits
can be blamed on the cost of "entitlements."' 3 More broadly, we are told
that the "culture of entitlement" threatens our very social fabric.1 4 Yet in
each of these contexts and many others, it is far from clear that the speakers and their audiences share a common understanding of what an "enti15
tlement" is.

11. 142 Cong. Rec. 20,900 (1996); see also, e.g., Peter Edelman, Searching for
America's Heart 140 (2001) (decrying PRWORA for creating a situation in which "no state
had any federally defined obligation to help needy children").
12. Ctr. on Budget & Policy Priorities, Should the Food Stamp Program Be BlockGranted? (June 25, 1995) [hereinafter Food Stamps].
13. "Like a weed run rampant, entitlement programs are taking over the Federal
budget, and unless they are brought under control, politicians and economists agree, no
hope exists for lowering the deficit in the long run." David E. Rosenbaum, Editorial,
Answer: Cut Entitlements. Question: But How?, N.Y. Times, June 8, 1993, at A22.
14. See, e.g., Dave Anderson, Changing a Culture of Entitlement into a Culture of
Merit, CPAJ., Nov. 2002, at 16, 16 (noting that characteristics of the culture of entitlement
include situations in which "[m]anagers no longer require[ ] results and corporations
stop[ I] demanding performance as a condition for keeping a job or getting a raise");
Marilyn Gardner, Will the "Culture of Entitlement" Give Way to the Age of Humility?,
Christian Sci. Monitor, Mar. 6, 2002, at 13 (criticizing the current sense of entitlement,
describing the "prevailing credo" as "[d]own with humility and fairness, up with privilege
and power").
15. Consider, for example, Professor Law's suggestion that the elimination of the
entitlement to cash assistance has contributed to low-income women entering the sex
trade. Sylvia A. Law, Commercial Sex: Beyond Decriminalization, 73 S. Cal. L. Rev. 523,
607-08 (2000). Because several things happened at once to cash assistance programs in
1995-1996, it is unclear to which of them she is referring. She may be saying that lowincome women no longer feel secure in the availability of cash assistance and hence feel
great pressure to find an alternative source of income for their families, even one they
would prefer to avoid. This is certainly plausible because of the supercharged antiwelfare
rhetoric of this period. But if this is the problem, the solution need not be legislative.
Alternatively, she may be referring to the new conditions being imposed upon the receipt
of cash assistance, such as time limits and work requirements. If so, a possible response
would be to modify those rules, leaving the basic structure of the program unchanged.
Then again, she could mean the elimination of a legal right to benefits. For this to have
affected significant numbers of women's behavior, however, those women must have a way
of learning that their legal rights have changed. Finally, she could mean that the women
are unable to receive benefits or that the amount of those benefits has shrunk to the point
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To a lawyer, an entitlement is a legally enforceable right.' 6 An entitlement program, then, would be a program that creates legally enforceable rights.1 7 That usage, however, although sensible enough, is generally
not what participants in legislative debates have in mind when they attack
or defend "entitlements."' 8 Since legislative intent is a central element in
determining whether a statute creates enforceable rights,19 lawyers need
to understand what "entitlement" means in public policy debates even if
that usage is not their own.
Moreover, defining a public benefit program as an "entitlement"
simply because it creates some legally enforceable rights is so broad as to
be practically useless. Claimants for benefits in programs funded under
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) clearly have some statutory rights: For example, recipients cannot be sanctioned for failing to
comply with work requirements if they lack child care for preschoolers 20
and have a right to receive assistance from secular providers when the
state elects to contract with religious organizations. 2' Yet calling TANF
an entitlement merely because of these paltry rights, and the few others
that may exist, would be plainly absurd. The scope of individual rights
that TANF offers is manifestly different from those in Social Security,
food stamps, farm price supports, and other programs commonly regarded as entitlements. Thus, even leaving aside legislative and policy
debates, some means of distinguishing among types of legal rights is
clearly necessary for the concept of entitlement to have any objective
value in analyzing public policy problems.
This Article seeks to disentangle these several types of entitlement,
considering their consequences separately as well as the relationships
that they no longer suffice to support their families. Here also, more details are needed to
clarify the argument.
16. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal
Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 Yale LJ. 1027, 1036-39 (1995) (emphasizing
the legal enforceability of rights); Darryl K Brown, Criminal Procedure Entitlements,
Professionalism, and Lawyering Norms, 61 Ohio St. L.J. 801, 803 (2000) (identifying
requisites of criminal procedure, such as discovery rights, expert witnesses, and jury trials,
as entitlements); Matthew Diller, Entitlement and Exclusion: The Role of Disability in the
Social Welfare System, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 361, 366 (1996) (emphasizing the importance of
legally enforceable benefits).
17. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538 (1985) (finding
that where terms of public employment create an "entitlement," employee has a legally
enforceable right to job that can be overcome only in accordance with the Due Process
Clause).
18. See infra Part I.A.
19. See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001) ("The judicial task [in
determining whether a statute creates a private right of action] is... to determine whether
[the statute] displays an intent to create not just a private right but also a private
remedy."); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 15 (1981) ("The initial
question before us, then, is one of statutory construction: Did Congress intend in [the
statute] to create enforceable rights and obligations?").
20. 42 U.S.C. § 607(e) (2) (2000).
21. Id. § 604a(e)(1).
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among them. Part I begins by distilling six analytically distinct definitions
of "entitlement"-as well as a few spurious ones-from the overheated
rhetoric that envelopes these issues. It then attempts to identify some
consistent relationships among these types of entitlement.
Part II analyzes the economics of entitlements. It begins by presenting an economic model of how benefit programs' rules and participation
are determined. It then compares the impacts of entitlement and nonentitlement structures on the administration of those programs, on claimants' incentives, and on the macroeconomy. It finds that many public
functions are almost inevitably administered through structures that meet
several basic characteristics of an entitlement. It then seeks to develop
general principles for determining when entitlement structures are and
are not appropriate. It concludes that while some aspects of entitlement
are essential for the effective management of many types of public functions and the reliable implementation of political choices, entitlement
structures do not necessarily imply liberal, generous, or unconditional
benefits. Thus, a central assumption of both liberal and conservative
thinking in this area is fundamentally flawed. Indeed, some prescriptions
for welfare programs offered by leading conservative critics are indisputably entitlements in some important senses of the word.
Part III explores the political dimensions of entitlement structures.
It finds that entitlements are essential to political transparency because
they allow programs to be described in terms intelligible to nonexperts.
Indeed, it finds that even in the absence of a legal entitlement, political
and legal arguments tend to assume one because of the difficulty in
describing nonentitlement programs coherently. It finds that both liberals and conservatives have taken advantage of the relative unintelligibility
of nonentitlement programs to pursue covert agendas to expand or eliminate programs.
The Article concludes that advocates of means-tested public benefit
programs, despite their sometimes intense rhetoric in support of entitlements, have in fact underestimated the political and practical importance
of entitlements. Those concerned about low-income people, however
much or little they are prepared to spend, should show more caution
about allocating those scarce resources to nonentitlement programs.
Although this Article illustrates its arguments primarily with reference to subsidies for low-income people, its analysis is applicable across a
wide range of spending programs and tax expenditures. Thus, while critics of some entitlement programs in recent times may have been disproportionately conservative and Republican, other programs-and even the
same programs in different eras-have had different constellations of opponents and supporters. The prescriptions here seek to advance a goal
that people of good will across the political spectrum should broadly
share: to make the most efficient and transparent application of
whatever resources society allocates to a given purpose.
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TAXONOMY OF ENTITLEMENTS

Policy debates about "entitlement" tend to produce more heat than
light, in significant part because they start from two fundamentally flawed
assumptions. First, scholars and advocates assume that the term "entitlement" has one, clearly defined meaning well known to all parties. Second, both their supporters and their critics tend to assume that entitlements are aberrations largely unique to the world of public benefit
programs.
This section demonstrates that the term "entitlement" has several,
quite different, meanings. Many programs are entitlements in some
senses of the word while not in others. 22 This section also shows that
some of the most important types of entitlement operate in ways familiar
from other areas of law and everyday life.
A. Six Types of Entitlement
At least six definitions of "entitlement" are pertinent to social welfare
programs such as those that were central to the 1996 welfare law. 23 These
same categories have close analogues in other spheres of economic and
political life. This section labels and describes these types while Part I.B
addresses a few additional meanings speakers apparently have in mind
when they discuss "entitlements." Because these latter definitions tend to
be either general epithets or amalgams of two or more of the primary
types discussed here, they are more impediments than aids to cogent
analysis.
1. Subjective Entitlement. - One aspect of an entitlement is a subjective feeling of security or self-assurance. From its earliest days, a primary
goal of the common law has been to induce a subjective sense of security. 24 People believing they have rights feel and act differently than those
25
believing their well-being is at the sufferance of others.
On the other hand, subjective entitlement can have a repellant side.
When we consider someone arrogant, we may say that "he acts like he is
22. A table accompanying this Article seeks to categorize many major federal
programs in this regard. See infra table.
23. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996
(PRWORA), Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105.
24. SeeJ.H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History 13-15, 413 (2d ed. 1979)
(describing early common law judges as extending the King's peace into previously lawless
countryside).
25. This is important in many contexts far removed from public benefits. Property
owners have advantages over renters that go far beyond the explicit terms of their fees. It
is not enough that our court system defends the financial interests represented in
contracts: We clearly recognize the importance of encouraging people to rely upon the
sanctity of contracts. When insurance companies or political leaders ask us to put our faith
in their hands, they are seeking to foster a sense of subjective entitlement to fair treatment
going well beyond any explicit promises they may be making.
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entitled." 26 Subjective entitlement can lead to ingratitude: When someone takes advantage of our generosity without ever giving thanks, we may
complain that she is treating us like an entitlement. Parents that foster
too strong a sense of subjective entitlement in their children may be said
to be spoiling them. More broadly, complaints about perceived subjective entitlements have figured prominently in criticisms of Generation X
27
and in some of the backlash against affirmative action.
Whether or not a given program is a subjective entitlement is a matter of individual perception. 28 As such, it cannot be directly controlled
by legislation, and individuals' perceptions may differ. Nonetheless, legislative and administrative choices, as well as public rhetoric, can contribute to or undermine subjective entitlements. Individual legal rights
("positive entitlements" 29 ) can contribute to subjective entitlements, as
can a set of straightforward and relatively non-discretionary program
rules.3 0 Perhaps the greatest determinant of whether a benefit becomes
26. See, e.g., Bob Woodward, The Agenda 338 (1994) (describing Democratic
Senator Bob Kerrey's condemnation of entitlement programs as reflecting a "corrosive
give-to-me, help-me attitude" in which individuals sought to be "protected from the
consequences of their own actions").
27. See, e.g., Maryanne George, Affirmative-Action Challenge Has Put U-M on Racial
Edge, Det. Free Press, Apr. 15, 1998, at IA (quoting a Native American student who
attributes opposition to affirmative action to "privileged white students [who] have a sense
of entitlement to attend a prestigious university"); Harold T. Shapiro, Affirmative Action:
A Continuing Discussion-A Continuing Commitment (Oct. 16, 1995), at http://
www.princeton.edu/pr/hts/speeches/9510-affirmative.html (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (describing opponents of affirmative action as opposed to "encourage[ing]
inappropriate feelings of group entitlement").
28. The table, infra, therefore does not seek to categorize any program as being or
not being a subjective entitlement: In each case, some claimants probably feel an
entitlement while others do not. One may reasonably speculate that a much higher
percentage of claimants regards Social Security as an entitlement than ever felt that way
about Aid to Families with Dependent Children, but proving that would require public
opinion surveys beyond the scope of this Article.
29. See infra Part I.A.3.
30. The latter is probably the more important of the two because claimants
experience program rules directly. Few public benefits claimants likely are aware of much
public benefits litigation. Thus, the mere fact that litigation may be under way cannot by
itself contribute to any subjective sense of entitlement. Although claimants have more
opportunity to receive an administrative fair hearing over disputed reductions or
terminations of benefits than they do to take claims to court, see Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254, 269-71 (1970) (requiring such hearings); 7 C.F.R. § 273.15 (2003) (describing
procedures for such hearings in the food stamp program), even fair hearings play little
role in most claimants' lives. For example, only about one in three hundred food stamp
households requests a fair hearing each year, and only about one in four of those prevails
even in part. See Jerry L. Mashaw, The Management Side of Due Process: Some
Theoretical and Litigation Notes on the Assurance of Accuracy, Fairness and Timeliness in
the Adjudication of Social Welfare Claims, 59 Cornell L. Rev. 772, 811-15 (1974) (arguing
that Goldberghad relatively little impact on AFDC's operation); Robert E. Scott, The Reality
of Procedural Due Process-A Study of the Implementation of Fair Hearing Requirements
by the Welfare Caseworker, 13 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 725, 760 (1972) (same); William H.
Simon, The Rule of Law and the Two Realms of Welfare Administration, 56 Brook. L. Rev.
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widely held as a subjective entitlement is the behavior of those dispensing
the benefit. Although this behavior can be influenced through numerous forms of public policy, it can be difficult to measure, particularly for
those not receiving the benefit. Thus, legislators, senior executive officials, and even the public at large may assume that a benefit is a subjective
entitlement for those who are eligible while the intended beneficiaries,
who must deal with surly, indifferent office staffs, feel nothing of the
kind. 3 ' One set of claimants, perhaps those in an area where a program
is well administered or those of a favored race or gender, may feel an
entitlement to a benefit that feels like a grudgingly dispensed gratuity to
32
others less fortunate.
The desirability of having potential claimants for a government bena subjective entitlement to that benefit depends on what
perceive
efit
kinds of behavior and attitudes one seeks to promote. If one believes a
high participation rate serves a broader public purpose, a subjective entitlement can help. 33 On the other hand, if one views participation in the
public program as an unfortunate departure from principles of personal
ensure
independence, undermining the subjective entitlement can help
34
that most people claim the public benefit only as a last resort.
777, 782-88 (1990) (finding that fair hearings and other results of procedural due process
adjudication did not suffice to empower systematically subordinated claimants); Lucie E.
White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing
of Mrs. G, 38 Buff. L. Rev. 1, 52-58 (1990) (same); David A. Super, Entitlement, CounterEntitlement, and Disentitlement: The Substantive Consequences of Programmatic
Structure (unpublished manuscript on file with the Columbia Law Review) (arguing that fair
hearing requirement does little to restrain the power of eligibility workers). To the extent
litigation may have contributed directly to the maintenance of a subjective entitlement at
all, it likely was primarily through cases requiring agencies to give claimants notices clearly
explaining their actions. See, e.g., Buckhanon v. Percy, 708 F.2d 1209, 1211-12 (7th Cir.
1983) (finding that state must provide notices clearly explaining its reasons prior to
reducing or terminating AFDC benefits); Eder v. Beal, 609 F.2d 695, 701 (3d Cir. 1979)
(requiring state to give beneficiaries advance notice allowing them to plan their affairs
before terminating eyeglass coverage in Medicaid). But see Gardebring v. Jenkins, 485
U.S. 415, 425 (1988) (finding that AFDC regulations did not give recipients a right to prior
notice of changes in the program rules affecting them); Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 130
(1985) (finding no right to notice of broad changes in food stamp eligibility rules even
when those changes require individualized calculations to be put into effect).
31. Frances Fox Piven & Richard A. Cloward, Regulating the Poor 150-51, 163
(1971).
32. See Susan Tinsley Gooden, All Things Not Being Equal: Differences in
Caseworker Support Towards Black and White Welfare Clients, 4 Harv. J. Afr. Am. Pub.
Pol'y 23, 23-24, 31 (1998) (finding large disparities in the supportive services eligibility
workers provide to white and African-American cash assistance recipients).
33. For example, without a sense of subjective entitlement, residents might dither
over whether to "bother" the fire department until a small fire grew to threaten their
neighborhood. A strong sense of subjective entitlement to public health services may be
crucial to averting epidemics when someone is exposed to dangerous infectious agents
such as bubonic plague.
34. Thus, for example, someone who calls the fire department several times a month
to get his or her cat out of a tree may be feeling too much subjective entitlement.
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People experiencing a subjective entitlement are more likely to be
more assertive when a program operates badly; depending on one's perspective, that may be a good or a bad thing. Voters may reward politicians who give them, or preserve for them, a sense of entitlement in a
public service or benefit that they value. Most of the time, however, the
subjective entitlement is likely to cause voters to take the benefit for
granted, with little inclination to reward anyone for its continued availability.3 5 On the other hand, the lack of a subjective entitlement allows
politicians to seek public gratitude when a benefit appears. 3 6
Prior to the 1960s, AFDC's administration was so highly discretionary
that it likely conveyed no sense of subjective entitlement even to most of
those who did receive payments. 37 Some states distributed AFDC checks
in state legislators' offices, presumably to help those legislators win recipients' gratitude and support. Building up a sense of subjective entitlement was an essential precondition to the rise of the welfare rights movement.3 8 This was at least as much a focus of its organizing as any
particular material or policy improvements. 39 On the other hand, to get
low-income people to accept the sharp, moralizing messages they wished
to convey through the welfare system, social conservatives in the 1990s
argued they had to break down this sense of subjective entitlement. 40
With benefit programs serving broad segments of the politically powerful middle class, the politics of subjective entitlement are quite different. Those advocating change in a program may seek to undermine the
sense of subjective entitlement in that program's benefits to enhance the
public's willingness to change the structure of that benefit (presumably to
take a more reassuring form). For example, proponents of replacing part
of the Social Security defined benefit system with defined contribution
individual accounts repeatedly emphasize the existing system's long-term
Sometimes we desire some but not all of the attributes of a subjective entitlement. For
example, we want people to feel entitled to call the police whenever they are threatened
with or victimized by a crime. Part of the job of the police is to make people feel secure in
their homes and walking the streets. On the other hand, we should not feel so entitled
that we fail to express appreciation to individual police officers who risk their lives for us.
And we should be sufficiently cognizant of the limits of what the police can do that we do
not take unnecessary risks, such as loitering after dark under shadowy freeway overpasses.
35. Few mayors, for example, get reelected for continuing to maintain sound fire
departments, although some likely are defeated for letting fire protection deteriorate.
36. If people felt an entitlement to a continuous supply of new post offices,
courthouses, highway projects, etc., they might consider politicians presumptuous to keep
showing up for ribbon cuttings.
37. See, e.g., Dorothy K. Newman et al., Protest, Politics, and Prosperity: Black
Americans and White Institutions, 1940-75, at 254-61 (1978).
38. See Piven & Cloward, supra note 31, at 196-98, 330-38 (attributing the explosive
increase in public benefits applications in the 1960s to changing attitudes among lowincome people).
39. Id.
40. See, e.g., Johnson et al., supra note 3, at 8-9.
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actuarial imbalance. 4 ' Yet when trying to avoid political damage from
having proposed changes in a popular broad-based program, politicians
may try to reassure the public that nothing that is being discussed should
in any way call into question the subjective entitlement to that program's
benefits. Thus, the same congressional Republicans who frequently remind the public of the Social Security system's long-term actuarial imbalance complain bitterly about Democrats' "Medi-scare" tactics in opposition to their proposals to modify Medicare-often neglecting to mention
that Medicare faces far worse fiscal difficulties than Social Security. 42 Bolstering the public's subjective entitlement helps take a program serving
the middle class off the political agenda.
2. UnconditionalEntitlement. - The term "entitlement" is sometimes
used to suggest a benefit that one need not earn or a benefit that is not
subject to conditions or reciprocal obligations. 43 Presumably having an
entitlement in the unconditional sense may contribute to the subjective
44
sense of entitlement.
This usage is more rhetorical than technical. In reality, designing an
entitlement without at least some reciprocal obligations is all but inconceivable. To begin with, programs generally want to require claimants to
cooperate in the eligibility determination process by providing informa45
tion and possibly appearing for interviews or submitting verification.
Programs also typically want to disqualify those who engage in various
kinds of misconduct, creating an implicit condition of good behavior on
46
eligibility for these programs' benefits.
41. See Peter A. Diamond & Peter R. Orszag, Reducing Benefits and Subsidizing
Individual Accounts: An Analysis of the Plans Proposed by the President's Commission to
Strengthen Social Security passim (2002), available at http://www.cbpp.org/6-1802socsec.pdf (on file with the ColumbiaLaw Review) (criticizing assertions that privatization
plans will "restor[e] long-term [fiscal] balance to Social Security").
42. See, e.g., U.S. Senate Republican Policy Comm., Democrats Resurrect "Mediscare" Tactics (1999), at http://www.senate.gov/-rpc/releases/1999/mc30399.htm (on
file with the Columbia Law Review).
43. See, e.g., Linda Gordon, Pitied But Not Entitled 288 (1994) ("'Entitlements' has
become a code word for undeserved benefits."). See generally Jayne Zanglein, Getting
Something for Nothing: Are Employee Benefits an Entitlement or a Gratuity?, 30 Tex.
Tech L. Rev. 627, 627-56 (1999) (examining Fifth Circuit cases concerning whether
employee benefits are entitlements or are provided at the will of the employer).
44. See Lawrence M. Mead, Beyond Entitlement 1, 46-64 (1986) (criticizing the
"permissiveness" of means-tested programs).
45. This may not strictly be true for all public services. Yet even the national parks are
available only to those who appear at an entrance during the hours they are open. Fire
departments wait for us to call-or neighbors to call on our behalf-and notify them of
the existence and location of a fire. More to the point, major means-tested and social
insurance benefits all have substantial eligibility determination systems.
46. Some of these disqualifications are explicit; others are not. Even municipal fire
protection services are likely to be conditioned on our not having savage dogs patrolling
the yard around the burning building and our not having stored large amounts of
explosive or poisonous chemicals in that building.
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On the other hand, the extent and nature of the reciprocal obligations that programs impose vary dramatically. Some appear to consider
programs with "few" conditions to be entitlements and other programs to
be something else. 47 The subjectivity of this approach obviously contributes to the emotionalism and frequent irrationality of debates about entitlements. It also suggests that programs under attack as inappropriate
entitlements may be able to defend themselves simply by publicizing the
conditions they already impose on benefits rather than by adding new
ones.
Some discussions of entitlement distinguish between the types of
conditions imposed on access to a public benefit. 48 For example, a program that imposes only those conditions that are necessary for the administration of the program might be seen as an entitlement, while programs
that require additional behavior to serve some broader social or governmental purpose escape that designation. By this definition, local fire protection services, public elementary and secondary education, public
parks, and a number of other basic services would be considered entitlements, although they are seldom described in those terms. Similarly,
some federal programs providing in-kind assistance, such as school meals,
do not condition eligibility on claimants having taken actions beyond
those necessary to operate the programs. 49 These programs, too, are not
commonly described as entitlements, presumably because they have few
active opponents.
47. See, e.g., Robert E. Rector, "Work" Bill with Crippling Potential, Wash. Times,
Oct. 2, 2002, at A15 (criticizing pending legislation as "reject[ing] the very concept that
welfare recipients should be required to earn benefits through constructive behavior" and
arguing that "[i]nstead, it would move us back to the old entitlement or 'one-way handout'
way of thinking."); Jason Turner & Robert E. Rector, Heritage Found., Backgrounder No.
1669, Under Senate Bill, Welfare Recipients Who Refuse to Work Would Still Get Cash
Benefits (July 18, 2003), available at http://www.heritage.org/research/welfare/
bg1669.cfm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing PRWORA as replacing
AFDC's "cash entitlements" with TANF's focus on "reciprocal obligation," in which "aid
would no longer be unconditional but would be linked to constructive behaviors").
48. The legal and normative merits of the conditions that the government may
impose on public benefits are beyond the scope of this Article. See Kathleen M. Sullivan,
Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1415, 1424-25, 1503-05 (1989) (suggesting
broad flexibility for the government to impose many types of conditions on eligibility for
public benefits).
49. Even here, the story is not perfectly clear. The National School Lunch Act and
the Child Nutrition Act do not impose behavioral conditions on individual recipients that
are not fairly directly related to the operation of these programs. See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1751-1791 (2000). On the other hand, local administrators in practice have
considerable ability to control what goes on in their schools and may use that authority to
impose behavioral requirements not authorized by the federal statute. See Heimberger v.
Sch. Dist. of Saginaw, 881 F.2d 242, 246 (6th Cir. 1989) (finding that children denied
school lunches for alleged misbehavior lack standing to challenge apparent violations of
the National School Lunch Act). Also, to the extent they are seen as benefits for providers
as well as children, they do impose some behavioral requirements. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.
§ 1766(a) (5) (requiring child care providers to comply with licensing requirements in
order to qualify for meal subsidies).
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The largest and more controversial means-tested programs-food
stamps, Medicaid, Supplemental Security Income (SSI), and the former
AFDC program-all include significant reciprocal obligations on claimants that go far beyond anything plausibly required to administer the programs. 50 Social insurance programs such as Old Age, Survivors' and Disability Insurance (OASDI, commonly referred to as "Social Security"),
Medicare, veterans' compensation, and unemployment compensation impose at least an obligation of contribution on the claimant (or one of her
or his close relatives) 5 ' and often other eligibility conditions as well.
In practice, when critics assail "entitlements" for their failure to impose reciprocal obligations on claimants, they typically are referring to
the major means-tested programs, 52 not social insurance programs, even
though both impose extensive conditions. 53 These critics implicitly either ignore means-tested programs' requirements of current work-related
activity-paid work,job search, participation in job-related training activities, or unpaid workfare 5 4-or value them far less than the requirements
Other programs do not impose reciprocal obligations on the federal level but allow
states to do so. See, e.g., id. §§ 8621-8628a (giving states broad flexibility to determine
eligibility for Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP) benefits).
50. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 2015(d), (i), (1), (in), (n) (2000) (disqualifying individuals or
households from food stamps for failure to comply with work, child support enforcement,
or other behavioral requirements); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396u-1(b) (3), 1396k(a) (1) (authorizing
states to disqualify adults from Medicaid for failure to comply with cash assistance
programs' work requirements or to cooperate with child support enforcement); id.
§ 1382c(a) (3) (J) (disqualifying blind and disabled persons from SSI if substance abuse is a
significant contributing factor to their disabilities); id. § 602(a) (19), (26), (44) (1994)
(repealed 1996) (disqualifying individuals from AFDC for failure to comply with work
requirements or cooperate with child support enforcement).
51. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(a)(1), (b)(1), (c)(1), (d)(1), (e)(1), (f)(1), (g)(1),
(h) (1), (i), 414, 423(a) (1) (A), (c) (1) (establishing contribution requirements for OASDI).
52. See, e.g., Amy L. Wax, A Reciprocal Welfare Program, 8 Va.J. Soc. Pol'y & L. 477,
485-86 (2001).
53. Alone among the largest means-tested benefit programs, the Earned Income Tax
Credit (EITC) generally avoids condemnation as an entitiement in the "unconditional"
sense of the word. Presumably this is because it is, by definition, limited to those with
earnings. Yet apart from that restriction, it is largely free of the behavioral requirements
that constrain claimants for other means-tested benefits. But see 26 U.S.C.
§ 32(c) (3) (B) (iii) (II) (2000) (requiring claimants to "care[ ] for [a foster child] as the
taxpayer's own child" in order to treat an otherwise claimable foster child as a "qualifying
child" for purposes of calculating the EITC).
54. Contrary to modern rhetoric portraying it as a "hammock" for lazy recipients, see,
e.g., Turner & Rector, supra note 47, at 1, AFDC was one of the most heavily conditioned
federal benefit programs. Long before the 1990s, claimants for AFDC could be
disqualified for failing to comply with a host of behavioral requirements, including
compliance with job search, workfare, or other work requirements; failure to cooperate
with efforts to establish paternity and enforce child support obligations; failure to live with
persons of a specified familial relationship; striking; and more prosaic forms of presumed
misconduct. 42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a) (19), (21), (26), (43), (44), 606(a), 607 (1994) (repealed
1996); Johnston v. Iowa Dep't of Human Servs., 932 F.2d 1247, 1249-50 (8th Cir. 1991)
(upholding sanction for failure to register for work against a family whom the state never
asked to do so). Under waivers the Bush and Clinton Administrations granted in the early
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of past work in the social insurance programs. Imputing non-reciprocity
into the term "entitlement," however, has allowed critics of means-tested
programs to distinguish between those programs, on the one hand, and
those for which eligibility depends on the work history of the claimant or
a close relative of the claimant. Thus, even though SSI and OASDI operate similarly in most respects-indeed, both involve significant redistributions of income-polemics attacking "entitlements" for their supposed
lack of conditionality or mutuality typically ignore OASDI.
Moreover, the more nearly unconditional programs-smaller public
benefit programs and an array of public services-also oddly often escape
condemnation as entitlements. This suggests that applying the term entitlement to mean "unconditional" benefit is multiply misleading: Not only
is unconditionality a relative rather than an absolute state, but it also implies a benefit whose worth exceeds some fairly significant threshold and
a rather subjective grading of what conditions are meaningful. Indeed,
55
even the process of assigning a worth to a benefit is rather subjective.
It would be tempting to dismiss the concept of an "unconditional
entitlement" as a thinly disguised epithet with no real substantive meaning. Yet although it often is applied capriciously or inaccurately, it does
clearly convey something of genuine significance. The notion of an exchange of obligations is essential to our basic economic and political theories. It is hardly surprising that many voters are more comfortable giving benefits in trade for work or other behavior 56-even if they regard
the trade as an unequal one-than they would be giving what they regard
57
as quite valuable benefits for nothing at all.
1990s, AFDC claimants also could be disqualified for failing to ensure that their children
attended school, for failing to get their children immunized, or simply for being a child
conceived by a woman receiving AFDC. Katz, Citizenship, supra note 1, at 90-100. The
fact that particular AFDC claimants were not required to take more specific actions as
conditions to receiving aid was far more the result of states' diffidence about operating
work and child support enforcement programs than of any rights claimants had under the
program's structure.
55. Among other things, the cost of interventions to address acute crises seems less
likely to receive scrutiny than responses to chronic problems. For example, the public cost
of extinguishing one small domestic fire, to say nothing of rescuing one beleaguered
climber from a mountain in a national park, likely far exceeds the typical monthly food
stamp, SSI, or cash assistance benefit. The cost of "emergency" agricultural subsidies could
fund the expansion of Medicaid to many uninsured low-income parents, yet the cost of the
two interventions are rarely compared even when Congress enacts farm "emergencies"
several years in a row.
56. See, e.g., Editorial, Reforming the Reforms, N.Y. Newsday, May 17, 2002, at A36
("The simple genius of welfare reform was the insistence that people work in exchange for
government checks.").
57. The fact that critics of programs may apply the term inappropriately suggests that
those programs' defenders have several possible strategies available to them: Add
conditions to a benefit, reduce the value of the benefit to the point that the public
becomes more comfortable providing it unconditionally, better publicize the conditions
already attached to the benefit, or better publicize how meager the benefit actually is. The
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The government has two major alternatives to a (relatively) unconditional entitlement. First, it could bind itself to provide aid on the condition that claimants take specified actions. The model here would be a
bilateral contract. This contractual model is common in the imagery of
conservative critics of means-tested programs. 58 Alternatively, the government could refuse to make any commitment to provide aid but insist that
if it does so, it will only be to claimants meeting certain conditions.
PRWORA adopted this barter model. 59 Whether the contractual or barter model is preferable depends on one's primary complaint against a
program providing relatively unconditional benefits. If the concern is to
get claimants to take the specified actions-perhaps look for work or perform unpaid labor-a system of mutual obligations will produce the most
results. If, on the other hand, the concern is that the program is dispensing too much aid, then the barter model is a logical response: It reduces
the number of people receiving aid while leaving the door open to further reductions, even at the expense of people willing to meet the specified conditions.

60

3. Positive Entitlement. - An "entitlement" also can be a legally enforceable individual right.6 1 This is the meaning of the term, denoted a
"positive entitlement," that is probably most familiar to attorneys. 62 It
relative strengths and weaknesses of these strategies are discussed below. See infra notes
292-298 and accompanying text.
58. See generally Mead, supra note 44.
59. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 607(e) (1) (2000) (denying benefits to persons who refuse to
work), with id. § 601(b) (disavowing any commitment to provide benefits even to
individuals who are willing to work).
60. As explained infra Part II, this barter approach-at least if it involves capping
participation in the program-is nonetheless likely to be quite inefficient.
61. Entitlements also can vest rights in other entities, such as states or businesses.
Indeed, some operate only with the joint actions of individuals and some larger corporate
entity. For example, Medicaid benefits are only payable if both a state elects to participate
and an eligible individual applies for benefits. This article will limit its discussion of
positive entitlements to those that accrue to individuals in jurisdictions that have made
whatever election is required to make that program available.
62. The current legal academic literature also focuses heavily on positive entitlements.
See, e.g., Timothy S. Jost, Disentitlement 23 (2003) (arguing that legal rights in Medicare,
Medicaid, and health-related tax provisions are fundamental to the provision of health
care); Todd G. Cosenza, Preserving Procedural Due Process for Legal Immigrants
Receiving Food Stamps in Light of the Personal Responsibility Act of 1996, 65 Fordham L.
Rev. 2065, 2070-72 (1997) (discussing impact of PRWORA on Goldberg v. Kelly entitlement
analysis); Cynthia R. Farina, On Misusing "Revolution" and "Reform": Procedural Due
Process and the New Welfare Act, 50 Admin. L. Rev. 591, 618-23 (1998) (asserting that
PRWORA's disclaimer of an entitlement to cash assistance was intended to eliminate
private rights of action, not to disclaim the existence of a property interest sufficient to
trigger due process scrutiny); Rebecca E. Zietlow, Two Wrongs Don't Add Up to Rights:
The Importance of Preserving Due Process in Light of Recent Welfare Reform Measures,
45 Am. U. L. Rev. 1111, 1121-24 (1996) (explaining how welfare rights came to be
understood as positive entitlements). Although much of this literature surrounds the 1996
welfare law, it also extends to other benefit programs the government provides. See, e.g.,
Eleanor D. Kinney, Procedural Protections for Patients in Capitated Health Plans, 22 Am.

HeinOnline -- 104 Colum. L. Rev. 648 2004

2004]

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ENTITLEMENT

also may be the definition people most commonly have in mind when
making moral arguments about society's duties to its less fortunate
63
members.
Under a series of cases in the late 1960s and early 1970s, a program's
being a positive entitlement has two specific implications. First, an individual denied benefits for reasons that an entitlement statute does not
authorize can sue to require that those benefits be provided. 64 Second,
the rights an entitlement creates are sufficiently choate to constitute a
property interest for purposes of the Due Process Clause. 65 The lion's
share of litigation over means-tested public benefits programs has in66
volved efforts to enforce positive entitlements in one of these two ways.
J.L. & Med. 301, 304 (1996) ("Courts have long recognized that beneficiaries of the
Medicare and Medicaid programs have a protected property interest in these programs.").
See generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Due Process Counterrevolution of the 1990s?, 96
Colum. L. Rev. 1973 (1996).
63. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 43, at 56-60 (describing the debates that led to the
creation of AFDC's predecessors).
64. See, e.g., Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 407-20 (1970) (finding a private right
of action for claimants to enforce the state plan requirements in the AFDC statute); King v.
Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 333-34 (1968) (holding that statutory provision assuring prompt
payment of aid to eligible claimants prohibits states from denying benefits on the basis of
criteria not authorized under federal law).
65. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261-62 & n.8 (1970) (noting that recipients'
interest in continued AFDC benefits was a property right triggering the protections of the
Due Process Clause). But see Glen 0. Robinson, American Bureaucracy: Public Choice
and Public Law 119 (1991) (seeing the derivation of legal entitlements from statutes as a
complex process of interpretation rather than a simple deduction); Richard B. Stewart &
Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1195, 1257-58
(1982) (suggesting that a plausible version of due process law could be constructed
without a formalistically defined concept of legal entitlement).
66. Other meanings are theoretically possible. A positive entitlement could be
property protected by the Takings Clause as well as the Due Process Clause. U.S. Const.
amend. V. The Court has given no support to this theory. See Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S.
587, 606-09 (1987) (finding no taking in rules denying AFDC to a family based on child
support payments legally limited to the benefit of one child notwithstanding argument that
this effectively compelled caretaker relative to divert those support payments to the benefit
of other family members); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 610-12 (1960) (finding no
taking in termination of employment benefits). But see id. at 622-23 (Black, J.,
dissenting) (disputing that conclusion). Similarly, the commitment to provide benefits to
identifiable people meeting specific requirements could be, but has not been, seen as a
contract protected from abridgement by the Contracts Clause. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl.
1. One could also see the granting of benefits to one person as creating a property interest
in all other similarly-situated persons under the Equal Protection Clause. U.S. Const.
amend. XIV, § 1. The Court has rejected any broad application of this principle. See, e.g.,
Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 238-39 (1981) (holding Congress's refusal to grant SSI
benefits to individuals in public mental institutions not funded through Medicaid does not
violate constitutional guarantee of equal protection); Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 56-58
(1977) (holding that preserving disability benefits for two eligible persons upon marriage
while terminating benefits if only one spouse is eligible does not violate equal protection).
It remains true, however, that members of a protected class are likely to gain a positive
entitlement to a benefit to which they had no other claim once it is provided to similarlysituated persons outside that class. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690-91
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The legal opposite of a positive entitlement is an entirely discretionary
government action 67 about which an individual has nothing more than a
68
unilateral expectation.
A positive entitlement need not, however, be unconditional or devoid of reciprocal obligations. Before 1996, the right to benefits under
AFDC was legally enforceable and recognized as a property right. Even
so, AFDC was also subject to numerous categorical, financial, and behav69
ioral conditions.
A positive entitlement's value thus depends on the nature of the underlying program it is protecting. How important is it really that the Spe(1973) (finding violation of Equal Protection Clause where military benefits granted
unequally on the basis of sex); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971) (finding
Equal Protection violation where welfare benefits were discriminatorily denied to aliens).
Most broadly, Professor Farina suggests that entitlements could trigger the full panoply of
rights Charles Reich envisioned as "the new property." See Farina, supra note 62, at
613-15 (discussing this possible meaning of a positive entitlement along with private rights
of action and property rights triggering due process protection); Charles Reich, The New
Property, 73 Yale LJ. 733, 783-85 (1964) (arguing that a broader conception of property is
essential to the preservation of civil liberties).
67. See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 835 (1985) (finding FDA had complete
discretion whether to take action against production and distribution of dangerous drugs).
68. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602-03 (1972) (finding that a claimant
must have more than a mere subjective expectation of continuation of a governmental
benefit in order to have a property interest). This rigid view that the Due Process Clause
only applies to deprivations of entitlements is hardly inevitable. See Cynthia R. Farina,
Conceiving Due Process, 3 Yale J.L. & Feminism 189, 265-66 (1991) (advocating a
contextualist approach to due process that varies the degree of due process protections to
reflect the extent of inequalities in power); Jerry L. Mashaw, Administrative Due Process:
The Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 61 B.U. L. Rev. 885, 888-95 (1981) (arguing that due
process law ought to vindicate the individual's right to participate in decisions affecting her
in important ways without regard to the presence of a positive entitlement); Richard B.
Saphire, Specifying Due Process Values: Toward a More Responsive Approach to
Procedural Protection, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 111, 139-43 (1978) (arguing Court's premising
recognition of due process upon positive guarantee "effectively drains due process of... its
substance as an independent constitutional restraint"); Robert S. Summers, Evaluating and
Improving Legal Processes-A Plea for "Process Values," 60 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (1974)
(same); see also Frank I. Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims in Procedural Due
Process, in Due Process: Nomos XVIII 126, 132-34 (J. Roland Pennock & John W.
Chapman eds., 1977) (suggesting that positivist definition of rights currently employed by
Court implies a "minimalist interpretation of due process"); Henry Paul Monaghan, Of
"Liberty" and "Property," 62 Cornell L. Rev. 405, 44041 (1977) (arguing that practice and
common social arrangements, as well as state law, plays a part in defining legal
entitlements sufficient to receive due process protection); William Van Alstyne, Cracks in
the "New Property": Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative State, 62 Cornell L.
Rev. 445, 483-84 (1977) (asserting general right to be free of arbitrary governmental
behavior without regard to whether the interests affected can be characterized as
entitlements).
69. See supra note 54; see also Jerry L. Mashaw, Due Process in the Administrative
State 33-34 (1985) (finding that Goldberg's requirement of administrative fair hearings
skewed the organization of public benefit programs in ways disadvantageous to claimants);
Simon, supra note 30, at 787 (same). Similarly, a positive entitlement need not give rise to
a subjective one. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
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cial Milk Program 7 0-providing half-pints to a few hundred thousand
children not receiving full school lunches-is a positive entitlement? The
value of a positive entitlement also depends considerably on the ease with
which claimants can enforce it and the extent of relief available. Rights
that a positive entitlement nominally protects can be lost because of rules
requiring exhaustion of cumbersome administrative remedies, 71 rules
preventing courts from correcting denials of rights that have taken place
before the claimant manages to get to court, 72 or allowing officials to
deny those rights in a substantial number of cases. 73 Some of the constraints on positive entitlements are program-specific; others cut across all
of public benefits law.7 4 Thus, the value of positive entitlements as a
group likely has eroded over the past three decades.
On the other hand, the complete absence of a positive entitlement
does not necessarily reduce the value of a benefit much if other political
or administrative factors will drive the government to continue to provide
it. A $400 check buys just as much whether the state was legally obliged
to write it or simply chose to do so. State and local governments routinely
take out and repay loans bound only by their "moral obligation" to do
so. 75 If bondholders can recognize the value in money that a state is likely
to pay, and is under great political pressure to pay, so too can claimants
for public benefits.
In sum, although a positive entitlement indisputably has value to
claimants, it is neither necessary nor sufficient to assure that they will
receive meaningful benefits. This may explain why neither supporters
nor opponents of PRWORA had much to say about positive entitlements

70. 42 U.S.C. § 1772 (2000).
71. See, e.g., id. § 405(g), (h) (precluding judicial review of most decisions of the
Social Security Administration that have not been rendered final through a multistep
administrative process); Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 674-75
(1986) (analyzing limitations on claimants' access to judicial review of adverse decisions in
Medicare); cf. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2000) (limitingjudicial review of federal agencies' actions to
final orders).
72. See, e.g., Edelman v.Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677-78 (1974) (holding that Eleventh
Amendment bars federal courts from ordering restoration of welfare benefits improperly
denied in prior periods).
73. See, e.g., Shands v. Tull, 602 F.2d 1156, 1160-61 (3d Cir. 1979) (finding only
"substantial compliance" with federal timeliness standards required of state agencies).
74. See, e.g., Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 73-74 (1985) (prohibiting even notice
relief in federal court where claimants have been unlawfully denied benefits but no
violation is ongoing).
75. E.g., Steup v. Ind. Hous. Fin. Auth., 402 N.E.2d 1215, 1218-19 (Ind. 1980)
(discussing state appropriations to pay bonds of state authority which the state had no legal
obligation to honor); Mass. Hous. Fin. Agency v. New Eng. Merchs. Nat'l Bank, 249 N.E.2d
599, 608-10 (Mass. 1969) (same); Utah Hous. Fin. Agency v. Smart, 561 P.2d 1052, 1056
(Utah 1977) (same); State ex rel. Warren v. Nusbaum, 208 N.W.2d 780, 801-02 (Wis.
1973) (same); Witzenburger v. State ex rel. Wyo. Comm. Dev. Auth., 575 P.2d 1100,
1117-18 (Wyo. 1978) (same).
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in the 1995-1996 debate. 76 A far subtler analysis of entitlement than
some lawyers have customarily offered is needed.
4. Budgetary Entitlement. - An "entitlement" under federal budget
process law is a program whose funding level is not ordinarily determined
through the annual competitive appropriations process. 77 Budget process law refers to entitlements more formally as "mandatory" or "direct
spending" programs. A formula of some kind written into permanent law
typically controls the amount committed to each budgetary entitlement.
In some cases, this formula may be as simple as a specified funding level
for each year with instructions about how those funds are to be allocated
among eligible claimants (e.g., states).78 More commonly, however, a
budgetary entitlement has eligibility requirements and a formula for determining the amount of benefits written into law or set administratively
79
under criteria specified by law.
Budgetary entitlements are considered "mandatory" spending because they are not conditioned on the enactment of appropriations legislation. 80 The budgetary opposite of an entitlement or mandatory program is a discretionary program. The laws creating, or authorizing, these
programs may contain detailed eligibility requirements and specifications
76. Indeed, while repeatedly disavowing any "entitlement" to benefits funded under
the block grant, the TANF statute also suggests (albeit without requiring) that states honor
another hallmark of the positive entitlement, the administrative appeal. 42 U.S.C.
§ 602(a) (1) (B) (iii).
77. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 622(9), 651(b), 900(c)(8), (17) (2000).
78. For example, 42 U.S.C. § 1397a gives states a budgetary entitlement to Social
Services Block Grants under Title XX of the Social Security Act, with 42 U.S.C. § 1397b
defining the share each was to receive of the $2.8 billion per year Congress designated for
the program in the early and mid-1990s.
79. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. §§ 2012, 2014, 2015, 2017, 2020, 2025 (2000) (setting out major
eligibility, benefit calculation, and administrative reimbursement requirements of the food
stamp program).
80. A law creating a budgetary entitlement establishes sufficiently clear legal rights
that unsuccessful claimants could successfully sue for benefits in the Court of Claims. For
example, should eligible claimants be denied Medicaid assistance due them, they
presumably could prevail under the requirement "that such assistance shall be furnished
with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals." 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8). If no
funds appropriated for that program were available, those benefits would be paid from the
permanent unlimited appropriation for judgments against the United States. 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2414, 2517 (2000). Thus, the law creating those enforceable rights to benefits is an
exercise in "direct spending," i.e., no further action is required for the funds to be made
available.
This does not, however, mean that positive entitlements and budgetary entitlements
are synonymous. Although some positive entitlement generally is required for a program
to be a budgetary entitlement, those rights may be held solely by states as is the case in the
TANF, SCHIP, and Social Services Block Grants. In these cases, no individual positive
entitlement exists. Even where individuals do have positive entitlements, if the program's
operation depends in the first instance upon state or local units of government opting to
participate-as in the case of Medicaid, food stamps, and the child nutrition programsthen any individual positive entitlement is conditional on those units exercising their
options.
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for benefit levels, but they lack any legally enforceable right to benefits.
Thus, if appropriations run short, the program must reduce benefits, establish waiting lists, or shut down altogether.
The distinction between mandatory and discretionary programs is
important for several reasons. First and most obviously, mandatory programs are generally immune from shortfalls in appropriations resulting
from delays in the appropriations process or political impasses.
Mandatory programs' advocates thus are less vulnerable to annual political rent-seeking8 l behavior from legislators, and their inability to meet
demands for rents is less likely to result in immediate damage to these
programs.
Second, budget process law does not charge spending for mandatory
programs against the annual caps imposed on appropriations. This
largely eliminates any incentive for appropriators to limit funding for
these programs.8 2 Recent presidents and congresses of both parties have
found tightening the caps on annual appropriations one of the least painful and contentious ways of reducing spending.8 3 Thus, exemption from
these caps can be an important advantage.
Finally, the Budget Enforcement Act of 199084 groups mandatory
programs together with taxes for purposes of its "pay as you go" requirement.8 5 Thus, an increase in mandatory spending may be offset with a
decrease in mandatory spending or an increase in revenues.8 6 Similarly,
reductions in entitlements can pay for tax cuts. When Congress is following "pay-go" rules, mandatory programs come under scrutiny when members seek to cut taxes, ratify revenue-reducing trade agreements, or in8 7
crease spending on other entitlement programs.
While important procedurally, budgetary entitlements are exceedingly difficult to describe in a meaningful way to those not steeped in
88
congressional procedure.
81. See infra text accompanying note 245.
82. Indeed, some statutes creating mandatory programs contain their own ongoing
appropriations, eliminating any occasion to go through the appropriations process. See,
e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 603(a) (1) (E) (establishing ongoing appropriation for TANF block grants
during the life of their original authorization).
83. E.g., Pub. L. No. 104-19, § 2003, 109 Stat. 194, 247 (1995); Pub. L. No. 103-66,
§ 14002(a), 107 Stat. 312, 683 (1993); Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 13111, 104 Stat. 1388, 1388602 (1990).
84. Pub. L. No. 101-508, §§ 13001-13401, 104 Stat. 1388-573, 1388-573 to -628
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 15, 31 & 42 U.S.C.).
85. 2 U.S.C. § 902 (2000).
86. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 644(b) (1) (A)-(B), (E) (allowing various budgetary
requirements to be met by offsetting changes in revenues and budgetary entitlements).
87. See generally infra Part III.B.
88. See, e.g., 142 Cong. Rec. 18,485 (1996) (statement of Sen. Bradley) (describing a
mandatory block grant as "transferring pots of money from one group of politicians to
another group of politicians without regard to need, rules or accountability"); id. at 18,488
(statement of Sen. Daschle) ("We are talking for the most part about discretionary
programs here that are in large measure underfunded today.... [I]f they do not have the
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5. Responsive Entitlement. - Many "entitlements" are funded based
on the number of eligible people seeking benefits and the amount for
which they are eligible. 89 Funding for these programs therefore rises and
falls based on need without any further legislative action. These responsive entitlements promise to meet the needs of all eligible claimants.
Thus, a promise to "leave no child behind" 90 is a promise of a responsive
entitlement.
The alternative is to cap program expenditures at a fixed amount.9 1
If demand appears likely to exceed available funds, the program's options
include reducing benefit levels, establishing waiting lists or other systems
for prioritizing claimants, or simply operating the program until it exhausts its funds and then shutting it down.
By definition, programs funded with discretionary appropriations
cannot assure claimants of a responsive entitlement. 9 2 On the other
hand, if appropriations are fully adequate to meet all valid claims in a
year, a discretionary program may operate as a responsive entitlement in
that year. The Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) is discretionary 3 but had sufficient funds to
serve all eligible claimants for several years prior to the recession of
2001.94 To much the same effect, if political reality makes passage of any
necessary supplemental appropriation a virtual certainty, a discretionary
95
program effectively becomes a responsive entitlement.
resources, if we do not have the safety net, if they do not have the opportunities to access
those programs, then ... they are meaningless.").
89. See, e.g., Rebecca M. Blank, It Takes a Nation: A New Agenda for Fighting
Poverty 99 (1997) (describing AFDC as it existed before PRWORA); Joel Handler, The
Poverty of Welfare Reform 135 (1995) (comparing AFDC with capped programs that ran
out of funds during the Great Depression); Tom Joe & Cheryl Rogers, By the Few for the
Few 17-18 (1985) (discussing New Deal "entitlement" programs).
90. See supra note 8.
91. In practice, because the number of participants is easier to track and control in
most programs than the amount spent on those participants, agencies commonly cap
participation at a level that will allow no more than the desired level of expenditures based
on projected average costs per recipient.
92. See supra Part I.A.4. Medicaid funds are subject to appropriations in state
legislatures. Although those appropriations sometimes prove inadequate, the alternative
to a supplemental appropriation-shutting down the Medicaid program for the remainder
of a state's fiscal year-is clearly unthinkable and probably contrary to federal law. See
Coalition for Basic Human Needs v. King, 654 F.2d 838, 841 (1st Cir. 1981) (requiring
State to pay AFDC benefits even in face of fiscal difficulties); Knoll v. White, 595 A.2d 665,
668-69 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1991) (finding state obligation to continue paying federally
funded public benefits even in absence of state legislative appropriation).
93. See 42 U.S.C. § 1786(a) (2000) (limiting WIC spending to the amounts
appropriated by Congress).
94. See, e.g., OMB, Budget of the U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 2002, at 110 (2001)
(proposing appropriation of $4.1 billion to serve 7.25 million people monthly in 2002);
OMB, Budget of the U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 2001, at 256 (2000) (proposing
appropriation of $4.1 billion to fulfill President's goal of "full participation in WIC").
95. For example, food, fuel, ammunition, combat pay, and other necessities for
fighting a war are all subject to appropriations, but the Pentagon quite sensibly treats them
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Conversely, some mandatory programs are capped and thus are not
responsive entitlements. AFDC's statute included a cap for a few years in
the 1960s when participation was growing explosively. 96 Since 1977, the
Food Stamp Act has included various types of caps, none of which has
97
ever compelled a reduction in benefits.
Laypeople have enormous difficulty comprehending programs with
no responsive entitlement. When told that meeting certain eligibility criteria is a necessary condition to receiving a particular benefit, the public
assumes that meeting that criteria is also a sufficient condition. Unfounded assumptions of responsive entitlements permeate legal and policy debates about public benefit programs. 98 Indeed, even courts adjudicating cases involving discretionary programs strike down state rules
rationing benefits on the grounds that some of those found less needy are
needy nonetheless. 99 However noble these sentiments might be, in the
absence of a responsive entitlement they largely involve shifting resources
from one set of needy claimants to another, possibly less needy one.
6. FunctionalEntitlement. - Another understanding of entitlement is
that it is a guarantee that the program will meet some qualitatively definable need of its beneficiaries. These "functional entitlements" are perhaps
more often described as "standards" than as "entitlements."1' 0 0 For example, courts, policymakers, and analysts often assume that AFDC benefits
provided the minimum amount necessary to sustain a family.' 0 1 Food
stamps are assumed to provide enough to purchase a minimally adequate

as responsive entitlements since it has no doubt it can win passage of any supplemental
appropriations it needs.
96. Edelman, supra note 11, at 72, 79-81.
97. See, e.g., Food Stamp Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-113, § 18(a)-(c), 91 Stat. 958,
979 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2027(a) (2000)).
98. See infra Part III.B.1.
99. E.g., Clifford v. Janklow, 733 F.2d 534, 540-41 (8th Cir. 1984) (rejecting state's
efforts to reduce benefits in low-income home energy assistance program to claimants
receiving federal housing subsidies); Crawford v. Janklow, 710 F.2d 1321, 1327 (8th Cir.
1983) (similarly rejecting efforts to completely exclude claimants receiving federal housing
subsidies).
100. See, e.g., 142 Cong. Rec. 18,483 (1996) (statement of Sen. Kerry) (equating
denial of food stamps to children with denying them "a minimally nutritious diet"); 141
Cong. Rec. 8501 (1995) (statement of Rep. Kennelly) (opposing proposed child nutrition
and child welfare block grants by insisting that in "the School Lunch Program, the
elimination of standards put at risk the whole point of the program-providing nutritional
meals" and worrying that "the elimination of minimal standards in child welfare
programs . . . could mean increased numbers of abused children").
101. See, e.g., 142 Cong. Rec. 18,479 (1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg)
(describing AFDC as a "guarantee that poor children in this country would not starve"); id.
at 18,482 (statement of Sen. Mikulski) (similarly assuming that vouchers replacing AFDC
benefits would be enough to "ensure that the basic subsistence needs of children are
met").
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diet. 10 2 Medicaid is assumed to assure access to necessary health care
10 3
services.
In fact, none of these assumptions is valid. The AFDC statute vaguely
suggested that states should determine how much a family would require
to meet its basic needs' 0 4 but never required states to pay that amount.
By the early 1970s, the Supreme Court had made clear that it would not
impose such a functional entitlement.10 5 The Food Stamp Act of 1964
did indeed purport to assure households of a minimally adequate diet.
When the D.C. Circuit took some tentative steps towards enforcing that
requirement, 10 6 however, Congress stripped that language from the statute.1 0 7 In 1985, the Supreme Court disavowed any functional entitlement in Medicaid, holding that states are largely free to deny indisputably
necessary services. 10 8 Thus, the opposite of a functional entitlement is a
102. See, e.g., John Caniglia, Agents Focus on Store in Huge Food Stamp Fraud Case,
Cleveland Plain Dealer, Jan. 14, 2003, at B1 ("The food stamp program is meant to ensure
that low-income families and children have a healthy diet."); Howie Carr, Cardinal's
Welfare Views Conflict with His Flock, Boston Herald, Oct. 15, 1995, at 10 (arguing that
the continued availability of food stamps ensures that children will not be "starving" when
cash assistance is terminated).
103. See, e.g., Frank R. Jose et al., Editorial, Health Commitment Must Be Preserved,
Seattle Times, Aug. 30, 1995, at B5 (describing Medicaid as having been "established to
ensure that all Americans receive necessary health care").
104. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(23) (1994) (repealed 1996).
105. See Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 413-15 (1970) (declining to interpret
statutory provision requiring states to update AFDC standards of need as compelling them
to make those standards adequate).
106. Rodway v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 514 F.2d 809, 818 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (requiring
food stamp program to ensure recipients can obtain "a nutritionally adequate diet"). The
Food Stamp Act continues to set benefit levels in a way designed to allow claimants to
purchase a particular amount of food, but that diet is adequate only under several quite
unrealistic assumptions. See Mary Ellen Natale & David A. Super, The Case Against the
Thrifty Food Plan as the Basis for the Food Component of the AFDC Standard of Need, 25
Clearinghouse Rev. 86, 88-91 (1991) (arguing that the "thrifty food plan" developed by
the USDA is nutritionally deficient and is based on faulty assumptions regarding lowincome households' ability to obtain and prepare food). Thus, it remains in part a
functional entitlement, but a somewhat defective one.
107. H.R. Rep. No. 95-464, at 246 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1978, 2191
("The food stamp program is still a significant nutritional benefit, but is no longer, if it
ever was, in and of itself sufficient to provide all the nutrition a participating household
should have in order to remain healthy."). Although no longer guaranteed, a functional
entitlement to an adequate diet remains the benchmark against which many judge the
program. "Even without any of the cutbacks the Reagan Administration plans to make in
the Food Stamp Program, the current allotments do not entitle the vast majority of
recipients to a nutritionally adequate diet." Marian Burros, Cutting the Food Stamp
Program Could Mean Even Poorer Diets for Some, Wash. Post, Feb. 12, 1981, at El; see
also Group Says Food Stamps Don't Assure Good Diet, L.A. Times, Oct. 19, 1985, at 10
(quoting Food Research and Action Center research finding that in major metropolitan
areas, a minimally nutritious diet cost 26% to 54% more than food stamp allotments
provided).
108. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 303 (1985) ("[T]he benefit provided through
Medicaid is a particular package of health care services ..... not 'adequate health care.'").
But see, e.g., Weaver v. Reagan, 886 F.2d 194 (8th Cir. 1989) (requiring state Medicaid
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benefit whose level is set arbitrarily, without regard to the cost of achieving any particular mission or function.
Although relatively rare in public benefits law, 10 9 the equivalent of
functional entitlements is the norm in numerous other settings. An automobile assembly plant is not simply given a fixed sum with which to
purchase wheels (the equivalent of a positive entitlement); it has a functional entitlement to four wheels plus a spare for each car it is building.
To be sure, it likely has a budget with which it is expected to obtain the
necessary wheels. Whatever the consequences of exhausting that budget
may be, however, they do not include sending cars to showrooms without
wheels. To the same effect, fire departments offer a functional entitlement to extinguish fully any dangerous fire: No one would suggest that
firefighters leave with a house still ablaze at the end of an arbitrary period
of time.
A functional entitlement is a definition of what beneficiaries will receive from a program. If that definition is legally enforceable, the program then is also a positive entitlement. If the function the benefit performs is an important one, it may give recipients some sense of subjective
entitlement. A functional entitlement need not be a responsive entitlement or a budgetary entitlement; indeed, most probably are not.
A functional entitlement is comprehensible to the layperson without
a great deal of programmatic or economic knowledge. Understanding
program to cover AZT for AIDS patients because it is medically necessary); White v. Beal,
555 F.2d 1146, 1151 (3d Cir. 1977) (recognizing broad discretion in distribution of
medical services under Medicaid but holding that manner of distribution must bear a
rational relationship to the underlying federal purpose of providing services to those in
greatest need). Medicaid does provide a functional entitlement for children through its
early and periodic screening, diagnosis, and treatment (EPSDT) component. See 42
U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(4)(B), (r) (2000); see also, e.g., Mitchell v. Johnston, 701 F.2d 337,
349-51 (5th Cir. 1983) (allowing state to deny dental services to children only upon a
showing that those services are unnecessary).
109. Designing programs often involves a trade-off between functional and responsive
entitlements. With the budget likely to be available to a new program, corners often must
be cut either as to how much of a benefit is provided or as to how many people can receive
the benefit. Housing assistance programs were designed as functional entitlements-with
clear standards about housing quality and affordability. When the supply of unsubsidized
low-cost housing shrank dramatically during the last quarter century, these programs lost
ground in their effort to assure safe and affordable housing to low-income people. AFDC,
on the other hand, operated as a responsive entitlement but handled budget problems by
allowing the real value of benefits to shrivel. The result in most states was a responsive
entitlement to an arbitrary, grossly inadequate sum of money.
Numerous discretionary programs-those that lack budgetary entitlements-offer
functional entitlements. E.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437a(a)(1), 1437d(f) (capping assisted
housing rents at thirty percent of households' income and imposing quality standards).
Few, however, purport to provide responsive entitlements. E.g., id. § 1437(a) (2) (expressly
disavowing any federal commitment to assure housing for all or even most of those in
need). This pattern reflects the fact that it is quicker and easier to reduce the number of
people served in response to an appropriations deficiency than it is to scale back the value
of the benefit provided.
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the functional significance of an arbitrarily defined positive entitlement,
on the other hand, is exceedingly difficult.11 0 This is especially true for
persons with little appreciation for the financial and other stresses lowincome people face-including mostjudges, legislators, and other senior
policymakers."' And commentators trying to construct rational arguments about public benefits issues are loath to begin their analyses with
the admission that the amount of the benefits whose allocation they are
addressing is fundamentally irrational. 112 It thus is far easier to assume
that each program offers a functional entitlement that seems consistent
with that program's general area of concern. This understandable but
flawed assumption has contributed mightily to misunderstandings about
means-tested public benefit programs.
B. Some Spurious Definitions of "Entitlement"
Some discussions of these programs employ the term "entitlement"
informally with a few other meanings. Some critics apply it to meanstested programs generally. 1 3 This seems unhelpful with other, more precise terms available for the same purpose. Moreover, as is developed at
more length below,'1 4 many means-tested programs are entitlements in
only a few respects-or none at all. Conversely, the federal government
spends far more on non-means-tested programs that are entitlements15in
most senses of the word than it does on all means-tested programs.'
110. Although we comprehend and discuss many positive entitlements-the right to a
trial by jury, the right to counsel, etc-upon close examination the best-understood of
these generally are functional entitlements, too. If litigants' legal rights included only a
fixed number of hours ofjurors' or lawyers' time, only those with some expertise in the
conduct of trials could determine what those rights were likely to accomplish.
111. When a court is asked, for example, to overturn a practice that relies on an
unlawful attribution of income to reduce families' AFDC benefits, it naturally wants to be
able to assert that it has done something more than increase the family's income from one
arbitrary, grossly inadequate sum to another. Similarly, when granting food stamp
households a more substantial deduction for high shelter costs, members of Congress want
to be able to claim they are eliminating, rather than just ameliorating, the conflict between
heating and eating. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 97-106, at 257 (1981) (recounting member
taking a position "to avoid forcing elderly people to choose between heating or eating"); S.
Rep. No. 96-236, at 17 (1979), reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 939, 955 (suggesting that
Senate proposal would prevent elderly people from having to choose between an adequate
diet and paying their shelter and medical costs).
112. See, e.g., Andy Sher, Bush Proposes Flexibility for States on Medicaid,
Chattanooga Times Free Press, Feb. 1, 2003, at Al (quoting aide to Senate Majority Leader
Frist as saying that Medicaid will "ensure continued access to quality health care").
113. See, e.g., 141 Cong. Rec. 38,110 (1995) (remarks of Rep. Meyers) (vaguely
characterizing a variety of means-tested programs as an "entitlement system").
114. See infra table.
115. The Congressional Budget Office projects that the two biggest non-means-tested
mandatory programs-Social Security and Medicare-will together spend $11.5 trillion of
a total of $18.4 trillion that the federal government will devote to budgetary entitlements
during fiscal years 2005 through 2014. Overall, non-means-tested budgetary entitlements
will spend more than three times as much as their means-tested counterparts over this
period. See Cong. Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2005
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Another unhelpful usage of the term "entitlement" is to designate all
government benefits whatsoever. When conservative critics of government argue that taxation to fund "entitlements" is improper redistribu1
tion of income, they likely have no particular type of program in mind. 16
Since their concept can readily be captured by generic terms like "public
benefits," little analytical purpose is served by applying the term "entitlement" to all such payments in the budget.
Finally, some seem to define entitlements as programs that are not
block grants. This meaning certainly can be gleaned from the welfare
debates of 1995-1996 and subsequent commentary. Block grants, however, vary considerably, with some (including TANF) qualifying as entitlements under some definitions. Block grants also involve federalism and
financial management issues that are quite independent of the question
of entitlement or disentitlement. 17 In recent years, the purpose of block
grant proposals often appears to be eliminating either a responsive entitlement 1 t 8 or a functional entitlement.1 19 Thus, it often will be more useful analytically to juxtapose a block grant with the particular type of entitlement it would negate.
II.

THE ECONOMICS OF ENTITLEMENTS

Understanding the practical consequences of entitlement and
nonentitlement structures can help policymakers improve the efficiency
of benefit programs in allocating the scarce funds society makes available
to them. Particularly important to this inquiry are the three definitions
of "entitlement" advanced in the last section-unconditional, responsive,
to 2014, at 57 (2004), available at http://www.cbo.gov (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
116. See, e.g., Larry P. Arnn, Claremont Inst., The Meaning of American Citizenship
(1997), at http://www.claremont.org/writings/970515arnn.html (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (criticizing other conservatives because "[flew oppose entitlements root and
branch" as illicit redistributions of wealth). For a more analytical approach to this
argument, see Richard A. Epstein, Takings 306-07 (1985).
117. See infra notes 179-186 and accompanying text.
118. The successful proposal to convert AFDC to a block grant in 1996 and the
unsuccessful proposals in 1995-1996 to block grant Medicaid, food stamps, child nutrition,
part of SSI, and child welfare services all essentially were efforts to end those programs'
responsive entitlements. By transferring substantial authority over the programs to the
states at the same time they capped funding, these proposals were less obvious, and less
vulnerable to political attack, than simple caps. President Bush's current proposal to give
states the option to replace Medicaid with a block grant is similarly in significant part an
effort to end Medicaid's responsive entitlement. See OMB, Budget of the U.S.
Government, Fiscal Year 2004, at 126-27 (2003) [hereinafter 2004 Budget] (describing
President Bush's Medicaid block grant proposal).
119. The failed efforts to block grant child welfare services, child nutrition, and WIC
in 1995 would have eliminated functional entitlements in those programs. President
Bush's current proposals to create mandatory or state-option block grants in place of
Medicaid, Head Start, child welfare services, and Section 8 housing vouchers similarly
would eliminate most or all of those programs' functional entitlements. See id. at 126-27,
130-31, 165-66.
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and functional entitlements-that are fundamentally economic concepts.
Together, the conditions on, amount of, and availability of a benefit
largely determine its economic impact.' 20 This section offers an economic analysis of the impact of designing programs with these three types
of entitlement features. 121 It begins by offering a rigorous economic
model for analyzing the way that public preferences and potential claimants' needs dictate the rules and participation in public benefit programs.
It finds that these two functions operate in a manner closely akin to that
in which producers' supply curves and consumers' demand curves determine equilibrium prices and quantities in private markets. It then demonstrates how responsive entitlements, and often functional entitlements,
foster greater economic efficiency in the same way that free markets most
efficiently set the prices of goods and services in the private sector.
From this foundation, this section explores other economic effects of
relying upon entitlement structures for public benefit programs. Finally,
it considers the circumstances under which nonentitlement structures are
more appropriate for public endeavors.
A. Modeling the Market for Means-Tested Benefits
Many members of Congress who typically espouse market-oriented
approaches to public policy issues have become staunchly opposed to
12 2
programs that operate as open-ended, or responsive, entitlements.
120. The liberality of a program's benefit structure is a function of how much it
provides-i.e., whether it is a functional entitlement at all and, if so, how ambitious the
functional commitment is-and what one must do to obtain the benefit. In a perfectly
commoditized world, one could attach a cost to complying with behavioral conditions and
compare that cost to the benefits the program provides. See infra Part III.B.2. From the
government's point of view, the cost of a program depends both on how many potential
claimants the program screens out with its eligibility conditions and the value of the
benefits that it provides to those who do qualify.
121. The two legal types of entitlement described in Part II.A-the lawyer's positive
entitlement and the legislator's budgetary entitlement-are important as means of
implementing one or another of the economic forms of entitlement. Positive entitlements
promote efficiency by ensuring that agreed-upon rules are followed and thus by limiting
and focusing policy debates. Budgetary entitlements, in turn, promote efficiency as well as
political transparency by limiting opportunities for political rent-seeking. Each, however,
has little inherent substantive structure that can be studied.
Psychology certainly plays a role in claimants' and program administrators' behavior;
subjective entitlements therefore would be appropriate elements of this analysis. As noted
supra Part I.A.1, however, determining which program designs will induce how many
claimants to perceive a subjective entitlement is an inexact science at best and requires
knowing a great deal about the ground-level administration of a program as well as the
public rhetoric surrounding it. A detailed discussion of the role of subjective entitlements
is beyond the scope of this article. See David A. Super, Offering an Invisible Hand: The
Rise of the Personal Choice Model for Rationing Public Benefits, 113 Yale L.J. 815, 825-32,
836-44 (2004) [hereinafter Super, Offering an Invisible Hand] (discussing ways of
reducing participation in means-tested programs in part by undermining subjective
entitlements).
122. E.g., 148 Cong. Rec. H3657 (daily ed. June 18, 2002) (remarks of Rep. Fletcher)
(discussing proposals for market-based Medicare prescription drug coverage); 141 Cong.
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Criticism of responsive entitlements led to a cap on food stamp expenditures in the 1995 House welfare bill. 12 3 Similarly, it has fed support for
converting responsive entitlements to block grants and to designing new
initiatives, such as the State Children's Health Insurance Program
(SCHIP),' 12 4 established in 1997, as capped programs.
This strong preference for capped programs is paradoxical. When a
program's primary purpose is to serve its recipients, responsive entitlements distribute benefits far more efficiently. This advantage holds without regard to how generous or restrained society wants to be in providing
a given benefit. Members who would reflexively oppose price controls in
other contexts are supporting very much the same thing when they reject
or dismantle uncapped responsive entitlements. In each case, the mar1 25
ket's failure to clear leads to serious inefficiencies.
1. The Basic Structure of Responsive Entitlements. - Society's willingness
to supply a public benefit and a potential claimant's inclination to seek
that benefit can both be reflected as simple functions of the liberality of
that benefit. The more people a program serves, the less willing society
will be to make that benefit available on liberal terms. Thus, for example,
some social service programs that provide counseling or other relatively
inexpensive services often have relatively relaxed means tests. A few errors here or there do not arouse great concern. If, however, a program is
going to provide more valuable benefits, society is more likely to insist on
tougher eligibility conditions. Conversely, the more liberal a benefit isboth in its eligibility conditions and in the benefits provided to those
meeting those conditions-the greater potential claimants' demand for
those benefits will be.
Figure 1 represents this interaction as a simple pair of supply and
demand curves: The vertical axis is the liberality of the benefit and the
horizontal axis is participation in the program. Thus, the supply curve
descends from top left to lower right and the demand curve climbs from
lower left to upper right. The slopes of these curves are reversed from
those in more familiar supply and demand diagrams because the "product" here-a public benefit-has a cost to the supplier and a benefit to
the consumer.126 A responsive entitlement may be defined as a program
Rec. 33,748 (1995) (remarks of Rep. Castle) (defending proposed spending bill for
"ending the open-ended entitlement nature of Medicaid").
123. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-430, at 631-32 (1995).
124. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1397aa-1397jj (2000).
125. In traditional economic terms, a market for a good is said to "clear" when the
price at which it sells is such that the number of people willing to sell at that price exactly
equals the number of people willing to buy at that price.
126. The slopes of the supply and demand curves in this diagram could be returned
to their traditional alignments by making the vertical axis "illiberality." To the extent that
society makes benefits less liberal by requiring claimants to comply with costly eligibility
conditions, it could be seen as raising the price of those benefits much as suppliers do in
other markets. Super, Offering an Invisible Hand, supra note 121, at 828-35. But since
illiberality, unlike price, has no logical lower bound-a benefit may be made as generous
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FicuRE 1:
SUPPLY AND DEMAND FOR PUBLIC BENEFITS

Liberality

A

Demand

Supply

Participation
in which participation is determined by the intersection of these two
curves. The "market" for a given benefit clears when the terms of that
benefit are made just liberal enough that the number of people claiming
12 7
the benefit equals the number whom society is willing to serve.
Figure 2 shows the impact of program rules that are not set at the
equilibrium level (L*) but rather on some more liberal terms (L**). The
number of people seeking to participate in the program will move from
the equilibrium point (P*) to some higher level (PD). The number of
people society is willing to serve in this more liberal program, however,
will decline because the benefit seems more generous or less conditional
(Ps). The difference between the number of people seeking to particias society chooses-inverting that axis seems unhelpful. Alternately, the diagram could be
recast as presenting the "supply of eligible claimants" and the "demand for giving." These
concepts are sufficiently counter-intuitive that the unusual alignment of the curves in the
actual diagrams seem less confusing.
127. Arguably a more complete representation of these choices would involve three
dimensions. On the X-axis would be the quantity of recipients of the benefit. On the Yaxis would be the size (or adequacy) of the benefit. On the Z-axis is the liberality (or
conditionality) of eligibility for the benefit. The supply function would be represented by
a curved surface approaching each axis some distance out from its origin. The demand
function would be another surface with one corner near the origin. Their intersection
would be a line, representing several possible equilibrium points that differ from one
another in that they provide different combinations of liberality of eligibility conditions
and generosity of benefits. The selection among these equilibrium points, which likely
would provide for differing levels of participation, would depend on political and
administrative choices in the design of the program. Given, however, the difficulty of
thinking-and drawing-in three dimensions, this model is presented in more
conventional two-dimensional form, with liberality of eligibility and generosity of benefits
aggregated into a single index of liberality. These two quite different factors are then
disaggregated below. See infra Part II.A.2.
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FIGURE 2:
EFFECT OF OvERLY LIBERAL BENEFIT RULES
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pate and the number society is willing to serve constitutes excess demand.
If the program remains a responsive entitlement-if the full number of
people seeking benefits receives them-political pressure will mount to
cut back the program.
FIGURE

3:

EFFECT OF OvERLY RESTRICTIVE BENEFIT RULES
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Figure 3 shows the opposite situation: eligibility rules (L***) more
restrictive than the equilibrium level (L*). Under these rigorous condi-
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tions, the number of people the public is willing to aid (Ps) will exceed
the number of eligible claimants interested in the benefit (PD). The difference is underparticipation. In the near term, it may lead to outreach
campaigns. Eventually, advocates for the benefit are likely to succeed in
making its benefits more generous or less conditional so that its liberality
approaches equilibrium. The path to equilibrium may not be a direct
one. If the program's liberality is raised to the equilibrium level, participation is likely to rise slowly at first as word of expanded eligibility or
improved benefits spreads. In the interim, the continued low participation may spur another set of liberalizations, resulting in a program whose
liberality exceeds the stable equilibrium level. When actual participation
catches up with these overly liberal rules, political pressure will build in
well lead to excessive cuts
favor of tightening up the rules. This could
1 28
and another period of underparticipation.
Should society become more generous, the supply curve will shift to
the right. Society will be willing to serve more people at any given level of
liberality. Assuming the demand curve does not move, the shift in the
supply curve will result in a shift in the equilibrium point to the left, with
society liberalizing the terms of the benefit and thus inducing more people to claim it (either because they have become newly eligible or because
the benefit level has become more attractive). Conversely, tighter budgets or impatience with means-tested public benefits may result in society's
shifting the supply curve to the left. (Figure 4.) To bring the program
back into equilibrium, eligibility conditions will have to be tightened or
benefit levels cut so that the overall level of liberality shrinks (from L1 to
L 2) and participation drops (from P1 to P 2)The demand curve, too, can shift. A recession can cause a shift to
causing more people to participate at any given level of generright,
the
osity in program rules. Economic expansions, an intensification of
stigma, or alternative sources of support can cause the demand curve to
shift to the left and reduce participation without any change in program
rules.
Some events can cause simultaneous shifts in the supply and demand
curves. For example, widely recognized economic downturns can both
increase demand for means-tested benefits and increase society's willing128. Moves to tighten program rules are likely to have much more immediate results.
Agencies can quickly terminate recipients that have become ineligible; word of expansions
of eligibility will take time to reach potential claimants, who in turn may take some time to
apply. Similarly, reductions in benefit level generally can be implemented immediately
and may cause the rapid departures of recipients that no longer find the benefits worth the
bother of receiving. Increases in benefit levels affect current beneficiaries immediately but
may take some time to attract new participants who would not have bothered to apply at
the lower benefit level. The impact of both increases and reductions in benefit levels may
be slowed somewhat where, as is commonly the case, a program has more formidable
barriers to entry than it does to continued receipt. Current recipients will stay on after
benefits are reduced below the level that would have caused them to apply initially, but
new entrants may continue to come slowly even after benefits have risen.
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FIGURE 4:
SHIFT IN SUPPLY CURVE AS SOCIErY BECOMES LESS GENEROUS
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ness to provide them. (Figure 5.) Thus, both the supply and demand
curves shift to the right at about the same time. 129 This allows participation to rise without changing eligibility rules or taking the program out of
equilibrium. Indeed, sometimes the increased public sympathy for claimants in recessions outstrips the increase in demand for benefits, allowing
130
liberalizations in programs' rules.
On the other hand, economic expansions often both reduce demand for means-tested benefits and create a societal expectation that participation will fall. If the supply and demand curves shift to the left at a
relatively similar pace, eligibility rules can be maintained without throwing the program out of equilibrium. If, however, middle-income people
believe that the economy has turned around, they may regard continued
high participation in means-tested programs as a sign that claimants are
unjustifiably idling and may demand cutbacks. The continued high participation in AFDC and food stamps after the formal end of the recession

129. In practice, downturns often begin to affect the lowest-skill, lowest-income
members of society well before major economic indicators and most of the middle-income
electorate recognizes the onset of a recession. Also, low-skill workers and other low-income
people often tend to be among the last to benefit from an economic expansion. For
example, food stamp participation began to rise a year and a half before the recession of
1990-1991 and continued to rise for two-and-a-half years after the formal end of the
recession. Author's tabulations of Database Monitoring Branch, U.S. Dep't of Agric.,
Program Information Reports (1980-2004) (data on file with the Columbia Law Review)
[hereinafter Tabulated Keydata Reports] (author's compilation and statistical analysis of
twenty-five years of USDA Keydata Reports).
130. A frequent example of this phenomenon is the establishment of emergency
unemployment compensation (UC) programs during recessions.

HeinOnline -- 104 Colum. L. Rev. 665 2004

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 104:633

FIGURE 5:
SOCIETY ACCEPTS AN INCREASE IN NEED RESULTING FROM A RECESSION
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of the early 1990s seems likely to have contributed to public support for
13 1
the reductions in benefits enacted as part of the 1996 welfare law.
As noted, when, for whatever reason, society becomes less willing to
supply benefits or the demand for those benefits increases in ways that
society does not embrace, the program must shrink. Figure 6 depicts the
two principle alternatives for how that shrinkage may be accomplished.
First, eligibility rules can be tightened or benefits reduced, cutting the
program's liberality from L1 to L2 and shrinking participation from P to
P 2. With these new rules, the program returns to equilibrium. Alternatively, the program can retain its current eligibility rules and benefit
structure (L1 ) but abandon the responsive entitlement structure. With
these still liberal eligibility rules, the number of people seeking benefits
remains unchanged at P 1. Society's willingness to supply benefits at these
rules is even lower than it would have been had the rules been tightened.
Thus, accommodating the new, more conservative mood will require capping participation at a level (P 3) well below the equilibrium (P 2) that
could be achieved with stricter program rules.
As Figure 7 shows, an increase in demand for benefits that society
does not regard as legitimate creates essentially the same two choices.
The program's rules can be toughened (from L, to L 2), dampening
(though not eliminating) the increase in participation. This allows participation to rise (from Pi) to the program's new equilibrium (P 2 ). Alternatively, if the program's rules remain unchanged, the number of eligible
131. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996
(PRWORA), Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105; see supra note 129; see also Newman et
al., supra note 37, at 254, 266 (describing early expectations that growth of the economy
and social insurance programs would steadily shrink AFDC roles).
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FiGuRE 6:

Two

POSSIBLE RESPONSES TO SOCIETY BECOMING MORE CONSERVATIVE

Liberality

f

Demand

t

PI

P2

P3

Participation

applicants will rise unchecked (to P 3) while the political system remains
unwilling to tolerate any increase above the previous level and imposes a
32
cap.'
FiGuRE 7:
Two
Liberality
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Participation caps-the rejection of responsive entitlement-also
can result from political maneuvering. A program's advocates may succeed in increasing the liberality of a program's rules above the equilib132. As discussed supra note 91, many programs are likely to cap funding rather than
participation, but the practical effect will be the same either way.
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rium point without building political acceptance for the level of participation such an increase will generate. This may happen when the
program's advocates slip a liberalization into broader legislation unnoticed or as part of an "inside" deal. It also may result from misestimates of
the impacts of changes in a program's rules. Or it may happen when a
program's structure is established without commitments of full funding.
Conversely, when conservatives become ascendant they may prefer to cap
participation or funding rather than to become embroiled in a debate
over specific changes to eligibility rules or benefit levels.
2. Determiningthe Generosity and Conditionality of Benefits. - The foregoing discussion treats liberality as a single variable. In fact, of course, it
is a composite of two quite different sets of variables: benefit level (functionality) and eligibility restrictions (conditionality). Some programs may
be quite liberal in one of these respects but restrictive in the other. The
school lunch and breakfast programs, for example, have very liberal eligibility rules but quite modest benefits. l3 3 Medicaid for nursing home residents or transplant patients, on the other hand, provides extremely
costly benefits 134 but only under very demanding eligibility rules. 135
133. In the 2003-2004 school year, federal reimbursements to schools for lunches
they served ranged from $0.21 for children from families with incomes over 185% of the
poverty line to $2.36 for children from families below 130% of the poverty line. National
School Lunch, Special Milk, and School Breakfast Programs; National Average Payments/
Maximum Reimbursement Rates, 68 Fed. Reg. 40,623, 40,625 (July 8, 2003).
134. Payments to nursing homes alone-not including payments for doctors' services,
hospitalization, and medication for nursing home residents-cost almost $32 billion in
fiscal year 1998, almost half again the cost of the entire food stamp program. House
Comm. on Ways & Means, 106th Cong., 2000 Green Book 924, 870 (Comm. Print 2000)
[hereinafter 2000 Green Book].
135. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1396r(e) (7) (2000) (establishing procedures to ensure that
Medicaid does not reimburse nursing home care that is not medically necessary); id.
§§ 1396a(f), 13 9 6p (allowing states to impose stringent financial requirements and
requiring states to attach the assets of Medicaid beneficiaries receiving nursing home
care). But see id. § 1396r-5 (relaxing some asset tests applied to married couples).
A host of practical examples demonstrate these tradeoffs. PRWORA imposed severe
new conditions on immigrants' participation in programs providing relatively costly
benefits-SSI, food stamps, Medicaid, and TANF-funded benefits, for example-while
imposing more modest restrictions or none at all on less generous programs such as school
meals and WIC vouchers. Compare 8 U.S.C. §§ 1612(a)(1), (b)(1), 1613(a), 1631(a)
(2000) (restricting many legal immigrants' eligibility for "[flederal means-tested public
benefit"), with id. § 1613(c)(2) (exempting school meals, WIC, short-term disaster
assistance, some in-kind services, and some other limited programs from these
restrictions). Federal law has never provided cash assistance, medical coverage, or housing
subsidies to non-elderly, able-bodied, childless adults based solely on need, but those
individuals qualify for at least some food stamps, presumably a less generous benefit. But
see Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA)
§ 824, 7 U.S.C. § 2015(o) (2000) (restricting many such individuals to three months of
food stamps in any three-year period unless they are working at least half time).
Conversely, although historically high caseloads in AFDC and food stamps were cited as
cause for alarm in the welfare debate of the mid-1990s, receipt of more generous but
highly conditional unemployment compensation benefits does not arouse anything like
the same kind of ire.
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If our model is to merge these dissimilar factors into a single variable
for program liberality, we must understand how the political process
tends to compare these different factors. In essence, this requires us to
construct indifference curves, representing the tradeoffs the political process recognizes between generosity of benefits and relative unconditional136
ity of eligibility.
As Figure 8 suggests, however, not all political systems will evaluate
these trade-offs in the same way. The generosity of benefits is likely to be
seen primarily in financial terms: The more one is spending, the more
care one is inclined to devote to ensuring that it is being spent appropriately. Eligibility conditions, by contrast, have both financial and normative components. For example, programs deny benefits to claimants with
resources exceeding specified levels both because doing so saves money
and because many people believe that those with greater resources ought
to spend those resources rather than turning to the government for help.
Similarly, work conditions both save money by denying aid to those that
do not meet them and make the public feel that those receiving benefits
13 7
are more worthy of aid.
136. Decomposing the liberality variable exposes another shortcoming of our model:
Raw participation does not fully capture the extent of a program. Consider a program
providing $100 to 500 claimants. Assume the jurisdiction providing that benefit is
considering whether to impose a particular eligibility condition-a resource limit, a work
requirement, or perhaps some other behavioral rule-that would cause 100 recipients to
leave the program-or to cut everyone's benefits by $25. The eligibility condition will
reduce participation 20%, which one surmises is likely to be more than the number of
people that will lose interest in the program because of the benefit cut. From a financial
point of view, however, the benefit cut is more severe: It would reduce total benefit
payments to $37,500 (even without considering discouraged claimants), compared with
$40,000 if the eligibility condition is imposed.
Yet neither of these facts tells us how either the political system or potential claimants
will regard the tradeoff. If the eligibility condition involves a matter of little normative
interest to the general public-perhaps we were thinking of disqualifying people with life
insurance policies or those that failed to appear to watch a video on housekeeping skillsthey may not feel that meeting this condition makes someone worthy of an additional $25
in benefits. On the other hand, if the eligibility condition is of great public interest-say a
work requirement-the public may think it is far more important than a $25 benefit
reduction and may remain almost as adamant that the condition be met at the $75 benefit
level as it was at the $100 level. A prospective claimant, in turn, will react to these
alternatives based on how each impacts her or him. If watching the video requires a
claimant to miss a day from work-or if it seems demeaning-she or he may well prefer
the benefit cut. Conversely, if the work requirement asks nothing more than the claimant
submit some simple documentation of work she or he is already doing, it may seem
preferable to a benefit cut.
In fact, if expressed with perfect precision, our model would have two dependent
variables: participation and the value conveyed. Since most policies-eligibility conditions
and benefit levels-simultaneously affect each of those variables in the same direction
(positively or negatively), albeit to differing degrees, in the interest of simplicity this
discussion will treat participation as the sole outcome of public benefit programs' rules.
137. The difference between the impact of benefit levels and eligibility conditions is
likely to be less pronounced from the point of view of prospective claimants. To be sure,
eligibility conditions will take some people completely out of the market; low maximum
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FIGURE 8:
INDIFFERENCE CURVES IN DESIGN OF PROGRAMS'

RULES
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Thus, we might imagine that a typical state, with both financial and
normative interests in the design of its benefit programs, may give substantial weight to both of these factors. To be sure, a program nearer the
upper left end of the indifference curve is likely to cost more than a less
conditional one, but we can imagine that the state is willing to bear these
additional costs because it is more confident that the people it is helping
are those it feels deserve that aid. Some states, however, may have much
tighter budgets. Such a state may be able to afford increasing benefit
levels relatively little even when it imposes stringent eligibility rules. In
other words, benefit levels in this state will be relatively inelastic. If this
state has a relatively liberal attitude towards means-tested programs-perhaps because so many voters are themselves in perilous economic posibenefit levels do this only if the program phases out the amount of benefits based on
income. (Thus, for example, if a program provides $X to someone with no income and
then reduces benefits by an amount equal to 20% of a claimant's income, reducing the
maximum benefit amount, $X, will reduce the income level at which the benefit has
phased out to nothing.) Both benefit levels and eligibility conditions, however, affect the
desirability of receiving a benefit. Low benefit levels discourage participation in obvious
ways; eligibility conditions make those that remain eligible less likely to receive a benefit
because of misunderstandings about eligibility, administrative errors determining
eligibility, and the cost of establishing compliance (producing verification and complying
with conduct requirements). Thus, it seems less problematic to treat demand for benefits
as a function of the liberality of a program's rules, as measured by a rough composite of
benefit levels and eligibility conditions.
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tions-it may tend to operate only moderately conditional programs but
at fairly meager benefit levels.
Other states may have plenty of funds but view these programs in
intensely moral terms. Former Wisconsin Governor Tommy Thompson
consistently portrayed his state in these terms.1 38 Wisconsin is generally
unwilling to reduce the conditions of participation in its cash assistance
program even with substantially reduced benefit levels.' 3 9 Thus, in Wisconsin benefit levels are relatively elastic with respect to the conditionality
of eligibility: Normative factors govern program rules far more than financial considerations.
A financial crisis in a state may both shift the supply curve to the left
and rotate its indifference curve counterclockwise, making money a more
central determinant of benefits policy. Media stories suggesting that a
benefit is being abused also may shift the supply curve to the left but will
tend to rotate the indifference curve clockwise, towards placing a higher
premium on conditionality. Conversely, economic expansions or improved political fortunes for the program's supporters can both shift the
supply curve to the right and change the shape of the state's indifference
curve between benefit levels and stringency of eligibility conditions.
Where a state settles on its indifference curve will depend on several
political factors. In a state where conditionality is relatively inelastic,
claimants' advocates may work to increase benefit levels as much as possible, even at the expense of getting a slightly more conditional program:
They may regard this as a good deal for claimants. Similarly, in political
systems where program funding is relatively fixed, claimants' advocates
may focus their efforts on reducing the conditionality of benefits to keep
claimants' cost of qualifying to a minimum (and perhaps to reduce the
share of program funds going to administration as opposed to benefits).
In almost any jurisdiction, program administrators are likely to seek to
move policy towards unconditionality because benefit reductions tend to
be easier to administer than eligibility conditions. Service providers, on
138. See, e.g., Jack Tweedie, From D.C. to Des Moines-The Progress of Welfare
Reform, State Legislatures, Apr. 2001, at 22, 22 ("I have always said-as loudly and publicly
as I can-that for welfare reform to be successful you have to make an investment up front.
It can't be done on the cheap") (quoting Governor Thompson). But see Frances Fox
Piven, Thompson's Easy Ride, The Nation, Feb. 26, 2001, at 4, 4-5 (arguing that Governor
Thompson's actions failed to match his rhetoric).
139. Thus, for example, while some other states are willing to excuse families from
TANF work requirements at least for some time if they accept sharply reduced benefit
levels in the form of a sanction eliminating the parent's share of a grant, State Policy
Documentation Project, Sanctions for Noncompliance with Work Requirements, available
at http://www.spdp.org/tanf/sanctions/sanctionsfindings.htm (last visitedJan. 29, 2004)
(on file with the Columbia Law Review), Wisconsin demands work before it will provide any
cash assistance to a family. Johannes Bos et al., Manpower Demonstration Research Corp.,
New Hope for People with Low Incomes: Two-Year Results of a Program to Reduce
Poverty and Reform Welfare (Apr. 1999), available at http://www.mdrc.org/publications/
60/execsum.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (citing Wisconsin's work-based
system of public assistance, Wisconsin Works, or W-2).
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the other hand, may prefer higher benefit levels even if tighter eligibility
140
conditions mean that those benefits' net value to claimants is reduced.
More generally, the political process tends to be sticky, with changes taking place generally only when the system is delivering results that deviate
far enough from current preferences to generate the political attention
and drive to force a change. A conditionality-generosity trade-off established at one time in response to the indifference curves then in place is
likely to persist for some time even though that curve has taken on a
substantially different slope and one or another interest group would
gladly move up or down the curve.
B. The Relative Efficiency of Entitlement Structures
Economists routinely analyze the relative efficiency of various possible ways of organizing private markets. Once the economic nature of
entitlement and nonentitlement structures is understood, applying the
same kind of analysis to public benefit programs becomes possible. This
section begins by considering the circumstances under which responsive
and functional entitlements may improve a program's efficiency. 141 It
then considers the circumstances under which it may be desirable to design a program without an entitlement.
1. The Efficiency of Responsive Entitlements. - The two alternatives for
resolving mismatches between demand and political supply of benefitschanges in program rules or caps on participation or funding-are more
fundamentally different than they might at first appear. A simplistic appraisal of the benefits delivered may not yield any clear preference between the two: Reasonable people may disagree about whether it is better to provide more limited or conditional benefits to a larger number of
people or to offer relatively generous and unencumbered benefits to a
smaller number. A closer examination of the economics of capped programs, however, exposes serious flaws.
140. If the providers expect that they will have to serve all claimants whether or not
they receive a subsidy-as in the case with hospitals concerned about emergency room
costs-or have large fixed costs-such as landlords on the low end of a slack housing
market-they may prefer to maximize the number of people receiving benefits even if
those benefits are relatively meager.
141. This Part does not address unconditional entitlements. As discussed supra Part
I.A.2, no program can operate in the real world as a true unconditional entitlement. Thus,
any discussion of the issue would have to compare the efficiency of having more or fewer
conditions on a benefit. Since each additional condition requires some marginal increase
in administrative resources, minimizing conditions generally improves efficiency. The
difficulty of enforcing possible conditions, however, varies considerably. A detailed
analysis of the relative burdens imposed by various kinds of eligibility conditions is well
beyond the scope of this article and has been addressed copiously elsewhere. See, e.g.,
Am. Pub. Human Servs. Ass'n, Crossroads: New Directions in Social Policy 11-24 (2001),
available at http://www.aphsa.org/reauthor/crossroads.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law
Review); Welfare Simplification & Coordination Advisory Comm., Time for a Change:
Remaking the Nation's Welfare System 49-62 (1993).
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In essence, a capped or nonentitlement program-a discretionary
program like housing assistance or a "capped entitlement" such as
SCHIP-operates very much like a market that does not clear. 42 In a
market with price controls, demand will exceed supply, the market cannot clear on its own, and some non-market rationing mechanism must be
introduced to distribute the limited supply among the overabundant
would-be consumers. The most obvious rationing mechanism is to distribute the limited supply of goods on a first-come, first served basis. This
will result in goods being allocated to many who value them less than
others who, when the seller runs out, receive none. Similarly, too high a
minimum wage can be expected to cause the labor supply to exceed the
number of available jobs and require non-market mechanisms-queuing,
favoritism, side payments, etc.-to allocate the available jobs.
These sorts of non-market allocation systems are commonly criticized on efficiency and other grounds.1 43 The mechanisms by which
agencies ration public benefits to stay within a cap are similarly inefficient
and likely to frustrate the program's goals as established through the political process. More generally, a responsive entitlement is likely to be
easier and cheaper to administer than a capped program. The number
of people served is controlled by the terms of the program. Administrators need only judge applicants against the program's eligibility rules and
award benefits in the specified amounts to those that meet all applicable
conditions. A participation cap inserts an extra step to the administrative
process between finding a claimant eligible and calculating her or his
benefit level: administering the cap. Moreover, an examination of the
specific options available for meeting the demands of a cap shows that
each has serious inefficiencies.
a. Waiting Lists and Priority Systems. - An agency can ration benefits
with waiting lists. This is the primary mechanism for rationing federal
housing subsidies and appears relatively common in capped child care
subsidy programs. These lists, however, are likely to deny benefits to people in far greater need than some of those getting benefits.
Frustration with the randomness and irrationality of waiting listsparticularly their failure to recognize sometimes sharp variations in

142. This discussion assumes, of course, that the participation cap is set low enough
that it actually constrains participation (presumably as a substitute for stricter eligibility
rules). Just as price caps set above the equilibrium price or output controls that exceed
demand at equilibrium have little impact on the operation of markets, so too participation
caps that are widely recognized as being higher than the likely number of eligible
claimants are unlikely to affect programs much. An over-adequate cap that is not
recognized as such may inhibit efforts to disseminate information about the availability of
the program's benefits and may cause administrators to begin rationing the benefits
prematurely.
143. E.g., Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 335-38, 476-81 (6th ed.
2003).

HeinOnline -- 104 Colum. L. Rev. 673 2004

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 104:633

need-can induce agencies to establish priority systems. 1 44 Priority systems are likely to require agencies to expend additional administrative
efforts to acquire and process more information from claimants. Implementing them also may require making arbitrary, often questionable disbenefits on
tinctions between very similar claimants.145 The targeting of
46
those most in need may be more appearance than reality.'
More fundamentally, the philosophy of priority systems is deeply inconsistent with that of waiting lists. The more people that are pulled out
of the queue to receive immediate service, the slower the queue moves
for those left to stand in it. This then increases demands to identify other
priority categories to be pulled out of the line. 1 47 This process is likely to
become circular and self-defeating: The more people are pulled from
the queue, the longer the wait will be for those that remain and the

144. That is, certain claimants deemed in particularly severe need may be designated
for immediate service. For example, homeless families have been given priority for
housing subsidies.
145. To be sure, achieving the same savings through increasing the conditionality of a
responsive entitlement might well involve making debatable distinctions between similarlysituated claimants. The distinctions required to administer a priority system, however,
often will be more arbitrary. An eligibility condition set through the legislative or
administrative rulemaking process explicitly disclaims assisting people over a fixed line.
The lines drawn in a priority system are likely to be more fluid-since the fraction of
claimants that the system must screen out varies depending on demand for the benefit and
the program's current budgetary state. Thus, administrators may be forced to differentiate
between very similar claimants in order to achieve the required level of savings. Budgetary
factors obviously drive the imposition of explicit eligibility conditions, too, but
policymakers' longer time horizons may allow them to draw somewhat more rational,
coherent lines. Also, administrators adjusting participation with priority systems must rely
upon criteria they can quickly adjust if savings prove inadequate; implementation time may
not be as severe a limiting factor when setting a permanent eligibility condition.
146. Strong advocates of the privatization of human services, of course, might argue
that participation caps create countervailing efficiencies by forcing claimants from public
to private programs. Even if one believes that privatization is more efficient, as opposed to
more appealing for other normative reasons, and even if one assumes that private charities
actually have the resources to meet this need (i.e., that the claimants turned away from the
public program will in fact receive alternative services rather than simply being
abandoned), this argument speaks only to the proper size of the public program, not to its
method of allocating benefits. Skeptics of public programs presumably would seek to push
society's supply curve to the left, allowing it to serve fewer people at any given level of
benefit generosity, but they have no reason to want whatever benefits the government does
provide distributed through inefficient rationing mechanisms.
147. Consider a housing subsidy program that gives priority to homeless families.
E.g., 24 C.F.R. §§ 882.808(a) (3), 960.206(b)(5), 982.207(d)(5) (2003). Media stories
about families becoming homeless while enduring long waits for housing subsidies may
lead to calls to extend priority to families at risk of homelessness so that they may be saved
from the trauma of living on the streets or in shelters and the likely loss of their personal
possessions that comes with eviction. Administering such a category requires developing
and applying standards for identifying families expected to become homeless before they
will receive a subsidy through the regular waiting list.
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greater difficulty they will have enduring until they receive the benefit. 14
All of this, of course, assumes that the cap is high enough to serve the
needs of the subpopulation to whom we are giving priority. If it is not,
then the priority category, too, will need a waiting list. 1 49 The priority
list's failure to deliver benefits, in turn, will spur calls for establishing a
super-priority list within the priority group. Further political and bureaucratic resources will be required to define and administer this super-priority list. If enough program resources are siphoned off for super-priority claimants, the "regular" priority list may become as meaningless as the
main waiting list.
In the end, we may end up with several tiers of nested programs that
seek to approximate a test of claimants' need. Even if we do our job
exceedingly well, the cost of administering our priority system will far exceed that of running a simple means test. We also will have carried the
program's design far away from that set out in statute; control will have
shifted from legislators with at least theoretical political accountability to
technicians with virtually none. The complexity of our system will largely
preclude thoughtful media scrutiny; at most, a reporter may seize upon
one or another anomaly to lambast it as "another example of bureaucracy
run amok." In addition, to keep our priority system from crashing, we
may develop principles for excluding claimants from one or another pri150
ority list that rely upon unrealistic fictions.
Allocating benefits through priority systems also is likely to create a
host of perverse behavioral incentives. If families that have had major
utilities terminated are deemed at greater risk of homelessness, we effectively reduce the relative benefit of paying these bills. Some families that
choose to buy food and allow their gas service to be shut off for this rea148. For example, if we start with a queue that requires an average of six months' wait
to receive a subsidy and pull out all those families likely to become homeless within six
months, the average wait may rise to a year. If we then give priority to those we expect can
fend off homelessness for six months but not a full year, the average wait may rise to a year
and a half. Eventually, the waiting list may consist only of people who we expect will never
become homeless-but they also will never receive subsidies. In essence, we have just
converted what purports to be a generally available housing subsidy program into a
homelessness prevention program-and done so in a strikingly covert and inefficient way.
The program's rules will still nominally grant eligibility to a much broader range of
claimants, but those not adjudged at risk of homelessness under our priority system will
have no chance of ever actually receiving benefits. To preserve the illusion that those rules
still matter, perhaps we will reserve a few subsidies to be distributed without regard to the
priority system, as if helping a handful of similarly-situated families somehow benefits the
vast number of families mired on a largely futile waiting list.
149. The delays in providing housing subsidies to our priority groups will cause some
homeless families to languish in shelters or on the street and will see other families that
were at the brink of homelessness tumble over the abyss.
150. For example, we may decide that any family with a close relative living within one
hundred miles is per se not at risk of becoming homeless, even if the relative is estranged,
lives in a dwelling too small to accommodate the family, or is prohibited by her or his lease
from taking the family in. We will then profess amazement when, despite our program for
preventing homelessness, families still end up on the street.
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son may become sick from the effects of the cold; others may burn in fires
caused by electric or kerosene space heaters. If only families with incomes below a particular arbitrary level are allowed on the priority list, a
low-wage worker will have a strong incentive to decline overtime that
could put her or him over that line. To be sure, perverse incentives exist
in any means-testing system. Priority systems for distributing capped benefits, however, may produce some of the worst incentive packages because
they tend to measure more aspects of claimants' lives and because they
are more likely to rely upon arbitrary "cliffs" beyond which earning a single additional dollar may effectively bar a claimant from receiving a bene15 1
fit of considerable value.
b. Covert EligibilityRestrictions. - Even where legislators make a political decision not to operate a responsive entitlement, the difficulties of
controlling individual eligibility workers' decisions through any other
means are so great that managers may effectively recreate a responsive
entitlement as a matter of administrative convenience. 152 In the absence
of a political commitment to a responsive entitlement, managers must
regulate spending and participation with repeated adjustments to the
generosity and conditionality of the program. Managers compelled to
save a fixed amount of money over the remaining months of a fiscal year
may feel compelled to take whichever route can be implemented most
easily, or whichever one is estimated to produce savings closest to the
shortfall they must address, rather than the one that makes the most pol153
icy sense.
Agencies can try to reduce participation in a program to the levels
the caps allow by restricting the availability of information about that program. This may explain why many programs with capped resources decline to publicize their existence even though doing so could bring them
more recognition and funding. This method, too, is likely to deny aid to
some of the needier claimants while granting it to more persistent but
less destitute ones. 154 It also is highly vulnerable to favoritism and tends
to privilege people with connections to the public welfare system-not
always a group whom the political process would want to reward.
151. See, e.g., 24 C.F.R. § 960.202(b)(1) (2003) (giving limited priority in public
housing admissions to families with incomes below 30% of the area median).
152. Thus, despite explicit language in PRWORA and a Colorado statute disclaiming
any entitlement to cash assistance benefits, program administrators found it necessary to
write such specific eligibility rules that the Colorado Court of Appeals found a property
interest sufficient to create a positive entitlement enforceable through the Due Process
Clause. Weston v. Cassata, 37 P.3d 469, 474-77 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001).
153. Thus, for example, if managers have information on the duration of many
claimants' receipt of benefits, they can reliably estimate the savings a time limit would
produce. This may make that time limit administratively preferable to requiring their staff
to conduct more nuanced examinations of claimants' need for continued aid, a process
with less predictable results.
154. See Super, Offering an Invisible Hand, supra note 121, at 827-28 (discussing
information-restricting strategy for rationing benefits).
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In a similar vein, agencies can add covert eligibility requirements or
simply try to wear out many claimants with procedural denials. Many of
the things the program will do to ration benefits among the over-large set
of claimants are likely to be inefficient in other ways as well. For example,
extensive procedural requirements force claimants to spend much of the
value of the benefit gathering and completing paperwork. The net benefit delivered is thus much less than what the government is paying for it.
Here again, the distributional effects may be troubling: Low-wage workers, claimants caring for small children or infirm relatives, and others
whose time is most valuable are most likely to be discouraged from participating. Moreover, all of these systems are vulnerable to favoritism, covert
racial or other discrimination, and side payments, particularly because
155
their complexity renders them largely immune to public oversight.
c. AdditionalInformation Costs and Administrative Burdens. - Whether
the agency maintains a waiting list, administers a priority system, or rations benefits in other ways, it almost certainly will require setting up
some system for the various eligibility workers and offices taking applications to coordinate their activities on an ongoing basis so that they can
avoid exceeding the cap. Gathering and analyzing this information is
likely to be quite costly in itself. Even more significantly, responding to
indications of over- or underparticipation is likely to require repeated
changes in the program's design. These changes must be taught to eligibility workers, programmed into computers, and ultimately explained to
claimants, all at no small cost. The frequent, seemingly irrational
changes in program rules may breed cynicism among eligibility workers,
who may be tempted to ignore or work around changes they dislike, perceiving no great principle to be at stake. Claimants also may become confused and cynical. More ineligible claimants will waste their and the
agency's time with futile applications, and more claimants that are eligi156
ble will mistakenly believe that they are not.
d. Common Reasons for Eschewing a Responsive Entitlement. - Operating a program as a responsive entitlement requires reducing the liberality
of the program's rules whenever society's supply curve shifts to the left or
claimants' demand curve shifts to the right (assuming in each case that
the other curve does not match this shift). In some circumstances, making these changes can be quite problematic. First, if the number of eligible claimants for a benefit exceeds the number the political system is willing to supply under current rules by X, the tendency will be to tighten the
rules enough to drive down participation by X. But once the rules are
tightened, society is likely to be willing to serve more people than it was in
the more generous program (except in the unlikely event that supply is
completely inelastic to changes in program liberality). Thus, the changes
in eligibility rules that are likely to reduce participation by X will overcut
155. See infra Part III.B.1.
156. See Super, Offering an Invisible Hand, supra note 121, at 830.
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and leave a condition of underparticipation. This common error may
help explain why many programs go through cycles of cuts and expansions that cannot be fully explained by economic or macro-political
changes.
Second, federalism can complicate the process of making cuts. In
AFDC, for example, the federal government had very limited options 5to7
reduce the generosity of benefit levels, which were largely set by states.'
If the political coalition controlling the federal government has little control over benefit levels and lacks sufficient politically acceptable means of
tightening a program's eligibility, capping participation-or at least federal contributions-may appear to be the most desirable option. This
appears to have been a factor in Congress's imposition of an AFDC participation cap in the 1960s1 5 8 and again in the block granting of AFDC in
1996. The TANF block grant capped federal contributions1 59 and gave
states the choice of imposing participation caps or making the program's
rules less liberal through means that were unavailable to federal policymakers under AFDC's structure. AFDC might well have been eliminated
anyway, but the paucity of policy levers at the federal government to
tighten the program's rules at least prevented its defenders from offering
a leaner, more stringent AFDC program as a credible alternative to block
granting.
2. The Efficiency of FunctionalEntitlements. - Up to this point, we have
been treating the level of generosity of benefits as essentially arbitrary. In
other words, we have assumed that the programs at issue were not functional entitlements. Yet operating a program without tying benefit levels
to a functional entitlement will often be inefficient as well.
In particular, programs providing benefits insufficient to purchase a
plausible quantity of a good or service in existing markets may severely
distort those markets.1 60 In this regard, it is important to differentiate
157. But see 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (10) (B) (1994) (repealed 1996) (requiring benefits be
pro-rated for month of application). This provision was added in the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357, 843-74, to reduce federal
spending.
158. Social Security Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-248, § 208, 81 Stat. 821, 894
(1968); see H.R. Rep. No. 90-544, at 110 (1967) (declaring that federal funding for AFDC
should be kept "within reasonable bounds" and suggesting that states needed incentives to
implement federal policies seeking to reduce AFDC participation).
159. 42 U.S.C. § 603(a) (1) (A) (2000) (setting formula for determining amount of
basic TANF block grants); see id. § 601 (b) (disavowing any right to assistance on behalf of
any claimant); id. § 603(b) (2) (capping amount federal government will provide to
supplement these block grants through contingency fund in times of severe need); id.
§ 606(e) (similarly capping amount federal government would loan states in times of
severe need).
160. The converse also is theoretically true: A program that provides benefits
sufficient to purchase more of a commodity than its recipients wish to consume could
distort markets in different ways. Whether recipients accept the constraint or sell their
unwanted benefits at a discount, value is likely to be lost. These concerns are central to
arguments for cashing out in-kind benefits. See, e.g., Martha B. Coven, The Freedom to
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between benefits that recipients can readily supplement and those that
they cannot. The Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program
(LIHEAP),' 16 for example, does not provide a functional entitlement to
utility service. LIHEAP recipients, however, are free to supplement gov1 62
ernment aid with their own payments to utility companies.
Medicaid, on the other hand, prohibits providers from accepting
payments from beneficiaries or their responsible relatives. 16 3 When
Medicaid sets its fee schedule below market levels,' 64 therefore, that limits what providers may receive for their services. Figure 9 illustrates the
difficulties this can cause. If the state set its fee for a particular Medicaid
service at the level (P*) that would attract enough providers to serve the
number of beneficiaries it can afford to cover at that price (Q*), the market will clear.' 65 If, however, the state seeks to save money by capping
reimbursements at a lower level (P**), it will be able to afford to cover
more beneficiaries (QD). Many of the better providers, however, will
drop away, leaving the available supply of medical care at a level (Qs)
below that needed by these beneficiaries. This imbalance may be resolved in several inefficient and undesirable ways: illegal side payments
to providers, 16 6 queuing for medical care that should not be postponed,
tolerance by licensing officials of incompetent providers, etc.
An intermediate case may be a program that technically allows recipients to supplement its payments but that pays for a service that, in practice, is so expensive that many cannot afford to do so. Some housing and
Spend: The Case for Cash-Based Public Assistance, 86 Minn. L. Rev. 847, 849-51 (2002)
(arguing that, apart from political considerations, means-tested benefits should be
provided in cash). In practice, however, public programs rarely provide hyperadequate
benefits: If they did, they would have difficulty fending off attempts to harvest their surplus
funds for purposes generating higher rents. And constraining benefits' use can improve
the political legitimacy of a program as well as the accuracy of its targeting. Super,
Offering an Invisible Hand, supra note 121, at 829.
161. 42 U.S.C. § 8621.
162. Id.
163. Id.§ 1396a(a)(25)(C).
164. See, e.g., Clark v. Kizer, 758 F. Supp. 572, 577 (E.D. Cal. 1990) (finding that
California's Medicaid reimbursement rates for dentists were lower than the customary rates
of more than ninety-nine percent of the state's dentists), vacated in part sub nom. Clark v.
Coye, No. 92-15131, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 15044, at *2, *8-*11 (9th Cir 1992) (affirming
the substance of the district court's decision but finding its remedial order was no longer
needed); Morgan v. Cohen, 665 F. Supp. 1164, 1167-68 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (noting that
Pennsylvania's Medicaid program reimbursed outpatient psychiatric treatment at $5.50 per
hour).
165. Here, of course, we are back to discussing a conventional private sector market
for a service-medical care-and our supply and demand curves are in their familiar
positions.
166. See, e.g., Cliff House Nursing Home v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 463 N.E.2d 578, 580
(Mass. App. Ct. 1984) (disqualifying nursing home from favorable rate treatment where
nursing home administrator accepted payments from Medicaid beneficiaries' families);
Glengariff Corp. v. Snook, 471 N.Y.S.2d 973, 976, 978 (Sup. Ct. 1984) (holding solicitation
of additional payments from medical beneficiaries' friends and family contrary to statutes
and public policy).
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EFFECT OF PUBLIC BENEFIT THAT IS NOT A FUNCTIONAL ENTITLEMENT
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child care subsidies fall in this category; health care coverage under some
state-operated programs may also allow beneficiaries to supplement its
payments. For those who can afford to supplement-generally the least
poor recipients-these programs provide useful partial payments in the
manner of LIHEAP. For those who cannot, an inefficient process is likely
to ensue in which a large number of recipients chase a smaller number of
providers willing to serve them at the set price. If the program imposes
quality standards (as child care and federal housing subsidy programs typically do), the benefit may actually become useless to the lowest-income
recipients if the unsubsidized cost of below-standard services is less than
the cost of supplementing the government benefit enough to attract
providers that meet the program's standards. In any event, the program
will be providing what amount to inferior benefits (or none at all) to1 6the
7
poorest recipients even while nominally treating all claimants alike.
3. The ParticularInefficiency of Block Grants. -

Block grants that are

not responsive entitlements1 68 are vulnerable to all the inefficiencies of
other capped programs and face some additional shortcomings all their

own. 169 In addition to difficulties allocating available resources among
167. This raises serious questions of political transparency, which are addressed infra
Part III.B.
168. See supra text accompanying note 92.
169. See generally, e.g., Food Stamps, supra note 12, at 13 ("A block grant would
force states with declining economies, rapidly growing populations, or poverty levels that
are rising for other reasons, to choose between cutting benefits substantially or providing
large amounts of state funds to meet the increasing need."); Jon Michaels, Deforming
Welfare, 34 Seton Hall L. Rev. 573, 598-99 (2004) (arguing that devolution to states is
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claimants, federal block grant programs also must divide funds among
states, and state block grants must divide funds among localities.
Even in an apolitical world of perfect information, finding the optimal formula would be difficult. Should it be based exclusively on need?
If so, should funds be allocated based on the total number of potentially
eligible claimants or the number likely to be served? Should funding
level take into account the cost of the benefits to be provided as well as
the number of claimants? 170 Block grants also often give recipient governments considerable discretion in setting eligibility levels; this raises
the question of whether the funding formula should consider only those
claimants the recipient government actually makes eligible or all those it
could choose to cover. Alternatively, many will argue that funding also
should reflect the recipient government's performance in some regard.
Finding a reliable, unbiased formula for measuring the government's
achievement of its many complex and often-conflicting objectives is extremely difficult. If meaningful performance measures can be found,
however, and if they become important parts of the funding formula,
they may systematically deprive weak performers of the resources they
need to improve.
Information in our world, however, is anything but perfect. Broad
demographic information generally is insufficient to determine exactly
which individuals or families are in fact eligible for aid under any particular set of rules. Difficult questions then arise about which approximation
of eligibility ought to be used (e.g., the number of people below a given
income threshold or the number unemployed). Information also takes
time to gather and more time to translate into funding decisions. The
number of people living in poverty in 2003 will not be known until the
very end of federal fiscal year 2004 and hence could not be translated
into funding levels until 2005 at the earliest. 17 1 State-level estimates of
the number of people in poverty are subject to significant sampling error,
especially in small states. 17 2 But if that error is offset by pooling three
years' data, the temporal match between need and funding will be even
inconsistent with both the new behavioralist goals of welfare policy as well as the residual
interest in protecting low-income families from severe harm).
170. For example, if two states have the same number of families living below a given
income eligibility limit, should it matter that one of them has twice as many people living
below half of that limit, and thus perhaps in need of more extensive benefits? In a health
program, should a state whose eligible population is older or sicker get more funding? In
a housing program, should the higher market rents in Northeastern and West Coast states
be taken into account?
171. Given that recipient governments need some lead time to plan how to design
their programs, an even greater delay may be required to avoid wasteful, unplanned
spending in states getting increased allotments, and chaotic cuts in states losing funds.
172. Even less data is available to measure need in particular counties or cities for
distribution of state block grant funds. The inefficiencies resulting from malallocation of
resources in programs that states block-grant to localities therefore are likely to be even
more severe.
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further removed. Areas with growing populations will be shortchanged,
as will areas whose economies have declined in the intervening period.
Our world also is not apolitical. The questions about funding formulas are sufficiently debatable and sufficiently technical that legislators can
freely advocate for whichever one best serves their constituencies. Sometimes this results in coalitions arising or powerful committee chairs skewing formulas in their favor; on other occasions, the compromise often is
to rely primarily on prior years' funding: the baseline.' 73 The longer a
block grant program operates on such a formula, the more disparities will
develop between states-the more money will be allocated to states where
it can accomplish less than it could in other states.
By shifting program design and operations down to smaller units of
government, some significant economies of scale are likely to be lost.
Most states can afford fewer and less expert program designers than can
federal agencies; program design on the local level is likely to be extremely primitive except in the largest of cities. The result of this less
sophisticated design is likely to be more perverse incentives in programs'
eligibility and benefit structures. 1 7 4 Also, more simply, it requires fifty
state policy-writers, training designers, etc., to replicate essentially the
same program design functions. Moreover, some aspects of program operations have significant economies of scale. Prior to the food stamp program's conversion to electronic benefits, 175 USDA was able to print far
more counterfeit-resistant food stamps than individual states could have.
The federal government's resources allow for more sophisticated computerized fraud detection efforts than any state likely could mount on its
own. 1

76

4. Types of ProgramsRationally Run as Nonentitlements. - Despite the
significant advantages of responsive and functional entitlements, some
programs are quite appropriately operated as neither. Political and
budgetary constraints often make it impossible to enact a program that
simultaneously is a responsive entitlement and serves a coherent, meaningful function. Many important and successful benefit programs, in173. See infra Part III.
174. To be sure, state and local policy analysts have no patent on program designs
creating perverse incentives: AFDC was a federal creation. Indeed, states have improved
on the gnarled program designs federal politics sometimes produce. For example, the vast
majority of the waivers states obtained from AFDC's rules reduced its disincentives to work
by increasing the amount of earnings disregarded in computing AFDC eligibility and
benefit levels. R. Kent Weaver, Ending Welfare as We Know It 259 (2000). AFDC counted
seventy percent of earnings that exceeded $120 as income to reduce families' benefits;
even these limited exemptions shrank after a few months. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(8) (1994)
(repealed 1996). Many states' waivers disregarded the first $200 that a family earned each
month as well as half of all earnings above that threshold and allowed these disregards to
continue as long as the family received benefits.
175. See 7 U.S.C. § 2016(l)(1)(A) (2000) (requiring all states to implement
electronic benefit transfer systems for food stamps by October 1, 2002, subject to very
limited exceptions).
176. See Food Stamps, supra note 12, at 10 (describing those systems).
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cluding food stamps, WIC, SCHIP, and LIHEAP, began as demonstration
projects of one kind or another. In these cases, a choice between a responsive entitlement and a functional entitlement may be necessary.
a. Instrumental Programs.- The goals of a program often will determine which design is most sensible. If it seeks primarily to benefit its
recipients, a responsive entitlement is crucial to avoiding the kinds of inefficiencies described above. This is true even if the program must be
heavily conditioned (for example, by limiting beneficiaries to a narrow
age bracket or to residents of a small geographic area).
Where the goals of the program are primarily instrumental, on the
other hand, a responsive entitlement may be less important. The key is
whether the government is acting as a supplier or a consumer in the market. If it is seeking to supply a public benefit to claimants as consumers, a
responsive entitlement makes sense. 177 If, on the other hand, it is acting
as a consumer on its own behalf or that of a broad segment of the public,
it can tailor the extent of its spending to the amount that it feels it can
afford. A pilot project, for example, may benefit its participants, but its
primary purpose is to purchase data. In exploring the effects of a benefit
on people in a variety of circumstances, the sponsoring agency may not
be able to condition the benefit sufficiently to allow benefits to be provided in a responsive entitlement. Indeed, in this case a functional entitlement may be crucial: If the benefits being tested have been diluted to the
point that they fall far short of meeting recipients' definable needs, the
evaluation is likely to show no impact. The program will have to bear the
burden of administering a rationing system, but it is not seeking to estab17 8
lish a stable market for the benefit.
Similarly, although public employment obviously benefits those
hired, its primary purpose presumably is to get work done for the government. Thus, we all take it for granted that the government will not hire
all comers but will ration that benefit through a screening and selection
process. The care that civil service rules require government agencies to
take to protect against favoritism, corruption, or political bias in govern177. In the same way, the postal service and public transportation agencies seek to
serve their customers by supplying deliver)' services or carriage. If the postal service
capped the amount of stamps it would sell, or a transit service set an arbitrary limit on the
number of rides it would provide, each would collapse under the weight of allocating its
quota.
178. A host of other public functions are properly conducted on capped budgets
because they are not designed primarily to benefit the direct recipients of governmental
funds. Purchases of land for national parks and forests, art works for museums, or
experiments for the space program primarily seek not to benefit the vendors but to
acquire something of value for the government and the general public. Although
establishing and implementing selection criteria is costly and potentially vulnerable to
error and manipulation, the government has no reason to empty the market. It can define
its own needs and declare itself satiated when it has reached its budget constraint. In these
activities, the government is participating in an existing market as a consumer rather than
creating a new market in a public benefit that it produces.
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ment hiring-and the shortcomings that process nonetheless experiences-provides a useful reminder of the difficulty of rationing government benefits without the market mechanism that responsive
entitlements offer.
b. Federalism Concerns. - In recent years, the desire to decentralize
has become the leading reason for establishing capped programs or for
capping existing responsive entitlements by converting them to block
grants. 179 Block grants' proponents argue that local officials will design
superior substantive policies because they know more about local conditions. Unquestionably, a bad enough program design could create worse
inefficiencies than the rationing mechanisms required to operate capped
programs. An employment and training program that teaches ice fishing
in Florida or serving tourist divers on the North Slope of Alaska would be
a waste of money no matter how it selected its participants. But not all
decisions need to be decentralized, and many important decisions can be
decentralized within the context of responsive entitlements.
Decentralization may plausibly justify abandonment of a responsive
entitlement under either of two circumstances. First, some decisions are
so dependent on local circumstances that they can only be made at the
state or (perhaps) local level. Second, some decisions that theoretically
could be made well on the federal level will, for one reason or another,
be predictably mishandled. In essence, decentralization may be required
because of a failure of the political market at the federal level. Arguments that both of these conditions existed figured prominently in the
justifications for eliminating responsive entitlements to cash assistance
and child care subsidies in PRWORA.
Each of these arguments merits some scrutiny: In many cases, it will
prove unnecessary to abandon the benefits of a responsive entitlement.
Many responsive entitlements operate in fields where some decisions
need to be made locally. For example, the National School Lunch Program establishes functional nutritional standards that meals must meet' 80
but leaves to local schools decisions about what specifically to serve,' 8' in
deference to their experience with what their students will actually eat.
Similarly, AFDC required employment and training programs but allowed states to determine the content of those programs: 8 2 If Florida's
E&T program ever were to teach ice-fishing, it would be no one's fault
but Florida's. States controlled standards and reimbursement rates for
179. In addition, decentralization is commonly cited as justification for dismantling
federal standards that seek to assure a functional entitlement. Arguably, however,
decentralized programs need clear performance standards more than those administered

directly by the federal government. By analogy, a shopkeeper is likely to give much looser
instructions to her staff if she plans to be present in the store all day than if she expects to
be away. Even if she has absolute faith in her staff's desire to "do the right thing," she still
needs to let them know what objectives they are trying to meet.

180. 42 U.S.C. § 1758(a)(1)(A), (f)(1) (2000).
181. Id. § 1758(f)(4) (A).
182. 42 U.S.C. § 682(a)(1)(B), (d)(1)(B), (e), (f), (g) (1994) (repealed 1996).
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child care providers before and after PRWORA. Most of the decisions
that PRWORA decentralized involved distribution of benefits-basic
means-testing decisions on which state and local governments have no
obvious comparative advantage. People want and need money to largely
the same extent everywhere and are likely to respond similarly to financial incentives. PRWORA's proponents continuously repeated the mantra that decentralization would allow states to respond better to local conditions' 8 3 but had little to say about which specific decisions dependent
on those conditions had been denied to states under prior law.
In addition, even if we believe that the federal government is experiencing political market failure,' 8 4 it behooves us to determine the extent
and intractability of that failure. We do not take a commodity completely
out of commerce simply because high information costs, monopoly, or
other distortions afflict its market. In the same way, the inefficiencies of
the ad hoc rationing systems that must operate in the absence of a responsive entitlement-and the additional inefficiencies of allocating
block grant funds among states-are a high and often unnecessary price
to pay for correcting a discrete failure of the federal political system. If,
as PRWORA's proponents argued, the federal government was politically
incapable of imposing tough work requirements, 8 5 giving states the authority to do so within the existing responsive entitlement (and perhaps
imposing work participation rates on the states to insure that they did so)
would seem a more focused response to the perceived problem.' 8 6 In
either case, where authority is more efficiently decentralized because of
the importance of local factors or because of political market failure at
the federal level, the advantages of decentralization should be weighed
against the inefficiencies of eliminating a responsive entitlement. This
weighing might lead policymakers to search more diligently for systems
183. See, e.g., 141 Cong. Rec. 8492 (1995) (statement of House Ways and Means
Committee Chairman Archer) (declaring that "the foundation of [the legislation that
became PRWORA] is our commitment to shrink the Federal Government by returning
power and flexibility to the States and communities where the needy can be helped the
most").
184. See infra notes 338-341 and accompanying text.
185. During the political frenzy that engulfed the welfare reform debate of
1995-1996, this remarkable argument was allowed to pass without serious scrutiny.
PRWORA's supporters' leading piece of evidence that the federal government was
incapable of imposing serious work requirements was the low number of AFDC recipients
engaged in employment and training activities as a result of the Family Support Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343. E.g., 141 Cong. Rec. 9100 (1995) (statement of
Rep. Talent). Yet this failure resulted primarily from states' failure to draw down the funds
the Family Support Act provided for work programs. In any more reflective political
environment, it is difficult to imagine how the states' entropy could be charged to the
federal government and could justify giving those same states far greater control of federal
funds.
186. In fact, once the block grant mechanism had been decided upon, conservatives
largely abandoned arguments about failures of the federal political market. Indeed, the
dominant theme of the 2002-2003 reauthorization of the TANF block grant has been
greater federal control of work requirements through tougher work participation rates.
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while maintaining responsive

C. Responsive and FunctionalEntitlements' Impact on Programs' Policy Goals
A fundamental tension in the design of means-tested public benefits
programs exists between targeting aid on those most in need and providing incentives for work and other favored behavior. 187 Given the difficulty of accommodating these two purposes under the best of circumstances, policymakers should take care to avoid programmatic structures
that exacerbate the conflict or reduce a program's effectiveness in serving
one of these goals without simultaneously improving its results on the
other.
1. Incentive Effects. - A traditional economic criticism of meanstested public benefit programs is that they dampen work incentives.' 8 8 In
effect, this criticism asserts that the government, acting as a supplier of
income, is unfairly or undesirably competing with other suppliers of income, specifically private employers1 89 (and perhaps prospective
spouses 90 ). The ascendancy of these arguments has coincided with attacks against entitlement programs. In fact, responsive entitlements
often provide clearer incentives than programs with capped participation. A responsive entitlement provides greater certainty about the consequences of taking a particular action than a capped program. A claim187. Compare, e.g., David T. Ellwood, Poor Support 24-25 (1988) (corresponding to
the "moral judgment" model of program operations and describing the "conundrum" that
"when we target people [in need], we often label them, change the rules, lower their
incentives, and break down the political links that help maintain public support for aid"),
with, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Bureaucratic Justice 21-23 (1983) (corresponding to the
'professional treatment" vision of program operations).
188. See, e.g., Kathryn Edin & Laura Lein, Making Ends Meet 218 (1997) ("The
federal welfare rules present welfare-reliant mothers with a stark choice: follow the ruleswhich disallow supplemental income-and subject their families to severe hardship, or
break the rules. Virtually all welfare-reliant mothers with whom we spoke . . . chose their
family's welfare."); Ellwood, supra note 187, at 19-20 (arguing that there is no serious
dispute that "[w]hen you give people money, food, or housing, you reduce the pressure on
them to work and care for themselves"); Posner, supra note 143, at 479-80 (discussing
various means of addressing the "incentive problem" inherent in cash transfers); Michael
Tanner et al., Cato Inst., Policy Analysis No. 240, The Work Versus Welfare Trade-off: An
Analysis of the Total Level of Welfare Benefits by State (Sept. 19, 1995), available at http://
www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-240.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) ("The choice
of welfare over work is often a rational decision based on the economic incentives
presented.").
189. Ellwood, supra note 187, at 137-41 (describing how the perverse incentives of
the welfare program leave many recipients with no viable income-producing alternative
other than to remain on welfare).
190. See, e.g., Patrick F. Fagan et al., Heritage Found., Backgrounder No. 1606,
Marriage and Welfare Reform: The Overwhelming Evidence that Marriage Education
Works 3 (Oct. 25, 2002), available at http://www.heritage.org/research/welfare/
bg1606.cfm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (arguing that "the welfare system has
punished marriage and rewarded single parenthood for a generation").
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ant may misjudge the incentives that a capped program offers, either
over- or under-estimating the chances that he or she may qualify (and
hence be affected by the program's incentives). Claimants that respond
to what they believe are a program's incentives only to be denied benefits
due to a cap are likely to become cynical and less sensitive to incentives in
the future. 19 1
More importantly, a responsive entitlement differs from a capped
program with a similar budget in that it distributes a reduced or more
conditional benefit to all claimants rather than applying more generous
rules to a fortunate subset of those eligible. If the program achieves equilibrium by reducing the benefit package, it will have a smaller amount to
phase out and can do so more gradually. 19 2 If, on the other hand, the
responsive entitlement reaches equilibrium by making the benefit more
conditional, the conditions selected can seek to provide positive
19 3
incentives.
Responsive entitlements also reinforce the importance of behavior
eligibility conditions. Consider a program whose eligibility conditions include a work requirement. If that program is a responsive entitlement,
the value of complying with that work requirement equals the value of
the benefit the program provides. If, however, the program caps participation at a level equal to half of aggregate demand, complying with the
work requirement only brings a fifty percent chance of a reward; assuming that a claimant is risk neutral, she will discount the value of complying by half. More likely, since complying has direct and opportunity costs
to the claimant, she may be somewhat risk-averse towards the program.
The message that work requirement sends also may be muddled. From
the claimant's point of view, it may appear that techniques for manipulating the program's priority system are at least as important as complying
with the program's requirements. Indeed, if administrators' struggles to
191. Late in the debate on PRWORA, Sen. Moseley-Braun made this point, arguing
that repealing the responsive entitlement to cash assistance undermined the bill's work
conditions: "This legislation does not give able-bodied people a chance to work and
support their own children." 142 Cong. Rec. 18,485 (1996).
192. For example, phasing out a $1,000 benefit in such a way that claimants become
ineligible when their earnings reach $10,000 allows benefit reductions that offset only ten
percent of the rewards from increased work effort. By contrast, a $2,000 benefit being
phased out over the same income range would require twenty percent of the value of each
increase in claimants' wages to be siphoned off. For a general discussion of the problem of
phasing down benefits, see Edgar K. Browning &Jacquelene M. Browning, Public Finance
and the Price System 281-85 (3d ed. 1987); Cong. Budget Office, Implicit Marginal Tax
Rates: Comparing the Health Security Act and the Managed Competition Act with
Current Law 7-9 (1994) [hereinafter Implicit Marginal Tax Rates]; David A. Super et al.,
Ctr. on Budget & Policy Priorities, Warning: Inadequate Low-Income Subsidy Design Can
Cause Problems for Health Care Reform x-xiii (1994).
193. To be sure, another possibility would be to impose stricter financial eligibility
conditions. This could result in phasing out the same benefit over a shorter range of
incomes, increasing implicit marginal tax rates. See Implicit Marginal Tax Rates, supra
note 192, at 7-9.
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stay within their cap have led to frequent, unexplained changes in the
program's rules, the claimant may suspect that the rules are in fact a
sham and that favoritism rather than compliance is what matters.
Other economic analyses of public benefit programs' impact are
likely to depend on assumptions that a program is or is not a responsive
or functional entitlement and to become problematic when those assumptions are not met. For example, Judge Posner criticizes the inefficiencies that result from differences in the generosity of public benefit
programs. 194 In addition to arguing that society as a whole loses when
low-income families move to high-benefit states for no useful economic
purpose, he also finds that low-income families as a group also lose because more claimants must share a fixed relief budget in the destination
state. 19 5 This assumes that the destination state imposes a hard cap on its
spending for benefits rather than operating a more flexible responsive
entitlement. More particularly, it assumes that spending on relief is perfectly inelastic relative to changes in the liberality of the program-that
the supply curve in Figures 1-7, above, is vertical. While possible, this
seems unlikely.
A more realistic assumption would have yielded a more ambiguous
story. If the political system in the new state accepted the increase in
demand, average benefit levels would stay constant and the low-income
population as a whole would not lose. If, on the other hand, the destination state resented the influx of claimants-if the supply function for
benefits remained unchanged-the liberality of the benefit program
would decline to reach a new equilibrium. The aggregate amount of benefits distributed, however, would rise as the public becomes more willing
to support the program as it adopts stricter rules.
Judge Posner also assumes that low-benefit states will be "en19 6
courage [d]" in their parsimonious policies by the outflow of claimants.
Here, he effectively assumes that the supply of benefits in these states is
completely elastic relative to the liberality of the program-that while the
supply curves for benefits in generous states are completely vertical, the
more miserly states' supply curves are horizontal. 19 7 These assumptions
are exceedingly difficult to reconcile; if anything, one might expect somewhat more elasticity in a high-benefit state. A more realistic view would
have the demand curves shifting to the left in the low-benefit state as a
result of the out-migration, resulting in some liberalization in the program that partially offsets the decline in participation. Eventually, with
194. Posner, supra note 143, at 675-76.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 675.
197. Put another way, Posner assumes that the high-benefit state operates with a
completely fixed budget for benefits which it divides up among whatever claimants appear
at its doors but that the low-benefit state pockets any savings from out-migration rather
than giving each remaining claimant larger benefits as its relative share of the pie
increases. It is unclear why this would be so.
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increased demand driving down effective benefit levels in generous states
and declining demand allowing liberalizations in low-benefit states, one
could imagine the gap between the two shrinking. Over time, the states'
policies might converge to the point that, after accounting for differences
in living costs, the increase in benefits families would reap from moving
would no longer offset their moving costs and the value of the informal
supports (e.g., child care from relatives) they would be leaving behind in
the low-benefit state. In fact, this already appears to be the case. 198
2. TargetingEffects. - Responsive entitlements also produce positive
distributional effects, helping to target society's resources better on those
most in need. They improve targeting both of society's overall fiscal policies and of that subset serving low-income people.
For many types of benefits, a responsive entitlement is the only conceivable method of administration. Tax expenditures operate as responsive entitlements since no one could determine and pay his taxes if the
availability of a deduction or credit depended on a subsequent discretionary decision by a tax administrator. 199 Similarly, administering a participation cap on the large middle-class benefit programs such as Social Security and Medicare would be both politically and administratively
inconceivable. Thus, a disproportionate share of the programs that
could plausibly operate without responsive entitlements are those that focus on low-income people. This suggests that, if the polity turns against
responsive entitlements, the impacts of enrollment caps, arbitrary deci198. Posner was commenting on durational residency requirements of the kind struck
down in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969), as a "crude and only partially
effective" response to the incentives to move that differential benefit levels create. Posner,
supra note 143, at 676. In Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 506-07 (1999), the Court reaffirmed
and strengthened Shapiro's result, striking down policies that provided reduced grants
(rather than none at all) to people traveling between states. In fact, extensive evidence
presented in the Saenz litigation suggests that differences in benefit levels do not appear to
play a significant part in low-income people's decisions to move. Roe v. Anderson, 966 F.
Supp. 977, 981-82 (E.D. Cal. 1997) (discussing evidence submitted in support of lower
court's order ultimately affirmed in Saenz). The loss of informal supports-spot
babysitting, emergency loans, and companionship-from friends and family, the cost of
moving, and the often higher cost of living in states with higher benefit levels all tend to
offset the difference in benefit levels.
199. According to Price Waterhouse's budget expert Stanley Collender, proposals for
tax expenditures "would be politically unacceptable if they were framed as the new
entitlements that they really are." Steven Pearlstem & Clay Chandler, Tax Reform Falling
Prey to Tax Cuts: In Political Battle, Economics Loses Out, Wash. Post, Dec. 18, 1994, at
Al (quoting Collender). See generally, Senate Comm. on the Budget, 104th Cong., Tax
Expenditures: Compendium of Background Material on Individual Provisions (Comm.
Print 1996) (cataloging rules forgoing tax revenues otherwise owing in order to reward,
assist, or provide incentives to various groups and behaviors). One exception is the
"demonstration project" in medical savings accounts (MSAs), which generally makes the
tax benefits of contributing to those accounts unavailable to new claimants after 750,000
taxpayers have done so. Id. at 422. Since the number claiming MSA tax preferences has
never approached this threshold, the administrative and equity issues that could then arise
have gone unexplored.
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sionmaking, and the general inefficiency of the nonentitlement structure
will be borne disproportionately by low-income people.
In addition, the lack of a responsive entitlement is likely to misallocate resources even within the low-income population. Persons needing
assistance during economic booms will be treated more generously than
those suffering along with many others during recessions. Since help
from friends, relatives, and private charities also may be more available
during periods when most are prospering, this redistribution seems difficult to justify. Conversely, a responsive entitlement redistributes resources from persons in prosperous times to those needing help during
20 0
recessions.
D. Macreconomic Effects of Responsive Entitlements
A responsive entitlement can act as an automatic stabilizer, stimulating the economy with additional spending during downturns and shrinking back when conditions improve. 20 1 As the number of poor and unemployed people rises, claims for food stamps and unemployment
compensation increase. 20 2 In addition, in a slack economy, more older
workers will elect to retire and begin drawing Social Security and Medicare. Moreover, during regional recessions, responsive entitlements automatically target additional spending on distressed areas without wasting
money on regions that continue to prosper.
In theory, Congress could increase spending for programs with
capped enrollment or funding to compensate for recessions. In practice,
this rarely works well. The administration's party may delay the relief because it fears being blamed for any downturn it admits is taking place.
Relief may be delayed further by battles over the form it should take and
which levels of government should control the funding. 20 3 Moreover,
200. If the program's rules remain constant, this redistribution will achieve equality of
treatment between the two groups. As discussed supra Part II.A, however, society may be
more willing to help people during recessions. If the supply curve for benefits shifts
farther to the right than the demand curve, some liberalization of the program's rules may
be possible on behalf of those needing aid during a recession.
201. See, e.g., Kondratas, supra note 6, at 6-7 ("[T]he [food stamp] program has...
served to mitigate the effects of regional recessions by increasing federal transfer payments
in such regions precisely at the time necessary to produce the greatest countercyclical
effects); Food Stamps, supra note 12, at 3 (explaining how the food stamp program
expands during recessions and contracts during economic recoveries).
202. See, e.g., Randy Rosso, Mathematica Policy Research, Characteristics of Food
Stamp Households: Fiscal Year 2001, at 11 (2003), available at http://www.mathematicampr.com/pdfs/2001charreport.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (showing that
the number of food stamp participants, persons in poverty, and unemployed persons all
track changes in macroeconomic performance).
203. During each of the last two recessions, by the time Congress and the President
could agree upon an extension of unemployment insurance benefits, the recession was
technically over. See job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-147,
tit. II, 116 Stat. 21, 26 (creating temporary extended unemployment compensation
program in response to recession of 2001); Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act
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much of the spending resulting from increased caps is likely to be mistargeted where a downturn has hit some parts of the country more than
others: Even if only some states are in distress, all are represented in
Congress and will want "their share" of any new spending. Finally, the
"emergency" spending may be difficult to end once the economy turns
around since the recipient programs will try to claim it as part of their
baselines.
E. Conclusion
The complexity of a given program's eligibility conditions is a function of a variety of political and policy factors. The more complex a system is, the greater the administrative cost, both to agencies 20 4 and to
claimants. 20 5 Whatever level of complexity society might otherwise settle
upon, however, is likely to increase substantially if it must ration benefits
among an excess of claimants drawn to the program by eligibility rules
more liberal than society is prepared to extend. These rationing systems
also misallocate scarce resources among competing claimants much as
systems to ration price-controlled goods tend to steer those goods to buyers that value them less than other prospective buyers. Constraining participation with eligibility rules rather than caps-maintaining a responsive entitlement-will both reduce the share of the program's resources
required for administration and allocate benefits to those most in need.
By making the receipt or non-receipt of benefits more predictable, responsive entitlements also help programs better calibrate incentives for
claimants. "Responsive entitlements also allow faster and more accurate
adjustments to the business cycle, to diverging conditions among regions,
and to other changes in the extent of need than does relying on the political process to make those adjustments manually.
Responsive entitlements often will not be the most appropriate
model for programs whose primary purpose is to build capital for society-such as pilot programs to develop knowledge about how a particular
program design works or educational programs to build a corps of people
trained in a particular trade or profession-but offer a clearly superior
of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-164, tit. I, 105 Stat. 1049, 1049 (establishing emergency
unemployment compensation program in response to recession of 1990-1991); Nat'l
Bureau of Economic Research, Business Cycle Expansions and Contractions (2003), at
http://www.nber.org/cycles (last visited Feb. 24, 2004) (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (estimating that the recession of 1990-1991 ended in March 1991 and that the
recession of 2001 ended in November 2001); 47 Cong. Q. Almanac 301-10 (1991)
(describing tortuous political history of the 1991 extension of unemployment
compensation). Similarly, President Clinton's proposed 1993 "stimulus package," which
targeted resources on cities, faced sufficient opposition from state-oriented Republicans
that it stalled in the Senate until evidence of strong economic recovery mooted the case for
it. 49 Cong. Q. Almanac 706-09 (1993).
204. Super, Offering an Invisible Hand, supra note 121, at 852-53.
205. Id. at 832-36.
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means of administering programs whose primary purpose is to benefit
their recipients.
Functional entitlements offer significant efficiency advantages of
their own. Particularly where legal or practical considerations limit beneficiaries' ability to supplement the benefit they receive, programs that
provide benefits inadequate to purchase a good or service on the open
market risk creating a shadow market for a highly inferior version of that
good or service. That market will function badly because demand will be
almost completely elastic with respect to price increases above the
amount of the subsidy. Alternatively, a different set of inefficiencies are
likely to result from claimants' attempts to supplement the benefit
illicitly.
Significantly, this argument for entitlement structures assumes that
society is able to express its policy preferences at least as well through
eligibility rules and the articulation of functional goals for programs as
through caps on participation and benefits-that is, that setting the strictness of eligibility rules or setting the size of a program cap are both effective means by which society can convey how generous it is willing to be in
providing a particular benefit. The next section tests that assumption. It
finds that entitlement structures in fact are not just adequate but clearly
superior vehicles for transparent political debate.
III.

THE POLITICS OF ENTITLEMENTS

The choice between entitlement and nonentitlement structures also
has significant implications for the transparency of the political debate
concerning a program. Most familiar, perhaps, are arguments that positive entitlements empower unelected judges to make policy in disregard
of the political process's wishes. Part III.A briefly examines this argument. It finds little evidence of a serious threat to democratic legitimacy
and indeed some reason to believe that legally enforceable rights are essential to keeping the political process relevant.
More broadly, this section finds that, in addition to creating serious
inefficiencies in the economic sphere, the lack of entitlement structures
can create troubling political inefficiencies as well. Specifically, as Part
III.B explains, responsive, functional, and relatively unconditional entitlements are far easier to describe intelligently and reliably to the general
public and hence foster political transparency. By contrast, nonentitlement programs are more difficult for the public to monitor and are much
more likely to produce results that differ significantly from what the public believes it is supporting.
Part III.C then discusses two important ways in which this difficulty
has distorted the political treatment of these programs, further obscuring
these programs' policies. As a result, nonentitlement programs have
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fared less well in the political process. 20 6 Finally, as Part III.D explains,
these distortions have led many actors to take political positions toward
entitlement that ill-reflect their professed values.
A. Positive Entitlements and Democratic Legitimacy
Before addressing the effect that the lack of responsive and functional entitlement structures (and relatively conditional programs) have
on political debates, it is necessary to consider whether the legal structures that often accompany these kinds of entitlements are antithetical to
democratic governance. Both liberal and conservative politicians have
criticized public benefits litigation under positive entitlements as improperly arrogating policymaking authority from elected officials. 20 7 These
complaints offer a possible justification for stripping public benefits
claimants of positive entitlements: the restoration of democratic legitimacy. This argument, however, does not bear close scrutiny.
First, it should be noted that some of these specific accusations may
be somewhat disingenuous: The critics, rather than the courts, may be
the ones deviating from the original intent of the legislation. 20 8 Thus,
some politicians may accuse the courts of twisting legislative intent to
allow themselves to claim that they are only restoring the program to its
agreed-upon rules rather than having to carry the burden of persuasion
on the merits of their proposed change. In effect, they argue that a prior
legislature considered the merits of their proposal so current policymakers need not.
More generally, the enforcement of entitlements can serve an important democracy-enhancing purpose. Litigation enforcing responsive or
functional entitlements typically seeks to enforce promises made in legislation or administrative rules. 20 9 If those promises have become unwork206. As with the economic analysis above, this section focuses on responsive,
functional, and relatively unconditional entitlements (and their opposites). Other types of
entitlements also generate important political issues. See, e.g., Stephen F. Williams,
Liberty and Property: The Problem of Government Benefits, 12 J. Legal Stud. 3, 13-14
(1983) (arguing that the binary nature of legal entitlement theory creates perverse
incentives for government to avoid setting firm rules for programs).
207. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 95464, at 246 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1978, 2191 (describing Food Stamp Act of 1977, which dramatically liberalized food stamp
eligibility, as also designed to prevent policy from being made through claimants'
litigation); James Graham, The Enemies of the Poor 121 (1970) (describing the outrage of
then-Governor Reagan and West Virginia Democratic Senator Robert Byrd over legal
services litigation on public benefit programs).
208. Indeed, the question of whether the courts should even try to ascertain legislative
intent is intensely controversial far beyond the bounds of public benefits law. See, e.g.,
Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation 16-18 (1997) (critiquing role of legislative
intent in statutory interpretation).
209. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Johnston, 701 F.2d 337, 346-47 (5th Cir. 1983) (enforcing
Medicaid statute's commitment to cover all necessary medical care for children through its
early and periodic screening, diagnosis, and treatment (EPSDT) component); Rodway v.
U.S. Dep't of Agric., 514 F.2d 809, 818 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (enforcing commitment in Food
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able or inadvisable for any reason, a proposal to amend or repeal them
allows far more open debate about the available alternatives than an
agency's covert non-compliance 210 or appropriators' quiet shorting of a
program's funding. 2 11 Some courts' aggressive efforts to construe eligibility conditions narrowly may sometimes produce results that the political process did not intend. They are not outliers in this regard. For example, numerous interpretive presumptions that courts have imposed on
legislatures for a variety of policy purposes openly disavow efforts to determine the actual will of the democratic process. 2 12 Moreover, on other
occasions, litigation narrowing or expanding eligibility may facilitate
democratic choice by forcing the political branches to make explicit their
2 13
desire to grant or deny benefits to a particular group of claimants.
Most importantly, legislators can readily override these decisions; little
evidence suggests that courts willfully resist legislative efforts to override
2 14
their decisions.
Nor do positive entitlements lead to litigation that raises serious issues of institutional competence. Litigation seeking to enforce responStamp Act of 1964, as amended in 1971, to provide a nutritionally adequate diet);
Robertson v.Jackson, 766 F. Supp. 470, 476 (E.D. Va. 1991) (finding that lack of resources
does not excuse state agency's noncompliance with federal law).
210. See Super, Offering an Invisible Hand, supra note 121, at 839-42 (discussing
policy implications of invisibility of informal rationing systems).
211. For example, whatever one's perspective on taxes, one could hardly argue that a
country with feeble enforcement of tax laws operates in a more democratically legitimate
manner than one in which candidates run on anti-tax platforms and then amend the laws
to reduce taxes upon winning office.
212. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460-61 (1991) (requiring a plain
statement to construe anti-discrimination law as impinging upon traditional areas of state
sovereignty); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248-51 (1991) (presuming
Congress did not intend anti-discrimination laws to apply overseas absent a very plain
statement to the contrary).
213. The classic example of this is King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 333-34 (1968), which
struck down state rules denying AFDC to women receiving frequent male visitors. The
federal agency responsible for AFDC had issued a memo several years earlier finding that
these "man in the house" rules were unlawful but had failed to enforce that interpretation.
Prior to Smith, this issue was difficult to join politically at the federal level: Legislation to
outlaw these rules would be redundant with the agency's memo, yet proponents of those
rules had no reason to propose legislation since the memo was not being enforced. After
Smith, proponents had a clear reason to seek legislation reinstating "man in the house"
rules. Their inability even to start moving legislation rendered a clear political verdict
against those rules.
214. Compare, e.g., Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251, 264 (1974) (interpreting statute
to exclude moneys not actually available to a family from consideration in AFDC's means
test), with Heckler v. Turner, 470 U.S. 184, 199-200 (1985) (unanimously abandoning the
actual availability principle in light of a contrary provision of the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1981); compare also Lewis v. Grinker, 965 F.2d 1206, 1214-15 (2d
Cir. 1992) (finding undocumented women eligible for prenatal coverage in Medicaid
despite statutory language that concededly suggested the opposite outcome), with Lewis v.
Thompson, 252 F.3d 567, 580, 589 (2d Cir. 2001) (vitiating earlier orders in response to
PRWORA's clear prohibition on providing non-emergency Medicaid to undocumented
immigrants).
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sive entitlements or challenging eligibility conditions typically calls for legal analysis of the kind that is common in administrative law-and
typically subject to Chevron 2 1 5 deference, making claimants unlikely to
win except where they have very strong cases. 2 16 Challenges to agencies'
compliance with functional entitlements may require judicial fact find2 17
ing, but this, too, is constrained by the Administrative Procedure Act.
B. The Innate Lack of Transparency of Nonentitlement Programs
With neither a functional nor a responsive entitlement, a public benefit program is likely to be almost impossible to describe meaningfully to
the general public. "We give some money to some senior citizens" may be
accurate, but it provides no basis for even the most tentative assessment
of the merits or adequacy of the program. Saying "we provide some food
assistance to some low-income people" conveys that the benefit is provided for an undeniable human need and that it is means-tested, but does
little more than that. The same phrase could apply equally to the food
stamp program, serving over twenty-one million people in an average
month, 218 and a one-time giveaway of surplus cheese. Few viable alternatives are available for describing the scope of a program that is not a
responsive entitlement or the purpose of a program that is not a func2 19
tional entitlement.
215. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844
(1984) ("[C]onsiderable weight should be accorded to an executive department's
construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer ....
).
216. See, e.g., Alexander v. Glickman, 139 F.3d 733, 736 (9th Cir. 1998) (deferring to
agency policy denying food stamp eligibility to households with vehicles in which they held
no equity despite legislative history and contemporaneous agency construction indicating
that such vehicles were exempt).
217. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000).
218. Database Monitoring Branch, U.S. Dep't of Agric., Program Information Report
tbl.2 (2003).
219. This difficulty in articulating meaningful differences between policy choices in
nonentitlement programs is also a serious impediment to litigation concerning these
programs. The U.S. Supreme Court has largely foreclosed such litigation under the
federal Constitution, e.g., Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 234-35 (1981) (reaffirming
that only a "reasonable basis" is required when Congress makes classifications in social
welfare programs such as Medicaid), but the problem remains where state courts have
interpreted their constitutions' equal protection clauses more broadly. See generally
Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal
Rationality Review, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 1132, 1144-53, 1168-83 (1999) (suggesting that
many factors constraining federal courts from scrutinizing social welfare program rules
closely do not apply to state courts interpreting their own constitutions). The most actively
litigated state constitutional declaration of welfare rights is Article XVII, Section 1, of the
New York Constitution, which provides that "[t]he aid, care and support of the needy are
public concerns and shall be provided by the state and by such of its subdivisions, and in
such manner and by such means, as the legislature may from time to time determine."
N.Y. Const. art. XVII, § 1. This language appears to create a responsive entitlement, see,
e.g., Tucker v. Toia, 371 N.E.2d 449, 451-53 (N.Y. 1977) (finding that "section 1 of article
XVII imposes upon the State an affirmative duty to aid the needy"), but the New York
courts have relied on the reference to the legislature to reject most claims of functional
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This difficulty in describing nonentitlement programs systematically
skews political debates about them. In particular, it greatly complicates
advocacy for expanding or preserving such programs and provides opportunities for dedicated opponents to maneuver program reductions going
far beyond what policymakers and voters think they are approving. These
problems thus should be of concern to supporters of social programs
across the political spectrum.
1. Responsive Entitlements. - The obvious way to describe a program
that is not a responsive entitlement is in terms of the number of people
or families it serves. For communicating with the general public, or even
most policymakers, this is unlikely to be terribly meaningful. Even
among those that have devoted their lives to working for low-income people, few likely could state within the nearest five million the number of
people in the United States living below the poverty line. 2 20 Thus, knowing, for example, that the food stamp program serves between twenty-one
and twenty-two million people in an average month is unlikely to convey
22
very much to most people. '
entitlement. See, e.g., Bernstein v. Toia, 373 N.E.2d 238, 244 (N.Y. 1977) (holding that
Article XVII applies only "to questions of impermissible exclusion of the needy from
eligibility for benefits, not to the absolute sufficiency of the benefits distributed to each
eligible recipient"); Hershkoff, supra, at 151-52 (noting that New York courts are
deferential to legislative decisions regarding the adequacy of benefits provided). But see
Fulton v. Krauskopf, 484 N.Y.S.2d 982, 984 (Sup. Ct. 1984) (finding a functional
entitlement to funds sufficient to allow homeless parents to pay transit fare to escort their
children to school). As for eligibility conditions-in essence the legislature's ability to
restrict who is deemed "needy" or what steps they must take to obtain aid-the courts'
holdings have been quirky. Compare Aliessa v. Novello, 754 N.E.2d 1085, 1088 (N.Y. 2001)
(striking down restrictions on immigrants' eligibility for Medicaid), with Alvarino v. Wing,
690 N.Y.S.2d 262, 263 (App. Div. 1999) (upholding similar restrictions on immigrants'
eligibility for state-funded food assistance). The overall result of this effort to define
constitutional welfare rights without functional entitlements or clear standards for how
conditional those rights may be made has been mixed.
220. For 2002, the latest year for which the Census Bureau has released data, that
number is 34.6 million, up three million from two years before. Ctr. on Budget & Policy
Priorities, Poverty Increases and Median Income Declines for Second Consecutive Year
(Sept. 29, 2003), available at http://www.cbpp.org/9-26-03pov.htm (on file with the
Columbia Law Review). Since 1978, when it was at 24.5 million, that number soared to 39.3
million in 1993 and then began to decline slowly until the recent recession. 2000 Green
Book, supra note 134, at 1285.
221. This measure, and others like it, tend to be complicated by numerous other
factors that most policymakers and the vast majority of the general public would not
anticipate and would have difficulty evaluating even if they were pointed out. For example,
if told the number of people in poverty and the number receiving food stamps in an
average month, the average person's natural tendency would be to compare the two. Such
a comparison could be deceptive: The Census Bureau measures poverty on an annual
basis, but food stamp eligibility is determined monthly. Many families whose annual
income exceeds the poverty line are poor for some months. Also, the number of food
stamp recipients includes a modest number above the poverty line. And although 21.3
million people received food stamps in an average month in federal fiscal year 2003, the
number receiving food stamps at some point during that year was roughly fifty percent
higher because of the constant turnover in the rolls. See Philip Gleason, et al.,
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Describing programs in financial terms is likely to be even less meaningful. Evaluating a program's budget requires knowledge of at least
three factors, none of which is likely to be within the command of any but
fairly sophisticated audiences: the size of the population needing the
benefit, the average cost of the benefit, and the program's administrative
costs. In a country as large as ours, virtually any program's budget will
sound impressive. The 2002 farm bill provided $80 million over six years
222
for a tiny, basically insignificant farmers' market nutrition program.
Yet most voters' only real frame of financial reference is their own family
budget, which is obviously inadequate to evaluate even figures far short of
$80 million.
When a program is described in terms of its current participation or
budget, the most common point of comparison is its participation or
budget in a prior year. This can be highly misleading, however, because
eligibility and need are likely to change sharply over time. Comparisons
also often neglect the effects of inflation. 223 Thus, opponents of the food
stamp program asserted that it was growing "out of control" when several
million economically displaced people began receiving benefits immediately before, during, and after the recession of the early 1990s. 224 In fact,
it would have been more convincing evidence of problems in design or

Mathematica Policy Research, The Dynamics of Food Stamp Program Participation in the
Early 1990s 58 (1998), available at http://www.fns.usda.gov/oane/MENU/published/
FSP/FILES/Participation/Dynamics.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (finding
that over half of all food stamp households left the program within six months in the
economically prosperous 1980s while over half left within nine months in the more
depressed early 1990s).
For what it is worth, the average monthly number of people receiving food stamps in
1994 and 1995 was equal to 72% and 73%, respectively, of the number of families in
poverty those years. U.S. Census Bureau, Historical Poverty Tables, tbl.2 (2003), available
at http://www.census.gov/hhes/poverty/histpov/hstpov2.html (on file with the Columbia
Law Review); Tabulated Keydata Reports, supra note 129. That ratio had dropped to 54%
by 2000. U.S. Census Bureau, supra, tbl. 2; Tabulated Keydata Reports, supra note 129.
Over the same period, USDA estimates that the food stamp participation rate-the
percentage of eligible people receiving food stamps in an average month-fell from 74.8%
in 1994 to 57.9% in 1999 before rebounding slightly in 2000 to 59.3%. Karen
Cunnyngham, Trends in Food Stamp Program Participation Rates: 1994 to 2000, at 10
(2002), available at http://www.mathematica-mpr.com/PDFs/trends.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review)
222. Food Stamp Reauthorization Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-171, § 4402, 116 Stat.
134, 334.
223. See, e.g., 141 Cong. Rec. 8506 (1995) (statement of Rep. Richardson)
("Republicans have been claiming they are not really cutting the School Lunch
Program... [but t] heir supposed spending 'increases' don't take into account rising food
costs, inflation, or increases in number of kids who need the program.").
224. See, e.g., id. at 24,559 (statement of Sen. Ashcroft) (attributing "exponential[ ]"
increase in food stamp spending to "fraud and abuse, compounded by oversight").
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management had the program failed to shrink rapidly when the economy
225
recovered.
Probably the best way to describe a program that is not a responsive
entitlement is in terms of the percentage of eligible people or families
that it serves. Little technical sophistication is required to comprehend
the qualitative difference between a program reaching five percent of
those eligible and one that serves over eighty percent of potential benefi226
ciaries. Estimating those ratios, however, is rarely straightforward.
Measuring the percentage of applicants served or the average time on a
waiting list, for example, ignores potential claimants who do not bother
to apply because they know a program is oversubscribed. On the other
hand, assuming that all eligible persons would receive benefits if they
were freely available also does not make sense: Even in well-established
responsive entitlements such as food stamps and SSI, a significant share
of the eligible population never applies. 22 7 Also, some eligibility requirements' impact on the size of the eligible population can be difficult or
impossible to estimate. Thus, few programs have a widely accepted participation rate and for virtually none is this figure included in many public discussions of the program. When the public reads media stories
about WIC and federal housing assistance programs, it has no way of
knowing that the former serves over eighty percent of eligible claim229
ants228 and the latter about a quarter.
In the absence of any intelligible basis for understanding programs
differently, the news media and its public-as well as even many policymakers and analysts who ought to know better-tend to assume that programs operate as responsive entitlements. 23 0 For the public, this assump225. In fact, food stamp participation dropped by about forty percent-about eleven
million people-from its peak in March 1994 until its trough in 2000, prior to the recent
recession.
226. See, e.g., Laura A. Casmer & Allen L. Schirm, Mathematica Policy Research,
Empirical Bayes Shrinkage Estimates of State Food Stamp Participation Rates for
1998-2000: Final Report 7 (March 2003), available at http://www.mathematica-mpr.com/
PDFs/empbay2000.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) ("[D]irect sample estimates
of participation rates are relatively imprecise."); National Research Council, Estimating
Eligibility and Participation for the WIC Program 21-29 (Michele Ver Ploeg & David M.
Betson eds., 2001), available at http://www.nap.edu/books/0309075904/html/Rl.htnl
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (outlining current methods for estimating eligibility
and full-funding participation).
227. See Karen Cunnyngham, Mathematica Policy Research, Trends in Food Stamp
Program Participation Rates: 1999 to 2001, at 6 n.8 (2003), available at http://
www.fns.usda.gov/oane/MENU/published/FSP/FILES/Participation/Trends19992001.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (asserting that individuals who leave TANF
often are unaware of their continuing eligibility for food stamps).
228. See 2000 Green Book, supra note 134, at 961.
229. Ctr. on Budget & Policy Priorities, Introduction to the Housing Voucher
Program 2 (2003), available at http://www.cbpp.org/5-15-03hous.pdf (on file with
Columbia Law Review).
230. The same erroneous assumptions cause the media and the public, sometimes
encouraged by politicians, to assume that private charities operate as responsive
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tion makes sense: If a benefit is worth providing, why would it be worth
providing to only some of those determined to need it? Conversely, if
large portions of the population deemed to need the benefit are getting
by without it, perhaps the benefit is not so important after all.
More sophisticated observers similarly assume that programs operate
as responsive entitlements because serious discussion is difficult or impossible without doing so. The issue of declining cash assistance caseloads is
a case in point. The broad political coalition that enacted PRWORA was
united in its rejection of AFDC but did not have a common vision of what
should take its place. If the law's goal was simply to stop providing checks
to families, it could have prohibited states from doing so with federal
funds. Similarly, if the goal was to reduce the number of checks provided, it could have capped the number of families that could receive
checks. Yet neither PRWORA nor any major welfare bill introduced in
the 103d or 104th Congress did so. 2 31 Explicitly announcing that families
in need would be denied basic subsistence assistance simply because
some arbitrary quota had been met was a far harsher policy than almost
anyone was prepared to sell to the public. The public was told that
caseloads would decline as a result of positive efforts to help recipients
find alternatives. 232 After PRWORA passed, its supporters treated declinentitlements. See Janet Poppendieck, Sweet Charity? Emergency Food and the End of
Entitlement 210-13 (1998) (discussing emergency food recipients' frustration with
insufficient quantity of food provided by private charities).
231. All but a handful of House Republicans in the 103d Congress co-sponsored a
comprehensive welfare bill introduced by House Minority Leader Michel. See H.R. 3500,
103d Cong. (1993). It would have imposed extensive new work requirements, given states
the option to convert AFDC into a block grant, authorized states to deny benefits on
numerous new grounds, and capped spending on means-tested programs. Id. §§ 101-103,
301-306, 309, 901, 904, 701-702. It did not, however, limit the number of families that
could receive welfare checks. Indeed, it would have imposed penalties on states that took
the AFDC block grant and then used the funds for any purpose other than paying cash
grants to families. Id. § 301.
The most conservative major proposal in the 103d Congress probably was the bill
introduced by Sen. Lauch Faircloth and Rep. James Talent and co-sponsored by, among
others, Senate Republican Leader Robert Dole and future House Speaker J. Dennis
Hastert. S. 2134, 103d Cong. (1994); H.R. 4566, 103d Cong. (1994). It would have
eliminated programs, capped funding, and imposed severe work requirements. S. 2134,
§§ 603, 601, 101. This legislation did not, however, include any limits on the number of
families states might assist. Indeed, even its time limit was only a state option. Id. § 501.
When they took control of Congress in the 1994 elections, Republicans' time
increasingly was consumed with working on legislation moving towards enactment. As a
result, fewer Republicans introduced their own separate welfare bills. Again, the most
conservative was probably Sen. Faircloth's, again with Sen. Dole's co-sponsorship. S. 834,
104th Cong. (1995). This bill, like its predecessor, emphasized the dissolution of
programs, constraining funding, and imposing demanding work requirements. Id. §§ 112,
101, 213. It, too, would impose no limit on the number of families that could receive
checks.
232. See, e.g., Danny Westneat & Kery Murakami, State Lags in Welfare CutsLegislature About to Play Catch-Up, Seattle Times, Feb. 27, 1997, at Al (quoting
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ing caseloads as a measure of success, 23 3 implying that it was still a responsive entitlement. 23 4 The law's drafters plainly recognized the importance
of responsive entitlements: They relied on changes in participation in
the food stamp program-still a responsive entitlement-to measure in2 35
creased need in states, triggering the TANF contingency fund.
The mistaken assumption that a program is a responsive entitlement
weakens the program's supporters politically in efforts both to preserve
and to expand the program. Expanding such programs can be very difficult. Getting the public excited about doing something that it thinks it is
already doing is not easy. This is particularly true when budgetary limitations mean that, even if enacted, the proposed program still will serve
only a fraction of those determined eligible. On the other hand, the difference between meeting one-quarter of need and one-fifth of need
hardly sounds like an issue of principle.
Someone generally disinclined towards means-tested programs
might welcome the political difficulties that the lack of a responsive entitlement status imposes on a program's supporters. That approach, however, ignores the serious inefficiencies that result. The liabilities a particular program may have in garnering support are not likely to affect the
overall level of public support for social spending. Instead, they will tend
to shift that spending from the consolidation and improvement of existing programs into the creation of new ones. If the same amount of
money will modestly increase the percentage of eligible families receiving
housing subsidies or fund the creation of a new (nonentitlement) program for the homeless, the political benefit of the latter approach may be
far more apparent. Multiplying the number of programs will, of course,
increase the number of bureaucracies that must be funded to operate
them. And, as shown above, those will be relatively costly bureaucracies
commentators who suggest that work requirements are responsible for reduced welfare
roles).
233. E.g., Robert Rector, Comment, in The New World of Welfare 265-66 (Rebecca
M. Blank & Ron Haskins eds., 2001) (discussing Wisconsin's experience of declining
welfare caseloads with no increase in child poverty).
234. In fact, it appears that most states operated TANF-funded cash assistance
programs as responsive entitlements, at least until the recession of 2001 and the slack
economy that followed sapped states' revenues and wiped out their accumulated TANF
surpluses. The fallacy in assuming that sharply declining caseloads reflected equally sharp
declines in need therefore is a more subtle one: a failure to appreciate the impact of an
increase in conditionality of cash assistance benefits. After modest increases around the
beginning of the recession, cash assistance caseloads have become essentially static despite
substantial increases in unemployment and poverty. This apparent mismatch between
need and participation may reflect additional increases in the conditionality of benefitsespecially as time limits begin to affect significantly more people-or may indicate that
some administrators are using the discretion PRWORA granted them to impose de facto
caps by ratcheting up the conditionality of their programs steeply as participation exceeds
desired levels. See Super, Offering an Invisible Hand, supra note 121, at 847-48 (linking
declining cash assistance caseloads to informal rationing).
235. 42 U.S.C. § 603(b) (6) (B) (2000).
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since they must ration benefits among an overadequate number of suitors. Finally, the lack of a responsive entitlement is likely to force society
to make a series of apples-against-oranges decisions in allocating the limited supply of funds, weighing coverage for a higher fraction of the eligible population against eliminating eligibility conditions of questionable
merit (or improving the quality or quantity of benefits). These sorts of
decisions are often made inefficiently, almost randomly, depending on
whether the media or the courts focus on people disadvantaged by a particular eligibility condition or limitation on the value of benefits or on
236
those mired on a waiting list.
2. Functional Entitlements. - For the same reasons it is difficult to
explain just who does and does not get a benefit when a program does
not operate as a responsive entitlement, the functions of programs that
are not functional entitlements are commonly misunderstood. The difference between providing very little help and coming close to meeting a
claimant's needs is difficult to express simply. The agriculture committees cut the food stamp program $600 million more deeply in PRWORA
than the Republican leadership required 23 7 so that they could buy commodities for the Emergency Food Assistance Program (TEFAP), which
aids food banks and soup kitchens. 238 The food stamp program, at least
until PRWORA, came relatively close to being a functional entitlement;
the emergency food network commonly provides families with only a few
days' food every few months. Yet the programs were seen as largely
equivalent: Both feed people.
A program that is not a functional entitlement will be open to a
range of damaging criticisms. If it is simply replacing expenditures that a
family would have to make anyway-as, arguably, LIHEAP does-its
nexus with the service it nominally provides comes open to question and
critics will insist that it is just a "welfare" program in disguise. 23 9 Alternatively, if it is possible to get LIHEAP and still have one's utilities shut off
or to receive food stamps and still be hungry, critics will complain that
the programs are failures even though they were not designed to meet
recipients' full needs-and may well be keeping utilities on longer, and
recipient families fed better, than would otherwise be the case.
The impulse to assume a functional entitlement even in the absence
of legal support may be even stronger than the urge to assume that all
programs are responsive entitlements. Here again, the public is likely to
236. See, e.g., Clifford v. Janklow, 733 F.2d 534, 540-41 (8th Cir. 1984) (rejecting
state criteria for targeting limited low-income home energy assistance funds on those most
in need); Crawford v. Janklow, 710 F.2d 1321, 1328 (8th Cir. 1983) (same).
237. David A. Super, Working for Food: The Food Stamp Program as Model for a
New Anti-Poverty Agenda, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2004).
238. 7 U.S.C. §§ 612c, 2036 (2000).
239. See DouglasJ. Besharov, The Past and Future of Welfare Reform, Public Interest,
Winter 2003, at 4, 17-18 (describing aid to working families "not receiving cash welfare" as
"new welfare").
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reason, if a problem is worth addressing at all, why would it be worth
240
providing a benefit in an amount inadequate to solve the problem?
Dissenting in Dandridgev. Williams, Justice Marshall complained that Maryland's ceiling on the size of AFDC grants, although nominally denying
all benefits "with respect to needy dependent children in excess of four
or five" was in fact a fractional reduction in all family members' benefits. 24 1 "The result is that support for the entire family is reduced below
minimum subsistence levels." 242 Although correct about the practical effect of the cap, he had little basis for assuming that Maryland's underly243
ing grant levels had any particular functional basis.
Just as in the case of programs that are not responsive entitlements,
champions of programs whose benefits are not functional entitlements
have difficulty developing a stirring message in opposition to further diminution of the value of the programs' benefits. 244 And unless funding is
sufficient to put a full functional entitlement within reach, they can have
little hope of rallying the masses in support of a "somewhat less inade240. "What good does it do to give an unwed mother a rent certificate if there are no
apartments available?" asked the head of the research office of the U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD), commenting on the inadequacy of the "fair
market rents" that provide the benchmark for what landlords participating in Section 8
may receive. Clayton Jones, Plan for Direct Housing Aid to Needy May Entice Reagan
Budget-Cutters, Christian Sci. Monitor, Jan. 6, 1981, at 4.
241. 397 U.S. 471, 518 n.l (1970) (Marshall,J., dissenting).
242. Id.
243. See Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 419 (1970) (declining to find a general duty
to update AFDC benefit levels for inflation, much less to set them at any functionally
defined level). The strength of the drive to find some measure of functional coherence is
evident in cases such as Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251 (1974), where courts labor to
make one small facet of the benefit formula serve a functional purpose (e.g., accounting
for all of a family's work expenses) even though the remainder of the benefit structure is
largely within defendants' control and can easily be adjusted to offset the results of the
court's ruling:
Congress thus sought to encourage AFDC recipients to secure and retain
employment by requiring the States to take into account fully any expenses
attributable to the earning of income in determining eligibility for assistance....
Standardized treatment of employment-related expenses without provision for
demonstrating actual and reasonable expenses in excess of that standard amount,
such as Colorado has adopted, threatens to defeat the goal Congress sought to
achieve ....
Id. at 264-65.
244. Even Justice Marshall's characterization of the cap in Dandridge as a complete
denial of assistance to some family members, 397 U.S. at 518 n.1l, invites trivial refutation:
Maryland could amend its policy to provide an additional dollar for each additional child
beyond the number that brings a family to the cap. To find this practically
indistinguishable policy unconstitutional, plaintiffs again would have to persuade the
Court to constitutionalize the setting of economy of scale adjustments. Thus, whether the
deprivation was considered absolute or relative, plaintiffs still would face the formidable
task of persuading the Court that it must essentially legislate standards for these numbers
to insure that the same degree of relative adequacy or inadequacy of benefits is provided to
each family. Although the precise terms of many constitutional rights the Court has
defined are complex, most can be summarized qualitatively in a few words.
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existing programs may
quate" benefit. Here again, failure to understand 45
2
lead to a proliferation of semi-overlapping ones.

The lack of a functional entitlement also complicates evaluation of
the program. If the program has no describable functional goals, how
can anyone determine how well it is performing? This presents several
problems. First, it is likely to lead to divergent, politically motivated assessments of the program that confuse and frustrate the public. Ultimately, the program's critics may sound more persuasive since its champions' arguments are likely to sound inconsistent: The program is doing
well in combating whatever problem it is there to meet, yet the problem
persists with such severity that additional resources are needed. To the
extent that reasoned arguments become less effective in setting a program's funding level, the program becomes more vulnerable to rent-seeking that diverts its resources and distorts its priorities. In addition, without clear functional goals programs may become subject to drift and
eventual capture by provider groups or other interested parties. A program's supporters should be concerned that difficulties in evaluating its
management could allow inefficient administration to linger, wasting
scarce resources and discrediting social initiatives generally.
In the absence of a functional entitlement, policymakers, analysts,
and journalists will tend to compare a program against the way it operated in prior periods.2 46 Unfortunately, absent a functional entitlement,
the most convenient way of expressing a program's past performance is
its budget. This can be more misleading than edifying, however, if eligible claimants' need for services, or the costs of providing those services,
changes significantly. Most obviously, these budgets commonly are compared without allowing for inflation. 2 47 Thus, for example, Medicare's
and Medicaid's costs often come in for sharp criticism during periods of
general medical inflation. 248 For a nonentitlement health care program
to continue to provide comparable care to a similar fraction of eligible
claimants over the last few years, therefore, it likely would need to receive
annual double-digit increases in nominal funding. Few but the most sophisticated observers will recognize this when hearing comparisons of
programs' budgets over time.
245. See supra text accompanying note 236.
246. Here again, responsive and functional entitlements are closely parallel. See
supra notes 223-225 and accompanying text.
247. This point has not been lost on House Republicans. When they took over the
House after the 1994 elections on a platform of reducing government spending, they
directed the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to produce baselines for discretionary

programs without any adjustment for inflation. H.R. Con. Res. 67, 104th Cong., § 311
(1995). This allowed them to show nominal increases in programs' funding even as those

programs' purchasing power eroded.
248. See, e.g., Woodward, supra note 26, at 141 (describing the effect of limiting
Medicare's spending growth to the general inflation rate at a time when health care
inflation had been running several times higher).
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3. UnconditionalEntitlements. - Although no program is a pure unconditional entitlement, as a program becomes more conditional it tends
to become more difficult to understand. Thus, a program that provides a
readily describable benefit to all those that qualify-a program that is
both a responsive and a functional entitlement-may sound most impressive. If, however, its eligibility conditions prevent most of its target population from accessing the benefit, the program may be little more than an
elaborate mirage. Here the problem is not with all conditions so much as
249
it is with complex or misleading ones.
Even if a condition is relatively easy to explain, its consequences may
not be. For example, the concept of a five-year time limit is easy to grasp,
but understanding how many claimants a time limit is likely to affect requires a sophisticated knowledge of program dynamics. Understanding
which claimants are likely to be affected, and why, is even harder. 25 0 The
more conditional a program becomes, the larger the gap is likely to become between the public's perceptions of the program and the reality
2 51
experienced by claimants seeking to access it.
Because middle-income people will tend to underestimate eligibility
conditions' impact on low-income claimants, the public is likely to overestimate what its government is doing for low-income people. This, too,
systematically biases debates toward reducing assistance to low-income
249. Programs lacking responsive entitlements are likely to accumulate more complex
eligibility conditions as their managers struggle to keep participation within the programs'
caps. See supra Part II.B.1.b.
250. The average middle-income voter's appreciation of eligibility conditions may be
further distorted because few have much experience with the pressures confronting lowincome claimants. A middle-income person with goodjob skills might think that five years
is a long time to receive assistance-certainly he or she would not need assistance for that
long-without having any real idea of the barriers many claimants can face in securing an
alternative source of income. Middle-income people who appear for appointments when
called by government agencies may miscalculate the likelihood that low-income people will
miss an appointment due to stolen mail, unreliable child care, delayed public
transportation, or the difficulty of juggling demands on their time and resources that far
outstrip what the claimants have to meet them.
251. Other problems also are likely to ensue. This can be understood from an
examination of the three models of administrative adjudication that Professor Mashaw
posits for public benefits cases. Mashaw, Bureaucratic Justice, supra note 187, at 23-31.
His "professional treatment" model seeks to ensure that the program is faithful to its often
paternalistic purposes in providing aid to those in need. Although eligibility conditions
often are imposed in pursuit of these paternalistic ends, the accumulation of a large
number of conditions can interfere with the program's ability to achieve its core purposes.
Id. Professor Mashaw's second, "moral judgment" model seeks to borrow legalistic
elements from civil litigation to ensure that claimants can assert their rights effectively.
The more complex a set of eligibility conditions are, the more costly it will be for the
government to adjudicate claimants' compliance with those requirements in a legalistic
way. Id. Finally, his "bureaucratic rationality" model seeks consistent, predictable
outcomes that treat similarly situated claimants similarly. The more conditions a program
imposes on eligibility, the more subjective judgments will be required and the more the
program will be vulnerable to variations among adjudicators' approaches. Id.
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people. 252 Thus, if one seeks to destroy a program altogether, making it
more conditional may be an even more effective strategy than destroying
253
responsive or functional entitlements.
4. The Aggregate Political Effect of Nonentitlement Programs. - Quite
apart from the obfuscating effect nonentitlement status has on individual
programs, the presence of so many such programs also makes it difficult
for the public to make informed judgments about the state of anti-poverty policy generally. 25 4 This can affect entitlement programs as well as
those lacking responsive or functional guarantees. For example, when
considering whether to support an increase in food stamp or SSI benefits,
should a voter think of the needs of a recipient who also gets housing
subsidies or one who does not?255 Many sensible voters might support an
SSI increase for recipients without housing subsidies but see insufficient
justification for the increase for those receiving substantial housing aid.
Similarly, voters weighing the merits of an SSI or food stamp increase may
be uncertain whether to assume that LIHEAP payments largely cover recipients' utility costs or still leave recipients struggling with large bills.
Each side of the debate will ask voters to visualize whichever type of claim256
ant is politically convenient.
252. This is true without regard to how large an intervention one favors. If most
policymakers and voters believe it is doing more than in fact it is, those that favor a more
expansive intervention will feel less urgency to act while those wanting more modest
programs may mistakenly believe that the status quo exceeds the level they find tolerable.
Thus, the tendency to underestimate eligibility conditions' impact undermines all
conscientious advocates of programs across the political spectrum.
253. See supra text accompanying notes 236 and 245.
254. See, e.g., Debra J. Saunders, The System Can Never Do Enough, S.F. Chron.,
Sept. 25, 1995, at A19 (citing conservative estimates that "the 75 major federal welfare
programs make up 5 percent . . . of the gross domestic product"); Robert E. Rector,
Heritage Found., Means-Tested Welfare Spending: Past and Future Growth (Mar. 7,
2001), available at http://www.heritage.org/Research/Welfare/Test030701b.cfm (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (making similar assertions by including many programs,
such as Head Start, that few would consider "welfare").
255. Not surprisingly, the analyses of conservative and liberal groups differ on this
point, with conservatives arguing that enough low-income people receive housing subsidies
to make it legitimate to count them in the budget of a typical family while liberals point out
that the great majority of low-income people do not receive those subsidies. Compare,
e.g., Tanner et al., supra note 188 (including the value of housing and other benefits in
drawing conclusion that welfare income is greater than likely income of entry-level worker
"in virtually every state"), with Sharon Parrott, Ctr. on Budget & Policy Priorities, The Cato
Institute Report on Welfare Benefits: Do Cato's Numbers Add Up? 1-2 (1996) (excluding
such benefits).
256. E.g., 142 Cong. Rec. 18,486 (1996) (statement of Sen. Santorum) (justifying
elimination of responsive entitlement to cash assistance by insisting that "guarantee[s]"
existed for most family needs and that current system was an over-functional entitlement
with "50 or more programs that are there to take care of every possible need a child in
America has"). Senator Santorum asks, "Do we want the Federal Government
guaranteeing every aspect of everybody's life?" Id. Compare, e.g., Tanner et al., supra
note 188 (suggesting that the generosity of AFDC benefits be assessed based on claimants
receiving a wide range of benefits from programs that lack responsive entitlements,
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5. The Impact of Combining Responsive and Functional Entitlements. Comparing the success of entitlement programs with that of nonentitlements suggests the difficulty policymakers and voters have in understanding the latter. In particular, several of the benefit programs that have
grown fastest in recent years are those that combine responsive and functional entitlements. 257 The direct cause of the growth has been increased
demand, but the programs have been allowed to meet this demand in
large part because their coverage and benefits are so transparent.
One of the fastest-growing major components of Medicaid, for example, is long-term care for the elderly and persons with disabilities. 258 Like
the rest of Medicaid, it is a responsive entitlement. 259 Much more clearly
than the rest of Medicaid, however, it is also a functional entitlement,
designed to cover fully the needs of persons in institutions. 260 This is
largely inevitable since its eligibility rules require beneficiaries to turn
over all of their funds, effectively depriving them of any ability to meet
other needs on their own. 2 61 Because it is widely understood as a func-

tional entitlement, 26 2 politicians can expect severe scrutiny if they establish limits on the amount, duration, or scope of services that cause harm

functional entitlements, or both), with Parrott, supra note 255, at 3-6 (arguing that most
AFDC recipients get nothing from many of the programs Cato cites and that those who do
typically receive much lower benefits than Cato suggests).
257. By contrast, domestic low-income discretionary programs-programs that may or
may not offer functional entitlements, but that generally do not operate as responsive
entitlements-as a group have fallen steadily behind the funding levels required to keep
up with inflation and population growth in recent years. See Richard Kogan, Ctr. on
Budget & Policy Priorities, Left Behind in Good Times and Bad 3-5, 9-12 (2003).
258. See Kaiser Comm'n on Medicaid and the Uninsured, Medicaid: Fiscal
Challenges to Coverage 2 (2003), available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/4112index.cfm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Kaiser, Fiscal Challenges]
(finding that seventy-seven percent of Medicaid growth between 2002 and 2003 was
attributable to the elderly and persons with disabilities and that the highest average annual
growth rates between 1998 and 2000 were in services used disproportionately by those
groups, particularly prescription drugs, home care, and long-term care).
259. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (10) (2000); see also id. § 1396r(c) (5) (prohibiting nursing
homes from interfering with the responsive entitlement to Medicaid).
260. See, e.g., id. § 1396r(b)(2) (requiring nursing homes to "provide services and
activities to attain or maintain the highest practicable physical, mental, and psychosocial
well-being of each resident"); see also, e.g., id. § 1396r(b) (1) (A) (requiring nursing homes
to "care for its residents in such a manner and in such an environment as will promote
maintenance or enhancement of the quality of life of each resident"); id. § 1396r(c)
(providing extensive substantive, as well as procedural, rights to residents).
261. Id. § 1396a(q); see also id. § 1396r-5(d).
262. See, e.g., Steve Bousquet, Lawmakers Scrounge Coins Under Budgetary
Cushions, St. Petersburg Times, Oct. 24, 2001, at 5B (describing legislators' extraordinary
efforts to avoid cutting nursing home staffs despite state fiscal crisis); Muriel Dobbin, States
Score Poorly on Care of Terminally Ill, Fresno Bee, Nov. 19, 2002, at A7 (describing
pledges of action from executive and legislative branch leaders in response to a report on
poor quality of care).
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to nursing home residents. 2 63 With participation caps and significant service limitations politically or legally barred, the federal and state governments can control costs only by tightening eligibility conditions. With the
benefit at stake readily describable, and many of those seeking care from
the politically potent middle-class, 264 this approach, too, has limited
5
prospects.

26

Although other components of Medicaid, such as prescription drugs,
are responsive entitlements that also have been growing rapidly, the absence of as sharply defined a functional entitlement 2 66 has allowed states
more ability to offset increased demand with limits on services as well as
tighter eligibility conditions. 267 In the current state fiscal crisis, services
for children have survived far better than those for non-institutionalized
adults 268 primarily because Medicaid's early and periodic screening, diagnostic, and treatment (EPSDT) component provides a much clearer func269
tional entitlement.
Two other fast-growing programs in the decade before PRWORA
were the School Breakfast Program and the Child and Adult Care Food
Program (CACFP).270 They, too, are functional entitlements, defined by
263. See 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(b)-(c) (2002) (requiring services to be of sufficient
amount, duration and scope to reasonably accomplish their purpose). States do try to save
money by keeping provider reimbursements as low as possible. With nursing homes
having strong trade associations, the opportunities to save money on reimbursements to
homes is limited both politically and legally. See, e.g., Concourse Rehab. & Nursing Ctr.,
Inc. v. Whalen, 249 F.3d 136, 139-42 (2d Cir. 2001) (describing public procedure states
must follow to set institutional reimbursement rates); Geriatrics, Inc. v. Colo.Dep't of Soc.
Servs., 712 P.2d 1035, 1040 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985) (requiring state to reimburse nursing
homes for cost of oxygen).
264. See, e.g., Stress Points in the State Budgets, N.Y. Times, Dec. 30, 1990, at 16.
265. See, e.g., Brigit Schulte, Budget Deadlock Forces Shutdown, Austin AmericanStatesman, Dec. 16, 1995, at Al (quoting a Republican congressional staffer describing
Republican proposal to shift some of cost of caring for middle-income nursing home
residents from Medicaid to their families as "political suicide").
266. Compare, e.g., Weaver v. Reagen, 886 F.2d 194, 200 (8th Cir. 1989) (requiring
coverage of AZT for HIV and AIDS despite lack of FDA approval at that time), and
Pinneke v. Preisser, 623 F.2d 546, 549-50 (8th Cir. 1980) (requiring coverage for sex
reassignment surgery), with Smith v. Rasmussen, 249 F.3d 755, 761-62 (8th Cir. 2001)
(refusing to order state to pay for medically necessary sex reassignment surgery).
267. See generally Donna Cohen Ross & Laura Cox, Kaiser Comm'n on Medicaid &
the Uninsured, Preserving Recent Progress on Health Coverage for Children and Families:
New Tensions Emerge 2-3 (2003) (citing new restrictions on income eligibility and
administrative obstacles as reasons for declining participation in public health care
programs in some states).
268. Id. at i-iii.

269. Nine states reduced benefits in 2002, twenty-five states did so in 2003, and the
administrations in twenty states expect to do so in 2004. Kaiser, Fiscal Challenges, supra
note 258, at 3. EPSDT's functional entitlement prevents states from applying these cuts to
children. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r) (5) (2000) (requiring states to cover necessary services for
children whether or not those services are otherwise part of the state's Medicaid plan).
270. In federal fiscal year 1986, the School Breakfast Program cost $406 million; the
Child Care Food Program, $483 million. Database Monitoring Branch, U.S. Dep't of
Agric., Program Information Report: September 1987 tbls.10 & 15 (1987) [hereinafter
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the meals they are required to provide. 27 1 They are responsive entitlements from the perspective of eligible schools, centers, and homes, and
where providers participate, a responsive entitlement for eligible children
as well. Political and demographic changes have prompted more schools
to offer breakfasts; demographic changes also have led to a dramatic increase in the number of participating child care providers. These programs' entitlement structures have made them easy for the public to understand and, because what they are doing is popular, they have become
politically strong without the focused attention of moneyed provider
27 2
groups.
PRWORA did reduce CACFP significantly, but only because
the legislation's sponsors found a way to make eligibility more conditional: means-testing eligibility in family day care homes. This change
2 73
was politically viable because its effects were somewhat obscure.
The National School Lunch Program has not grown nearly as fast as
the School Breakfast Program or CACFP, 274 primarily because the vast
majority of eligible schools and children enrolled many years ago. The
strength of its combined responsive and functional entitlements became
apparent in the 1995-1996 welfare debate when the otherwise dominant
House Republicans were badly embarrassed and forced to retreat from
275
proposals to cut funding for school meals.
To be sure, all of these programs serve relatively appealing constituencies. Yet other programs providing important services to the same con1987 Keydata]. By fiscal year 1997, those totals had increased to $1.211 billion and $1.561
billion, respectively (with a tiny part of the latter increase attributable to an expansion to
cover adult care centers). Database Monitoring Branch, U.S. Dep't of Agric., Program
Information Report: September 1997 tbl.29b (1997) (hereinafter 1997 Keydata]. Even
after accounting for the decade's 35% total food inflation, this represents increases of
120% in breakfast and 139% in child care food.
271. 42 U.S.C. § 1766(g) (1) (A).
272. Although the teachers' unions and other education trade associations take a
passing interest in the school meal programs, their primary focus is decidedly on programs
and policies affecting classroom instruction. See Nat'l Education Ass'n, NEA on the Issues,
at http://www.nea.org/topics (last visited Feb. 22, 2004) (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (listing twenty-one areas of interest to NEA, none of which involve school meals
even though legislation making significant changes to those programs is currently before
Congress); Am. Fed'n of Teachers, AFT on the Issues, at http://www.aft.org/issues/
index.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2004) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (similarly
listing fifteen issue areas, none of which involve school meals).
273. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996
(PRWORA), Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 708, 110 Stat. 2105, 2293-94. The CACFP means test's
direct effect was to reduce the payments many homes qualified to receive. Its indirect
effect, however, may have been more significant: increasing paperwork burdens to the
point that some homes completely left the program, rendering all children enrolled at
those homes unable to participate in CACFP.
274. From 1986 to 1996, spending on the National School Lunch Program increased
from $3.55 billion, 1987 Keydata, supra note 270, tbl.6, to $5.35 billion, 1997 Keydata,
supra note 270, tbl.6, a 12% increase after allowing for inflation.
275. See Robert Pear, G.O.P. Finds It Difficult to Deflect Attacks on the School Lunch
Proposals, N.Y. Times, Apr. 9, 1995, at 18; see also infra Part III.C.2.
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stituencies faired far worse. 276 More generally, it likely is precisely because these programs are so politically appealing that they have been able
to establish themselves as both functional and responsive entitlements.
C. PoliticalDistortions Resultingfrom Confusion About Entitlements
The difficulty of conceptualizing nonentitlement programs clearly
has caused the political process to adapt in several ways. Most obviously,
as noted above, politicians, analysts, and journalists assume the existence
of responsive and functional entitlements even when that is clearly not
the case. In two other important respects, too, these distortions have further obstructed informed debate about the scope and terms of public
benefits programs.
1. Manipulation of Varying Definitions of "Entitlement." As the
passages at the opening of this piece suggest, attitudes toward and willingness to discuss entitlements vary considerably across the political spectrum. Opposing political groups also seek to exploit confusion about the
definition of "entitlement." A program's detractors attack an unpopular
type of entitlement to build support for policies curtailing other types; its
champions similarly tout the importance of more popular types of entitlements to parry efforts to curtail those with less public sympathy.
Supposed subjective and unconditional entitlements are favorite
targets of criticism. 277 Programs' champions rarely offer a direct defense
of either, presumably reluctant to portray their beneficiaries as taking
public largesse for granted or having qualified for that largesse under lax
standards. Instead, programs' advocates prefer to argue that programs
are more conditional than is commonly understood. Alternatively, programs' advocates sometimes concede proposals to make benefits more
conditional but argue that these additional conditions transform the benefit into a kind of social contract with reciprocal obligations that justifies
278
a responsive entitlement.
276. For example, Congress refused to prevent a deep reduction in SCHIP funding in
2001, even as deterioration in states' budgets was making that funding vital. Congress and
the Bush Administration delayed almost a year before extending the availability of unused
SCHIP funds scheduled to expire. See Pub. L. No. 108-74, 117 Stat. 892 (2003).
277. Many leading Republicans argued that eliminating the AFDC entitlement was
crucial to the success of welfare reform, but it is not always clear which type of entitlement
they had in mind. Reps.Johnson, Archer, Shaw, and Hastert, in the passage quoted supra
text accompanying note 3, appeared to be thinking primarily of subjective and
unconditional entitlements, yet it is far from clear that AFDC was either of those.
278. See, e.g., 141 Cong. Rec. 8499 (1995) (statement of Rep. Clement) ("In short, we
guarantee recipients that if they will go to work we will provide the money and take all the
necessary steps to ensure that recipients have a real opportunity to become selfsufficient."). Similarly, members of Congress from farm states justified the 1995 Freedom
to Farm Act as a social compact in which farmers would receive increased subsidies for a
few years in exchange for moving to a more market-driven production system. See 142
Cong. Rec. 7082-83 (1996) (statement of Rep. Roberts); id. at 7083-84 (statement of Rep.
Buyer). A system of mutual obligations-conditional eligibility and a responsive
entitlement for those that meet those conditions-may be contrasted with a barter system
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Many critics of programs, on the other hand, have proven reluctant
to attack responsive entitlements directly. 2 79 Conversely, programs' advocates, who have been unwilling to defend subjective, unconditional, or
even positive entitlements, are sometimes a bit more vocal on the need
for responsive entitlements. 2 8 0 With the distinctions among the various
types of entitlements so poorly understood, it is possible that the success
of these arguments in the 1995-1996 welfare debates might have pre28
served positive entitlements as well. '
2. Obscuring Policy Through Devolution. - Establishing a program
without a responsive or functional entitlement tends to change the nature of the choices that must be made to ration benefits. Responsive and
functional entitlements can be constrained with relatively broad conditions that are amenable to public debate and definitive legislation. By
in which claimants are not assured that their compliance with eligibility conditions will
indeed result in an award of benefits. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
279. Indeed, even as they were arguing for passage of PRWORA, which ended the
responsive entitlement to AFDC without establishing any alternative responsive
entitlement in its place, many conservatives incorrectly asserted that they were continuing
to assure benefits for all those that qualified. For example, Sen. Santorum promised
recipients "education and training that is meaningful" and declared that "if you cannot
find ajob in the private sector, if you cannot get ajob on your own, the State will assist you
getting thatjob. If you cannot find a private-sector job, the State will assist you in getting a
public-sectorjob." 142 Cong. Rec. 18,486 (1996).
280. See, e.g., 142 Cong. Rec. 18,488 (1996) (statement of Sen. Daschle) (stating, "I
have heard the discussion of a list of other Federal programs that may be provided. But,
Mr. President, the emphasis is on 'may"' and arguing that "[i]f they do not have the
resources, if we do not have the safety net, if they do not have the opportunities to access
those programs, then, Mr. President, they are meaningless").
281. Indeed, the opposing camps' reluctance to challenge one another directly over
any one form of entitlement suggests that their bottom lines may be closer than is
commonly realized. In full control of Congress and facing a president loath to veto a
welfare bill a few months before facing the voters, Republicans had no need to
compromise in 1996. Had negotiations taken place, however, one can imagine a
compromise in which a responsive entitlement to cash assistance remained but became far
more conditional and was shorn of whatever features could plausibly be said to engender
subjective entitlement. Also, the 1996 welfare law eliminated the entitlement to child care
for AFDC recipients complying with JOBS work requirements and for AFDC recipients in
their first year after having worked their way off of AFDC. Yet with some prominent
Republicans emphasizing that the problematic entitlement was to cash assistance, one can
imagine these child care entitlements being preserved. Had that been done, considerably
more child care assistance to working families likely would be available today
notwithstanding the large nominal increases in funding the child care and development
block grant received in 1996. See generally Sharon Parrott & Nina Wu, Ctr. on Budget &
Policy Priorities, States Are Cutting TANF and Child Care Programs: Supports for LowIncome Working Families and Welfare-to-Work Programs Are Particularly Hard Hit 2,
19-28 (June 3, 2003), available at http://www.cbpp.org/6-3-03tanf.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (describing cutbacks that have left child care subsidies virtually
unavailable for families not receiving cash assistance in about twenty states). Prior to
PRWORA, child care subsidies for cash assistance recipients were a responsive entitlement,
with two additional funds available for other low-wage workers. 42 U.S.C. §§ 602(g)(1), (i),
603(a) (1994) (repealed 1996); id. §§ 9858-9858q (1994) (amended 1996).
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contrast, keeping a program within a spending or participation cap is
likely to require an ongoing series of adjustments to eligibility rules and
benefit levels that are too nuanced, and too numerous, for effective public debate. These adjustments also may need to be made more rapidly
than the legislative process, or even administrative rulemaking, can
accommodate.
Thus, eschewing entitlement structures tends to make rationing decisions less visible and hence less subject to democratic review and revision.
This is true when the federal government pays state governments to administer a benefit program without a responsive entitlement under federal law. It is equally true when state officials hand their local counterparts a program for which available funding is insufficient to assure a
responsive entitlement. It also is true when high officials in a bureaucracy ask their subordinates to do more than available resources will
allow.

282

Not surprisingly, then, a study of eleven major block grants over the
past two decades found that their funding declined by an average of
twenty percent after adjusting for inflation (but without adjusting for
other changes in need).283 Excluding the Child Care and Development
Block Grant, which received a large one-time increase in 1996 to help it
cope with the demands of welfare recipients entering the workforce or
work programs, real funding for the remaining block grants declined by
more than a quarter over this period.2 84 This erosion is all the more
remarkable because the direct recipients of these block grants-chiefly
governors, county commissioners, and mayors-have far more political
capacity to fight for higher funding than do low-income beneficiaries of
285
entitlements.

282. When PRWORA replaced AFDC's responsive entitlement with the TANF block
grant, it gave states powerful fiscal incentives to reduce spending on benefits. Since states
generally concluded that departing from a de facto responsive entitlement would be an
administrative nightmare and a potential political embarrassment, those seeking to reduce
their expenditures on cash assistance needed to make benefits either less functional or
more conditional. Most of the welfare law's critics predicted the former, escalating
reductions in benefit levels characterized as a "race to the bottom." See, e.g., Edelman,
supra note 11, at 146-47 (explaining that rather than cutting benefits, states achieved
reductions in welfare roles through "sanctions and terminations, combined with rejection
of new applicants"). In practice, most states found the latter route easier and more
productive of the declines in caseloads that had become the de facto measure of states'
success. See, e.g., id. (pointing out that in some states, it was infeasible to cut benefits
below already minimal levels).
283. Matthew Broaddus, Ctr. on Budget & Policy Priorities, Federal Funding for Block
Grants Erodes over Time 3 (2003).
284. Id. at 1, 3.
285. Even if some of these officials do not feel any particular passion for helping lowincome people, these funds could reduce demand for spending state funds on this
population. This would free up state revenues to address other priorities.
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D. Recent PoliticalStruggles over Entitlements: Means-Tested Public Benefit
Programs
The principles developed above are much more than abstractions.
They increasingly have shaped the outcome of struggles over public benefit policy in recent years. In particular, debates about the proper role of
entitlements have increasingly driven policy in means-tested programs.
More broadly, the absence of entitlements has allowed both program advocates and opponents to pursue covert political agendas. Some liberals
have sought to disguise the extent of the expansions they seek in the
public sector by starting with small nonentitlements serving a small fraction of the beneficiaries and functions of the programs that were their
ultimate ends. Conversely, some conservatives have made a fundamental
principle out of reducing entitlement programs and the taxes-in a
sense, negative entitlements-that support them.2 86 This section identifies the impact of entitlement status on public benefit programs' political
vulnerability, considers the rhetorical problems that both supporters and
opponents face in debating entitlement and nonentitlement programs,
and explores the sometimes paradoxical behavior of many political activists toward the concept of entitlement. Although the principles discussed
here apply to a wide range of programs, this section focuses on the debates over means-tested programs over the past few decades, following
prothe common if imprecise convention of identifying critics of those 288
grams as conservatives 287 and those programs' defenders as liberals.
1. The TraditionalValues-Based Model of PublicBenefits Debate. - In this
country, battles over public welfare law often have been fought in moralistic terms. Opponents of means-tested benefits have sought to impose
eligibility restrictions based on the supposed moral failings of low-income

286. See, e.g., John Maggs, Grover at the Gate, 35 Nat'l J. 3100, 3101 (2003)
(describing tax-cutting as a central theme of the conservative platform in Washington);
Americans for Tax Reform, Taxpayer Protection Pledge, at http://www.atr.org/
nationalpledge/index.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2004) (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (pledging to oppose any raises in federal taxation levels).
287. Some conservatives, of course, have sought significant expansions of social
welfare programs. See, e.g., 148 Cong. Rec. 8610 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 2002) (statement of
Sen. McConnell) (proposing across-the-board increase in food stamps for families with
children); id. at 498 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 2002) (text of amendment increasing food stamp
benefits co-sponsored by conservative Republican Sens. Brownback, Ensign, Fitzgerald,
Grassley, Hagel, and Lugar, as well as some liberal Democrats); id. at S419 (daily ed. Feb. 6,
2002) (statement of Sen. Durbin) (conservative Republican Sens. Domenici, Lugar, and
Smith joining with liberal Democratic senators to sponsor amendment to provide food
stamps to legal immigrants); VincentJ. Burke & Vee Burke, Nixon's Good Deed 188-204
(1974) (describing President Nixon's initiative to create Supplemental Security Income
(SSI) program for elderly and persons with- disabilities living in poverty).
288. Partisan identification is more difficult. A great many Democrats have supported
sharp reductions to means-tested programs, particularly in the mid-1990s, while a number
of Republicans opposed or sought to moderate many of these cuts.
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people. 28 9 Champions of these programs have written exposes of the difficult conditions faced by the poor 290 or counter-attacked programs' critics for their supposed insensitivity to that plight. 29 1 These time-honored
strategies for gaining political leverage will no doubt continue.
These strategies, by themselves, are unlikely to produce any clear,
lasting victor. Consistently over time, the American public holds conflicted feelings about low-income people and public efforts to aid them.
It feels compassion for low-income people in distress but is suspicious of
their morals. 29 2 It sees relief of suffering as an appropriate public function in such a wealthy country but feels cheated when anti-poverty programs' failings are exposed.29 3 Left on their own, these moral arguments
are likely to lead to cyclical changes in public policy, as a round of sympathetic stories about struggling families generates a groundswell for expansions of social initiatives, only to be followed by a round of stories about
fraud or bureaucratic inefficiency that sends the pendulum swinging
back the other way. The public is likely to have at least a crude sense of
which side has been getting its way most recently and may become receptive to its competition's claims that things have gone "too far."
The continuation of this pattern depends, however, on some degree
of transparency in the programs themselves. Programs with responsive
and functional entitlements, and with relatively intelligible eligibility conditions, provide a fair amount of transparency. Capped programs with
289. See, e.g., Herbert J. Gans, The War Against the Poor 14-47 (1995) (tracing
history of stigmatizing labels for low-income people); Graham, supra note 207, at 59-63
(describing the "man in the house" rule and other efforts to regulate the sexual and other
morality of women seeking AFDC); Michael B. Katz, In the Shadow of the Poorhouse
276-80, 286-87 (1986) [hereinafter Katz, Poorhouse] (finding that critiques of moral
failings of "underclass" provided the foundation for President Reagan's programmatic
changes in public benefit programs in early 1980s); Katz, Citizenship, supra note 1, at
196-97 (describing "moral hazard" theory for curtailing social insurance and means-tested
benefits); David Zucchino, Myth of the Welfare Queen 64-65 (1997) (quoting Ronald
Reagan's attacks on welfare recipients' honesty in his second presidential campaign).
290. See, e.g., Michael Harrington, The Other America 19-38 (1962) (noting
conditions faced by low-income people generally); Peter H. Rossi, Down and Out in
America 1-8 (1989) (homeless); John E. Schwarz & Thomas J. Volgy, The Forgotten
Americans 16-31 (1992) (low-income workers).
291. See, e.g., David Dahl, In Washington, They Pick Words Carefully, St. Petersburg
Times, Feb. 6, 1995, at IA (quoting Republican pollster as saying that Republicans'
proposals for orphanages made them look mean); Howard Kurtz, Spin Cycles: A Guide to
Media Behavior in the Age of Newt, Wash. Post, Feb. 26, 1995, at 8, 11 (Magazine) ("Many
articles seized upon Gingrich's welfare proposals, painting the Republicans as the party of
orphanages."); Republicans Slow to Adopt Gingrich Orphanage Idea, Omaha WorldHerald, Dec. 8, 1994, at 13 (same).
292. See, e.g., Katz, Poorhouse, supra note 289, at 276-80 (tracing the history of
society's moral judgments about low-income people in the U.S.); David J. Rothman, The
Discovery of the Asylum 161-95 (1971) (describing institutionalization movement of early
nineteenth century as effort to rectify morals of poor).
293. Weaver, supra note 174, at 172-77 (discussing contrast between positive public
sentiment toward programs for the poor and general public dissatisfaction with existing
welfare programs).
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arbitrary funding levels, distributing benefits in arbitrary amounts to an
arbitrary fraction of an eligible population defined by intricate eligibility
conditions, on the other hand, can be transformed without much public
comprehension. This has created opportunities for single-minded factions on both ends of the political spectrum. Supporters of a program
can increase its funding many times over while continuing to claimtruthfully-that unmet need remains. Opponents of a program, in turn,
can devastate its coverage, benefit levels, and eligibility requirements
without the public realization that is needed to send the political pendulum swinging in the other direction.
In these circumstances, a more permanent shift in the generosity of
these programs becomes possible if the side of the debate holding the
levers of power is willing to apply them single-mindedly. During the
1960s and 1970s, several programs grew from modest beginnings-lacking responsive entitlements, functional entitlements, or both-to become
major entitlements. 29 4 Over time, however, the advantage is more likely
to accrue to opponents of these programs: Removing money from a program does not require the same kinds of hard choices elsewhere in the
budget that adding funds does. Even if advocates of greater social spending would like to pump up the funding of an array of nonentitlement
programs, they must find offsetting cuts somewhere else in the budget,
run the political gauntlet to increase taxes, or be held accountable for
deficit spending. Whittling away at programs' funding presents no such
dilemma and may even allow the programs' foes to curry political favor by
295
redirecting the proceeds to other popular causes.
294. For example, the food stamp program began in the early 1960s as a pilot
program. Pub. L. No. 86-341, § 11, 73 Stat. 606, 608 (1959) (authorizing food stamp pilot
program). Under President Nixon's guidance, Congress made it available nationally and
then added a functional entitlement to a nutritionally adequate diet in the late 1960s and
early 1970s. Pub. L. No. 91-671, 84 Stat. 2048, 2048 (1971). Similarly, the Special
Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) grew from a
tiny pilot to a de facto responsive entitlement between the early 1970s and the late 1990s.
Compare Pub. L. No. 92433, § 9, 86 Stat. 724, 729 (1972) (authorizing two-year WIC pilot
program at $20 million per year), with, e.g., Pub. L. No. 107-76, tit. IV, 115 Stat. 704, 726
(2001) (appropriating over $4.3 billion for WIC); see also H. Conf. Rep. No. 107-275, at 78
(2001), reprinted at 2001 U.S.C.C.A.N. 757, 780 (expressing the expectation that the funds
appropriated would be sufficient to meet all demands for 'WIC benefits and still have
enough left over to fund some additional activities). Medicaid grew from a very limited
indigent health care subsidy, Pub. L. 89-97, 79 Stat. 343 (1965) (establishing Medicaid);
Walter I. Trattaer, From Poor Law to Welfare State 327-29 (5th ed. 1994) (tracing
evolution of Medicaid), to a responsive entitlement with a fairly broad functional
entitlement over the course of the 1960s and early 1970s.
295. Some empirical support for this hypothesis can be found by comparing changes
in funding for low-income domestic discretionary programs in 1993-1994, the first two
years in more than a decade when Democrats controlled the White House and both houses
of Congress, and in 1995-1996, the first two years of Republican control of both houses of
Congress in a generation. Despite having to deal with a Democratic president,
Republicans cut discretionary funding for low-income programs far more than Democrats
had added to it. Robert Greenstein et al., Ctr. on Budget & Policy Priorities, Bearing Most
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This would seem to suggest a set of covert political strategies that
programs' single-minded supporters and opponents can use to manipulate policy. Because the group with the strongest control of the levers of
government generally benefits from public misunderstandings about the
scope of nonentitlement programs, 29 6 conservatives seeking to abolish or
radically shrink these programs today have an apparent interest eliminating responsive and functional entitlements in existing programs and in
taking those programs still farther away from the mythical "unconditional
entitlement." This strategy, of course, does not make sense for all conservatives. Those who favor more modest investments in social programs,
but who want whatever society does spend to be spent effectively, should,
and often do, 2 9 7 support entitlement structures to avoid the inefficiencies
of nonentitlement structures described in Part 11.298 And, most simply,
those favoring open debate on these issues should favor the more intelligible entitlement structures.
In the current environment, with means-tested programs' supporters
relatively marginalized politically, their answer is even clearer. The transparency of entitlement programs generally helps the programs' political
efforts to secure more resources while the greater efficiency of the entitlement structure allows those programs to spend more of whatever resources they have on benefits rather than on administering rationing systems. Advocates of extensive government intervention to address a
particular set of problems thus should focus their efforts on defending,
simplifying, and expanding entitlement programs that address those
problems. Conversely, they generally should avoid being distracted by
capped programs and those with ill-defined benefits and eligibility
29 9
conditions.
Those given to covert machinations may, in eras when liberals' political position is stronger, feel tempted to avoid debate over the extent of
their desired interventions by starting a small nonentitlement program
and trying to grow its funding incrementally over time. Apart from the
questionable legitimacy of such a secretive approach, it also dooms the
program to the inefficiencies of a nonentitlement program discussed
3 00
above.
of the Burden: How Deficit Reduction During the 104th Congress Concentrated on
Programs for the Poor 8-10 (1996).
296. See supra Part III.A.
297. See, e.g., Kondratas, supra note 6, at 6 (arguing for effective programs to meat
articulated goals of welfare reform).
298. See supra Part II.B.
299. The likelihood that this multiplicity of programs will achieve few visible results
apart from creating bureaucracies that serve as lightening rods for criticism is another
reason for liberals to avoid being distracted by numerous small nonentitlement programs.
See supra Part III.B.4.
300. See supra Part II. It also assumes that liberals will control government, and have
sufficient available funds, for long enough to build up a meaningful and defensible
program. Recent history suggests that this is a perilous assumption.
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2. Attacks on Entitlement Programs. - In practice, despite the inefficiencies of an anti-entitlement tack, it has become an important theme of
many critics of social spending, particularly an influential faction within
the Republican Party. In the social welfare area, the increasing focus of
some conservatives on the destruction of the entitlement structure of programs over the past two decades may be in part a result of their disappointment with the results of the "Reagan revolution" of 1981-1982.
President Reagan leveraged his enormous popularity to push several
30
packages of specific reductions in low-income programs into law. 3'0 2Alit
though this effort produced dramatic reductions in these programs,
also produced a broad perception that the federal government had
turned its back on low-income people. 30 3 This made the public receptive
to significant increases in benefits for low-income people over the next
30 4
dozen years.
One possible conclusion that conservatives could have drawn from
this experience would have been that President Reagan tried to do too
much, too rapidly, and in so doing provoked a strong reverse swing of the
political pendulum. This could lead conservatives to pursue a more moderate course that could be sustained over the long term. Some clearly
did. 30 5 Others, however, departed from the relative transparency of the
Reagan assault on means-tested programs.
As a result, efforts to reduce means-tested programs since the early
Reagan years increasingly have shifted to a two-step strategy. 30 6 First, a
301. Joe & Rogers, supra note 89, at 49-57; Katz, Poorhouse, supra note 289, at
285-89 (describing cuts enacted in social security, income-maintenance, and related
programs induced by the Reagan administration).
302. Katz, Poorhouse, supra note 289, at 285-89 (noting that under the Reagan
reductions, 408,000 people lost AFDC eligibility and 299,000 lost AFDC benefits by 1983).
303. See, e.g., Study Cited as Sign of Health Peril to Children of Poor in U.S., N.Y.
Times, Apr. 7, 1983, at B15 (quoting Republican Sen. Danforth as saying "[w]e do have an
obligation to make sure these people stay alive and have an adequate diet" and expressing
the hope that funding for food programs would be increased).
304. Thus, even after PRWORA's even more sweeping reductions in low-income
programs, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that $46.1 billion more in
mandatory means-tested benefits would be distributed to low-income people who do not
receive cash assistance in 1999 than would have been provided had 1984 rules been
applied instead. Cong. Budget Office, Policy Changes Affecting Mandatory Spending for
Low-Income Families Not Receiving Cash Welfare 2 tbl.1 (1998), available at http://
www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=849 (on file with the Columbia Law Review). The
increase was primarily in the EITC and Medicaid/SCHIP programs. See id. PRWORA had
offset sizeable food stamp increases in 1987, 1988, and 1993. See id. at 15-18 (comparing
food stamp eligibility rules in 1984 and 1999).
305. See, e.g., S.2560, 100th Cong. (1988) (hunger relief legislation co-sponsored by
seventeen Republican senators from across the party's ideological spectrum that
moderated some of the Reagan food stamp cuts).
306. In fact, both Presidents Nixon and Reagan presaged this strategy by converting a
range of categorical programs, some of which provided functional entitlements, into
"general revenue sharing" or block grants. See David A. Stockman, The Triumph of
Politics 215-21 (1986) (giving an account of the days leading up to passage of President
Reagan's 1981 budget-cutting legislation). Once the functions of these programs became
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program is stripped of one or more of its entitlement features, generally
without reducing its funding significantly. 30 7 With no specific "cuts" to
criticize, the program's defenders have difficulty persuading the media
and the general public that anything significant is at stake. Second, with
the program no longer operating as an entitlement, it can be reduced in
relative invisibility or simply allowed to erode under the effects of
3 08
inflation.
Two major vehicles for destroying functional and responsive entitlements in the social welfare area have been waivers and block grants.
Waivers are dispensations federal officials grant to a state government to
deviate from the terms of applicable statutes or regulations in its operation of a federally-funded program. The 1995-1996 welfare reform debate was presaged by widespread waivers of many of the most prominent
features of AFDC in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 30 9 These waivers focused primarily on making the program more conditional; at the margins, some also eroded its responsive entitlement. PRWORA vastly expanded waiver authority in the food stamp program 31 0 and created a new
waiver-like device, innocuously named the "simplified food stamp program," that allows states to further erode the functional, although not
responsive, entitlement of the program.3 1 1 President Bush's Health Inblurred, funding for the block grants declined sharply. By the time President Reagan took
office, the purposes of general revenue sharing and other Nixon-era block grants had been
sufficiently forgotten that he could shut the programs down completely. See id. at 143
(noting the shutting down of Nixon-era block grant programs).
307. Although the main thrust of efforts to eliminate entitlements has been
legislative, a few key court decisions have narrowed responsive entitlements, see, e.g.,
Frazar v. Gilbert, 300 F.3d 530, 544-45 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding that federal regulations
acknowledging that states will miss some eligible children in their Early and Periodic
Screening, Diagnosis and Treatment (EPSDT) programs preclude standing for all children
denied service because none can show that she might not be one of those permissibly left
out), and particularly functional ones. See, e.g., Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 363
(1992) (finding no enforceable functional entitlement in child welfare services statute);
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 24-27 (1981) (finding the
standards in several laws authorizing programs for persons with mental disabilities too
vague to be judicially enforceable).
308. These two strategies can be seen together within a single page the budget
President Bush proposed in February 2004. First, he proposes to eliminate the functional
entitlement to the Section 8 housing voucher program in favor of giving broad flexibility to
local governments. 2005 Budget, supra note 4, at 185. Then he criticizes the Community
Development Block Grant (CDBG) program-the result of earlier legislation replacing
functional entitlements-because local governments have exercised their broad discretion
unwisely. Id. at 185-87; see also id. at 219 (proposing to eliminate the State Criminal Alien
Assistance Program block grant because states' varied spending choices prevents
meaningful analysis of the program's results).
309. See Katz, Citizenship, supra note 1, at 90-101 (recounting various ways states
used waivers to modify entitlement structures).
310. 7 U.S.C. § 2026(b) (2000).
311. Id. § 2035.
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surance Flexibility and Accountability (HIFA) 31 2 and Pharmacy Plus 3 1 3
waiver programs in Medicaid offer to release states from Medicaid's functional entitlement in exchange for states' accepting caps on future funding that are likely to force states to exercise that authority. HIFA also
allows states to cap participation for some beneficiaries, making part of
Medicaid operate without a responsive entitlement for the first time. 3 14
More grandiosely, President Bush and the House have proposed a
"superwaiver" as part of the TANF reauthorization that would allow HHS
to grant virtually standardless waivers of the rules of a wide range of programs, including food stamps and Section 8 housing assistance. 31 5
For single-minded opponents of entitlement programs, block grants
have several political advantages over waivers: They affect more states at
once, they implicate the federal government less explicitly in any resulting departures from responsive or functional entitlements, and they tend
to be politically irrevocable. 3 16 Presidents Nixon and Reagan turned to
block-granting, for these political advantages, although almost none of
the programs they swept up were responsive entitlements, and most were
312. See 2004 Budget, supra note 118, at 126 (explaining how the budget's optional
allotment for Medicaid, based on the HIPA initiative, would change current funding);
Cindy Mann, Kaiser Comm'n on Medicaid and the Uninsured, The New Medicaid and
CHIP Waiver Initiatives 22 (2002), available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/4028index.cfm (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (noting that each state under a HIFA
waiver will be subject to a cap on federal expenditures).
313. See 2004 Budget, supra note 118, at 129-30 (describing Pharmacy Plus waivers
and stating that several had been approved and more are pending);Jocelyn Guyer, Kaiser
Comm'n on Medicaid and the Uninsured, The Financing of Pharmacy Plus Waivers:
Trade Offs Between Expanding Rx Coverage and Global Caps in Medicaid 1 (2003),
available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/4114-index.cfm (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (noting that Pharmacy Plus waivers require states to accept a cap on federal
Medicaid funding).
314. See Kaiser Comm'n on Medicaid & the Uninsured, Section 1115 Waivers at a
Glance: Summary of Recent Medicaid and SCHIP Waiver Activity 6-7 (2003), available at
http://www.kff.org/medicaid/4102-index.cfm (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(noting that waivers allow states to freeze or cap enrollment and may not provide coverage
to all those in the eligibility range).
315. H.R. 4, 108th Cong. § 601 (2003); Executive Office of the President, Working
Toward Independence 34-35 (2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/ 2002/02/welfare-reform-annoucement-book.html (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (stating that states may establish program rules subject only to "minimal Federal
requirements").
316. When shifting programs to the state or local level, block grants also may
empower officials less sympathetic to income support programs. See Smart Butler & Anna
Kondratas, Out of the Poverty Trap: A Conservative Strategy for Welfare Reform 82-90
(1987) (stating that states are "less inclined to support income transfer programs" due to
concern that richer residents will leave for a nearby jurisdiction); Sheryll D. Cashin,
Federalism. Welfare Reform, and the Minority Poor: Accounting for the Tyranny of State
Majorities, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 552, 582-83 (1999) (arguing that "the state level [of
government] provides a worse environment than the national arena for deciding
fundamental questions about redistribution [and welfare policy]").
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not functional entitlements, either. 3 17 In addition to the TANF and child
care block grants that ultimately passed in PRWORA, Republicans at one
time or another during the 1995-1996 debate proposed to block grant
part or all of Medicaid, food stamps, SSI, child nutrition programs, and
child welfare services. President Bush recently proposed creating an optional Medicaid block grant for states that would provide more money in
the near-term to help them deal with the current fiscal crisis in exchange
for capping federal funding in the long-term at a level estimated to fall
below what would be spent under existing law.3 18 Similarly, his proposal

to block grant the Section 8 housing assistance program would eliminate
the standards that make it a functional entitlement.3 19 The TANF
reauthorization bills the House passed in 2002 and 2003 both would allow a number of states to convert the food stamp program to a block
3 20

grant.

In addition to program-specific initiatives, conservatives also have explored devices for eliminating functional or responsive entitlements en
masse. The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of
1985321 required deep across-the-board budget cuts in most government
programs in the event that Congress failed to achieve specified deficit
reduction targets. These reductions likely would have the effect of destroying either a functional entitlement or a responsive entitlement in a
program that had both. The legislation, however, exempted many important low-income responsive entitlements from these sequestrations. 32 2 In
practice, Congress allowed only one fairly small sequestration ever to occur under the Act. Subsequent "pay-as-you-go" requirements 323 did not
similarly exempt many low-income programs, making them vulnerable to
predation by powerful interest groups seeking to finance tax cuts or increases in other mandatory programs and forcing advocates of program

317. See, e.g., Katz, Citizenship, supra note 1, at 70 ("The [Reagan Administration's]
1981 budget legislation began to transfer responsibility for child care to the states by
bundling funds, which had been cut by 20 percent, into block grants and eliminating
requirements for state matching funds."); see also supra note 306.
318. See Robin Toner & Robert Pear, Bush Proposes Major Changes in Health Plans:
Critics See Less Security and Fewer Benefits, N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 2003, at Al (discussing
Bush Administration proposals for transforming Medicare and Medicaid).
319. Barbara Sard & Will Fischer, Ctr. on Budget & Policy Priorities, Housing
Voucher Block Grant Bills WouldJeopardize an Effective Program and Likely Lead to Cuts
in Assistance for Low-Income Families 1, 17 (2003), available at http://www.cbpp.org/514-03hous.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (stating that block grant proposal
would terminate link between voucher funding and housing costs and withdraw
commitment to consistent federal support of existing vouchers).
320. H.R. 4, 108th Cong. § 602 (2003).
321. Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1037, 1038 (1985)
(codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 900-922 (2000)).
322. 2 U.S.C. § 905(h).
323. Id. § 902.
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expansions to challenge those same interest groups. 324 Democratic conservatives persuaded President Clinton to establish a system of entitlement spending goals in 1993 as the price of their votes for his budget
legislation. 3 25 More broadly, by cutting taxes and increasing spending on
the military, agricultural subsidies, and highways, the Bush Administration and Congress are creating such large deficits that tougher devices for
imposing across-the-board spending cuts are likely to become politically
acceptable. Although the specified savings could be achieved through
detailed modifications to programs' eligibility rules and benefit levels, the
fastest approach-and the one likely to provoke the least effective opposition-is to impose artificial caps that destroy responsive and functional

entitlements.
To be sure, conservatives have not always avoided direct cuts in programs that are still entitlements. PRWORA made many immigrants, substance abusers, and members of other unpopular groups ineligible for
several entitlement programs, judging that those groups were sufficiently
insular that the political risk of attacking them was slight. Apparently
because of some computational errors, House Republicans' proposal to
block grant the school meal programs in March 1995 also included substantial funding cuts.

326

This ignited a feeding frenzy and ultimately

forced them to abandon any significant cuts to these programs in the
welfare law. 327 The welfare bills proposed throughout 1995 and 1996 in-

cluded deep, specific cuts in food stamps. Republicans protected themselves against sharp criticism here, however, by holding the responsive
entitlement to food stamps hostage: They made it clear that, if criticism
of their cuts ever became too intense, they would simply convert the program to a block grant. Even at that, the House Republicans' 1995 welfare
bill sought to eliminate both the functional and responsive entitlements
to food stamps by freezing benefit levels and capping total program
spending. 328 The food stamp reductions ultimately enacted focused on
areas where the program's functional entitlement was weakest-and
hence the impact of the cuts was most difficult to describe except relative
to the baseline. 329 More commonly, however, contemporary conservative
324. See Elizabeth Garrett, Harnessing Politics: The Dynamics of Offset
Requirements in the Tax Legislative Process, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 501, 543 (1998) (stating
that "PAYGO" rules and other provisions intensified conflicts between interest groups in
federal budgeting).
325. Exec. Order No. 12,857, 58 Fed. Reg. 42,181 (Aug. 4, 1993). Under this
procedure, the Administration must consider cuts in programs whose spending exceeds
predictions for reasons that cannot be explained on one of a handful of accepted bases.
The impact of this procedure, too, remains to be tested.
326. See, e.g., 141 Cong. Rec. 8506 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Richardson) (arguing that "many of the increases [Republicans said their block grants
provided] were written on committee worksheets, not in the proposed legislation").
327. See supra note 275.
328. H.R. 4, 104th Cong. § 1062 (1995).
329. For example, PRWORA froze the food stamp standard deduction-a crude
estimate of certain average living costs set almost two decades earlier-at $134. Personal
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critics of low-income programs have preferred to apply downward pressure on those programs' spending in general, rather than face the political risks of proposing specific cuts that would preserve responsive and
33 0
functional entitlements, albeit on narrower terms.
This strategy makes sense only if one's sole interest is the dismantlement of a program.3 3 1 As demonstrated in Part II, it causes whatever
funds the program retains to be spent inefficiently and undercuts any
behavioral incentives the program's conditions seek to create.33 2 It also
forgoes the opportunity to try to persuade the public of the demerits of
these programs and possibly forge a new political consensus about them.
3. Liberals' Quixotic Approach to Entitlement. - In contrast to their conservative peers, liberals have shown much more diffidence toward entitlements. Sometimes they have defended and sought to expand existing
entitlements. On other occasions, they have abandoned or even attacked
existing programs' entitlement structures. 333 And they have routinely
sought to establish new programs with hazy functional entitlements and
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA), Pub. L. No.
104-193, § 809(a), 110 Stat. 2105, 2309-13 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2014(e)(1)
(2000)).
330. The case of the House budget resolution for fiscal year 1999 is instructive.
Republicans wanted deep spending cuts to pay for tax cuts. Initially, House Budget
Chairman Rep. John Kasich designed a plan that specified where the cuts would be made,
eliminating several programs and narrowing the functional entitlements in others. Kasich
Budget Proposal Hits Snag, Wash. Post, May 14, 1998, at A5. But "[w]ith moderate
Republicans and appropriators of both parties howling that the cuts go too far .... House
[Republican] leaders concluded that the less said about the details of Kasich's new plan,
the better." Eric Pianin, Kasich Backs off Demand for Further Budget Cuts, Closing of Two
Departments, Wash. Post, May 15, 1998, at A13. Rep. Kasich then proposed a budget
resolution requiring the same level of cuts but without any details, and the Republican
caucus closed ranks around him. Eric Pianin, Reluctant House Passes Tax-Cutting Budget,
Wash. Post, June 6, 1998, at A8.
331. Accordingly, since this approach seems to abandon many conservative principles,
one might speculate that some of its appeal is its potential to free up funds from meanstested programs over time for other uses, such as tax cuts. Alternatively, this strategy could
be a covert effort to act upon the extreme view that the very existence of means-tested
programs, more than any particular features of their design, is morally corrupting. See,
e.g., Charles Murray, Losing Ground 227-33 (1984) (advocating the abolition of most
major means-tested programs to increase low-income people's incentives to work).
332. This latter deficiency may explain the apparent diffidence toward entitlements
that social conservatives such as Robert Rector sometimes express. See Rector, supra note
5, at 7.
333. This retreat was not limited to PRWORA. Democrats also heartily embraced the
Workforce Investment Act of 1998 (WIA), which merged a number of job training
programs-some with standards providing meaningful functional entitlements-into a
single amorphous block grant whose few standards are readily evaded. Pub. L. No. 105220, 112 Stat. 935 (1998); 53 Cong. Q. Almanac 7-20 (1997) (describing overwhelming
Democratic support for WIA in House); Allan Freedman, Vocational Programs Will Be
Biggest Hurdle as Conferees Take Up Job Training Bill, 56 Cong. Q. Weekly 1233 (1998)
(same in Senate).
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no responsive entitlement. 334 The reasons for this confusion appear to
be several.
First, some felt it unduly dangerous politically to be seen as supporting entitlements. 3 35 Although they could have argued that properly
framed subjective entitlements provide security that is important to vulnerable families, they feared that security would be equated with a hammock and juxtaposed with work. Similarly, they could have argued that
the proper alternative to a (relatively) unconditional entitlement is a system of mutual obligations in the form of a social contract. Although this
form appealed to some-Iowa Democratic Senator Tom Harkin won inclusion of a cosmetic provision on "individual responsibility plans" in the
final TANF legislation 3 36-they made no serious effort to make these
plans enforceable against the state, as they were against claimants. 3 37 Instead, they largely acquiesced in a system that effectively resembled barter: Claimants had clear obligations but no clear rights. And with the
public debate conflating the various types of entitlements, most liberals
334. See, e.g., Lynn A. Curtis, Policy for the New Millennium, in Locked in the
Poorhouse 129, 134-40 (Fred R. Harris & Lynn A. Curtis eds., 1998) (proposing to make
Head Start a responsive entitlement but otherwise offering a menu of new and expanded
discretionary programs as a response to urban poverty); U.S. Conference of Mayors,
Domestic Priorities: Outline of Economic Security Proposal (Jan. 22, 2003), at http://
usmayors.org/71stWinterMeeting/stimulus2_012203.asp (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (recommending tax changes and a series of new and expanded discretionary
programs as high domestic priorities). The most striking example of this short-sighted
policy is presented by the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251.
Democrats had significant leverage over that legislation because Republicans needed
President Clinton's signature to enact their large package of tax cuts. They exercised that
leverage to win enactment of new social spending in several areas. The spending they
championed, however, was remarkably short-sighted. First, its aggregate amount was a tiny
fraction of the amount of tax cuts in the legislation: A single one of the tax cuts-the
reduction in the estate tax-cost more than all the spending initiatives combined. Second,
all of the Democratic initiatives either expired or were designed to shrink significantly over
time. Finally, and most importantly, only one of those initiatives-restoring some legal
immigrants' eligibility for SSI and Medicaid-provided a clear functional or responsive
entitlement. The others-an increase in the cap on spending for food stamp,
employment, and training programs, an arbitrary number of exemptions from the food
stamp three-month time limit for some childless adults, a capped (and expiring) fund for
local welfare-to-work projects, and the capped SCHIP block grant-all subsequently
experienced serious problems typical of capped programs, with substantial funds going
unspent due to administrative problems despite indisputable need. See Robert
Greenstein, Ctr. on Budget & Policy Priorities, Looking at the Details of the New Budget
Legislation: Social Program Initiatives Decline over Time While Upper-Income Tax Cuts
Grow 13-14 (1997), available at http://www.cbpp.org/812bud.htm (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (discussing preference for tax cuts over social spending initiatives in
the 1997 budget legislation).
335. See Edelman, supra note 11, at 139 (suggesting President Clinton signed a bill
replacing AFDC with the TANF block grant to minimize political risk).
336. 42 U.S.C. § 608(b) (2000).
337. The result was quite remarkable-a contract of adhesion that nonetheless did
not even purport to bind its drafter.
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feared their defense of responsive or positive entitlements could be misconstrued as championing subjective or unconditional entitlements.
Second, liberals' fractured political base has interfered with their development of a single, coherent approach to social welfare programs. In
addition to public benefits claimants and their allies, liberals also respond
to governors, state legislators, mayors, public employee unions, trade associations of service providers, academics, and others. Articulating a coherent vision broad enough to satisfy all of these groups would strike
moderate voters as too far to the left. Therefore, at a time when shrinking government is the consistent message of conservative factions dominating the Republican Party in most of the country and exercising substantial influence on Democrats in many places, liberals have lacked a
counter-message. Strengthening a responsive or functional entitlement
program may please one element of their constituency, but winning a
short-term infusion of cash into a block grant or vaguely defined discre338
tionary program may please others.
Third, the proliferation of new, mostly small, nonentitlement programs may be the result of a kind of political market failure. Creating a
new discretionary program-even if funding is dubious-is likely to be
the politically cheapest way to win favorable headlines. 3 39 Opponents of
domestic spending have little reason to block creation of the new program so long as total funding on domestic discretionary programs remains capped: 340 The new program either will not be funded or will have
to build its budget by cutting funds going to other programs. The media's general failure to differentiate between funded and unfunded programs3 4 1 and the tendency it and the public have to assume that pro338. It should be noted that this problem is not merely a function of "pay as you go"
rules making it difficult to increase spending on budgetary entitlements. Since the mid1990s, Democrats have expended enormous, and sometimes successful, efforts to increase
funding for the hopelessly amorphous Social Services Block Grant (SSBG), a budgetary
entitlement. No procedural or jurisdictional barriers would prevent any money made
available for SSBG from being applied instead to liberalizing responsive entitlements such
as SSI or EITC.
339. The mismatch between the nominal formation of substantive policy and the
actual policy that legislators are willing to fund-and public misconceptions about which
set of decisions is more important-is hardly limited to public benefits law. For example,
although public attention and scholarship treats the appellate courts' decisions as
controlling criminal defendants' rights, in fact, state legislators, who may be unsympathetic
to some of the appellate courts' decisions, can ration the extent to which defendants can
actually realize those rights by underfunding indigent criminal defense. Thus, the
legislature may covertly ensure that criminal defendants' positive entitlements do not
operate as the responsive entitlements the public widely assumes them to be. William J.
Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107
Yale L.J. 1, 7-12 (1997).
340. 2 U.S.C. §§ 633(a)(5), (c), (f), 900(c)(3)-(4), 901(a) (2000).
341. Indeed, if a discretionary program actually is funded, even partially, it is likely to
generate a second round of media coverage. This may lead many people to believe that
twice as many programs are being created and twice as much money is being spent than is
actually the case. See, e.g., Janet Cawley, Senate Passes $423 Million Homeless Bill, Chi.
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grams are designed as functional and responsive entitlements3 42 make
these efforts politically rewarding to liberals. Ironically, even if net spending on social programs is not being increased, these news accounts are
likely to give the public the sense that benefit programs are expanding
and lay the foundation for very real cuts in programs that are responsive
or functional entitlements.
Finally, some liberals' penchant for creating and supporting a plethora of relatively small programs, rather than focusing on a few major entitlements, seems to spring from an interest in pursuing a covert political
strategy that is the mirror image of the one some critics of social programs have pursued: They appear to believe that, by avoiding an explicit
public debate, they can manipulate funding decisions over time. Envisioning a far larger role for the state than this country currently accepts,
these liberals seem to see each program as a foot in the door that can be
exploited to open up a broad new area of public involvement. This strategy abandons the efficiency of entitlements as well as the legitimacy that
343
comes from making forthright moral arguments to expand programs.
It also reflects a remarkable degree of optimism. 3

44

Even in the heyday of

political support for anti-poverty programs, the efficacy-to say nothing
of the political legitimacy-of this model of change would have been dubious. As in the case of the covert conservative strategy to eliminate programs by dismantling their entitlement, this covert liberal strategy must
tolerate the inefficient use of whatever funds the program has while it is
operating without a responsive entitlement. And, as is true of those that
would convert entitlements to capped programs, the strategy of creating
new capped programs also risks creating confused and undesirable incen3 45
tives for prospective claimants.
Trib., Apr. 10, 1987, at 1 (treating authorization of appropriations as if it actually provided
funds); Dorothy Collin, Spending Bill Goes to Reagan, Chi. Trib., July 3, 1987, at 5
(describing appropriations bill containing funds for same legislation also as making that
money available). But see Robert Pear, President Signs $1 Billion Bill to Aid Homeless,
N.Y. Times, July 24, 1987, at Al (explaining meticulously the difference between
authorizations and appropriations).
342. See supra notes 98-99, 101-103 and accompanying text.
343. See supra note 299 and accompanying text.
344. See, e.g., Peter K. Eisinger, Toward an End to Hunger in America 86, 128-31
(1998) (belittling legislation spending several billion dollars to improve the food stamp
program's functional entitlement and to remove eligibility conditions poorly related to
need while recommending a range of local pilot projects involving food pantries,
community gardens, and investment incentives).
345. See supra Part II.C. To be sure, many liberals are skeptical of either the
desirability or the efficacy of manipulating low-income people's behavior through
conditions on benefit programs. See, e.g., Theodore R. Marmor et al., America's
Misunderstood Welfare State: Persistent Myths, Enduring Realities 219-22 (1990) (noting
that "incentives are not behaviors"). Nonetheless, many policymakers and voters will
assume that low-income people follow these incentives and thus lend receptive ears to
critics attacks on the programs couched in those terms.
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Today, this model seems wildly naive. To be sure, a few programssuch as WIC and Head Start-that started as pilots have blossomed into
widely accepted social policies. Many, many more, however, have been
defunded, merged, block granted, or simply condemned to an indefinite
half-death as isolated, obscure funding streams protected by the political
strength of their current beneficiaries but without any prospects for
expansion.
Liberals could not transform the United States into Sweden with a
little sleight of hand on the appropriations committees-even if they controlled the appropriations committees. Rather than dividing social
spending among tiny programs too numerous and complex to defend,
seeking to accomplish goals whose full achievement would require aggregate spending far exceeding anything any President or Congress might
plausibly support, liberals would be better advised to accept that social
initiatives in this country are, and for the foreseeable future will remain,
far more limited than they may prefer. The maintenance of a multiplicity
of nonentitlement programs does, however, exacerbate two important
factors limiting the public's receptiveness to more social initiatives: the
3 46
mistaken belief that we already are doing far more than in fact we are
and the sense that public programs work poorly since they have failed to
check the widespread social problems liberals cite as justification for
more social spending. Finally, the lack of transparency of this approach
undermines liberals' credibility in attacking the equally illegitimate conservative strategy of dismantling programs' entitlements while leaving
their shells in place.

34 7

A more practical approach would be to focus on strengthening the
few major programs that could plausibly attain both functional and responsive entitlements without adopting such restrictive eligibility conditions that they must ignore a large portion of those in need. If liberals
can show that government programs can effectively assure low-income
people access to minimally adequate health care-or nutrition, or housing, or child care-the public is more likely to entrust them with the
funds and responsibility to address another social problem. The present
system of half-efforts to address this problem and quarter-efforts to address that one is too confusing to inspire much public confidence and
too easy for skeptics to dismiss as a sweeping failure.
E. Transparency and Legitimacy in Public Benefit ProgramPolitics
Just as responsive and functional entitlements are essential to the efficient operation of public benefit programs, those same structures are
equally vital to an open and legitimate dialogue about the social role
those programs play. Programs governed by complex formulas and caps
are all but impossible for most policymakers and voters to understand. As
346. See supra Part III.B.4.
347. See supra Part III.D.2.

HeinOnline -- 104 Colum. L. Rev. 725 2004

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 104:633

a result, nonentitlement structures largely remove these programs from
the realm of informed public debate. This lack of transparency has prevented the public from making informed assessments of the extent of the
safety net it is supporting. The obscurity of these questions also has created opportunities for factions on both sides of the political spectrum to
pursue covert agendas to expand or dismantle means-tested programs.
Whatever the short-term tactical advantages of these strategies, they undermine the effectiveness and efficiency of means-tested programs as well
as the legitimacy of any outcome they yield.
CONCLUSION

Although much-debated, the economic and political implications of
entitlements remain remarkably poorly understood. Allowing the term
"entitlement" only symbolic meaning, whether as a harsh epithet or as a
proud banner, obscures some important concepts well worth examination. Understanding the behavior of society, which supplies public benefits, and potential claimants, who consume them, as forming a market
allows us to bring to bear familiar principles of economic analysis. These
techniques reveal that most programs are much more efficiently administered as responsive entitlements-programs that serve all claimants meeting specified eligibility criteria. This is true without regard to how generous a program may be. Manipulating a program's participation through
changes in eligibility rules rather than waiting lists or complex priority
schemes minimizes administrative costs, better targets available resources
on need, and clarifies the program's incentives for current and prospective claimants. It also allows the program to respond automatically to
changes in the aggregate amount or distribution of need. Defining benefits in terms of the functions we intend them to accomplish can reduce
disruption of private markets.
The clarity of entitlement structures also has important political implications. Defining who gets benefits in terms of relatively straightforward eligibility criteria, and what recipients get in terms of what practical
purpose the benefit is supposed to help them accomplish, allows a broad
range of policymakers and the public to debate the program's proper
role. Defining programs in terms of arbitrary participation caps and benefit amounts restricts meaningful participation in debates to an expert
few. The lack of transparency of arbitrarily capped programs offers opportunities for extreme groups to pursue covert agendas far out of step
with the wishes of most of the electorate. The ease with which nonentitlement programs' scope can be misrepresented for political gain has created perverse incentives to rely upon these economically inefficient program designs.
Broader disagreements about the proper scope of government in
our society have resulted in an antipathy for entitlement structures that is
neither rational nor wise. This emotional rejection of entitlement structures, rather than assessing each program on its merits, risks losing the
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economic efficiencies and political transparency of having programs controlled by general laws drawn in relatively clear, intelligible terms. In an
area of public policy that so clearly defines us as a nation, we can afford
neither the waste nor the alienation that this anti-entitlement frenzy has
brought.
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